Hubert v. Kaiser

• Decision Date: 21 June 1912
• Citation: 206 N.Y. 46,99 N.E. 195
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HUBERT v. KAISER, Warden.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

206 N.Y. 46

99 N.E. 195

PEOPLE ex rel. HUBERT

v.KAISER, Warden.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 21, 1912.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Habeas corpus by the People, on the relation of Martin F. Hubert, against Harry M. Kaiser, as warden and agent of Clinton Prison, to procure the discharge from such prison of Folke Engle Brandt. From a final order discharging the prisoner, the warden appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (135 N. Y. Supp. 274), and from an order therein dismissing the writ and remanding the prisoner, relator appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1142,135 N. Y. Supp. 694,99 N. E. 197.

Mirabeau L. Towns, of New York City, for appellant.

Thomas M. Carmody, Atty. Gen. (J. A. Kellogg, of Glens Falls, of counsel), for respondent.

GRAY, J.

[1] This is an appeal by the relator from an order of the Appellate Division, in the First Department, which reversed a final order of the Special Term, sustaining a writ of habeas corpus and discharging the prisoner, Brandt, from custody under a judgment of the Court of General Sessions of the city and county of New York. The order of the Appellate Division dismissed the writ and remanded the prisoner to the custody of the warden of Clinton Prison under the judgment. The justices of the Appellate Division were unanimous in their decision; and the opinion, which was delivered by that court, has most thoroughly covered the ground upon which the relator rests his contention that the prisoner, Brandt, is illegally detained in custody. The question was a very simple one. It was whether the court before which Brandt was arraigned had jurisdiction to try him and to pronounce judgment against him for the offense for which he was indicted. The statutory provisions regulating a proceeding under the writ of habeas corpus are, so far as material, that a person is not entitled to the writ ‘where he has been committed, or is detained, by virtue of the final judgment, or decree, of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.’ Code of Civ. Pro. § 2016. Section 2032 of the Code, provides that ‘the court or judge must forthwith make a final order to remand the prisoner, if it appears that he is detained in custody for either of the following causes, and that the time, for which he may legally be so detained, has not expired. * * * 2. By virtue of the final judgment or decree of a competent tribunal, of civil or criminal jurisdiction.’ Section 2034 provides that ‘a court or judge, upon the return of a writ issued as prescribed in this article, shall not inquire into the legality or justice of any mandate, judgment, decree, or final order, specified in the last section but one (i. e., section 2032), except as therein stated.’

The petition of the relator, as the ‘next friend’ of Brandt (made five years after the judgment), set forth the commitment upon an indictment charging the prisoner with the crime of burglary in the first degree and his plea of guilty; that the record disclosed that the crime was never committed, as charged; and that the prisoner did not plead guilty, but did state, in answer to the judge of the court, facts showing that he had not committed the crime. The return of the warden of the prison where the prisoner was detained showed that the prisoner was committed to one of the state prisons for a term of 30 years, pursuant to a judgment of conviction of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace of the city and county of New York, annexing a copy of the commitment. A traverse was made to the return by the relator and not by the prisoner, as the statute requires (Code Civ. Pro. § 2039), which, by various allegations, denied the validity of the commitment and the jurisdiction of the judge to sign the commitment, or to pronounce the judgment. Upon the matter coming on to be heard, the indictment, an extract from the clerk's minutes of the proceedings had in court thereon, and a copy of the stenographer's minutes of the proceedings were read in evidence. The indictment charged Brandt, in three counts, with the crimes of burglary in the first degree, of grand larceny in the first degree, and of criminally receiving stolen property. He appeared in court on March 25, 1907, to plead to the indictment and entered a plea of not guilty. On March 28, 1907, he was arraigned in court and, by leave, withdrew his plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty of burglary in the first degree . He was then examined by the court, at some length, as to his nationality his age, and his acts in Mr. Schiff's house, where the crime was committed. An adjournment being had to April 4, 1907, the prisoner was arraigned for sentence, and judgment was entered, committing him to the state prison, at hard labor, for the term of 30 years. There was no motion in arrest of judgment; nor was there an appeal. Upon the indictment was indorsed the appearance of C. A. Bayles, as counsel appearing for the prisoner. Carl Fisher Hansen, an attorney, appeared for him on April 4th, when arraigned in court for sentence, and argued for clemency. From an affidavit made by Hansen, it appears that he had been requested by the trial judge to ask Brandt if he understood the nature of the proceeding, and that he (Brandt) said he did. It was not alleged by the relator that the court had not jurisdiction to try Brandt for the crime with which he was charged, and to impose sentence upon conviction, or upon a plea of guilty. It was therefor clearly the duty of the judge at Special Term, upon the record, to dismiss the writ upon which the prisoner was brought before him, when it was shown that he was held by virtue of the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.

[2] An argument is, curiously, sought to be made that, although the prisoner pleaded guilty, and although his plea was not withdrawn, the facts appearing upon his examination before sentence ‘indicated’ that he was not guilty of the crime. But the only fact with which the court below was concerned was that of the jurisdiction; that is to say, the power of the tribunal before which Brandt was arraigned to sentence him. It was not concerned with questions relating to the regularity of the proceedings, or to the sufficiency of the facts to establish his guilt, or to the severity of the sentence. The question was not about his guilt; it was about the authorityto pronounce...