Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1978
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 580 P.2d 665, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3102, 85 Lab.Cas. P 55,153 BELRIDGE FARMS, Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 30594.

Page 165

147 Cal.Rptr. 165

21 Cal.3d 551, 580 P.2d 665, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3102,

85 Lab.Cas. P 55,153

BELRIDGE FARMS, Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. 30594.

Supreme Court of California.

June 22, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1978.

Parker, Milliken, Kohlmeier, Clark & O'Hara, Everett F. Meiners and Kenneth J. Florence, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Dressler, Guttero & Stoll, Donald G. Dressler, Jeffrey L. Guttero, Newport Beach, and Charley M. Stoll, Newport Beach, as Amici Curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Walter L. Kintz, Jerrold C. Schaefer and Robert Le Prohn, San Francisco, for respondents.

Jerome Cohen, Sanford N. Nathan and Barry Winograd, Salinas, for real party in interest.

BY THE COURT ^*

Petitioner seeks review of a decision by the general counsel of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (board) not to issue unfair labor practice complaints against United Farm Workers of America (UFW), real party in interest.

Petitioner filed four unfair labor practice charges against UFW with the board's regional director. Petitioner alleged that after entering its property, UFW organizers violated the board's access regulation by refusing to identify themselves, engaging in conduct coercive of petitioner's employees, and interfering with work performance. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, pt. II, ch. 9, §§ 20900-20901.) The charges further alleged these violations constitute unfair labor practices under Labor Code section 1154, subdivision (a)(1).

Petitioner sought review by the general counsel after the regional director refused to issue complaints. The general counsel refused to issue complaints on the ground Labor Code section 1154, subdivision (a)(1), requires showing the union conduct restrained or coerced employees as a condition precedent to issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint. The general counsel held that violation of the access regulation, while unlawful, does not per se rise to the level of an unfair labor practice. ¹

A. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GENERAL COUNSEL DECISIONS

Petitioner contends the general counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is judicially reviewable under Labor Code section 1160.8. We conclude that, in the absence of circumstances justifying extraordinary writ, negative decisions by the general counsel are not subject to judicial review.

The powers and duties of the general counsel are specified in Labor Code section 1149: "There shall be a general counsel of the board who shall be appointed by the Governor . . . . He shall have final authority, on behalf of the board, with respect to the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under Chapter 6 (commencing with section 1160) of this part, and with respect to the prosecution of such complaints before the board." (Emphasis added.)

Labor Code section 1160.8 enumerates the circumstances under which courts have jurisdiction to review decisions of the board. That section states in pertinent part, "Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeal having jurisdiction over the county wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in . . . by filing in such court a written petition requesting that the order of the board be modified or set aside."

Labor Code section 1160.9 provides, "The procedures set forth in this chapter shall be the exclusive method of redressing unfair labor practices."

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) (Lab.Code, § 1140 et seq.) is derived from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). (See generally, Levy, The Agricultural Relations Act of 1975 La Esperanza de California Para El Futuro (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law. 783.) Labor Code section 1149 is substantively identical to NLRA section 3(d). (29 U.S.C. § 153(d).) With one exception, Labor Code section 1160.8 is identical to NLRA section 10(f). (29 U.S.C. § 160(f).) Section 1160.8 differs from section 10(f) only in that the former contains an additional requirement that a petition for review of a board order must be filed with the court within 30 days following the order.

The federal courts have interpreted the words "final orders of the board" in section 10(f) as referring to a decision of the board either dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint or directing a remedy for an unfair labor practice as a result of the culmination of procedures instituted under NLRA section 10(b) and (c) (29 U.S.C. § 160(b), (c)). ² (Lincourt v. National Labor Relations Board (1st Cir. 1948) 170 F.2d 306, 307; see American Federation of Labor v. National L. R. Board (1940), 308 U.S. 401, 406-408, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347.)

The general counsel's refusal to issue an unfair labor practice complaint does not constitute a final order of the board under section 10(f). (E. g., Shell Chemical Company v. National Labor Relations Board (5th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 1116, 1120-1121; Laundry Wkrs. Internat'l U. v. National Labor Rel. Bd. (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F.2d 701, 703-704; Lincourt v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 170 F.2d 306, 306-307.)

Although recognizing a general immunity from judicial review of determinations other than final orders of the board, federal courts have exercised their equitable powers to review such determinations when the complaining party raises a colorable claim that the decision violates constitutional right (Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis (5th Cir. 1969) 406 F.2d 1158, 1164; Fay v. Douds (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F.2d 720, 723) or exceeds a specific grant of authority (Leedom v. Kyne (1958) 358 U.S. 184, 188-189, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210; United Federation of College Tach., Loc. 1460 v. Miller (2d Cir. 1973) 479 F.2d 1074, 1075; Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien (8th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 699, 703). Refusal to issue a complaint based on an erroneous construction of an applicable statute also has been held reviewable under the court's general equitable power. (Southern California Dist. Coun. of Lab., Loc. 1184 v. Ordman (D.C.1970) 318 F.Supp. 633.)

This court has long recognized the principle of statutory construction that "(w)hen legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in the identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended that the language as used in the later enactment would be given a like interpretation. This rule is applicable to state statutes which are patterned after (the) federal statutes. (Citations.)" (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 688-689, 8 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3, 355 P.2d 905, 907; Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 2 Cal.2d 727, 734-735, 43 P.2d 291; see Englund v. Chavez (1972) 8 Cal.3d 572, 589-590, 105 Cal.Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457; Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 852-853, 94 Cal.Rptr. 785, 484 P.2d 953.)

We are satisfied the Legislature intended to adopt the federal rule limiting review not only by its use of language identical to section 10(f) but also by other provisions of the ALRA. The general counsel's decision not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is not a decision or order of the board. Labor Code section 1149 confers upon the general counsel final authority over the issuing of complaints, establishing that in these matters he acts independently of the board. This autonomy is further demonstrated by the fact that the board neither appoints nor directs the general counsel. Labor Code section 1149 specifically provides for appointment of the general counsel by the Governor, subject to Senate confirmation, for a term of four years.

The language in section 1149 stating that the general counsel acts "on behalf of the board" does not negate this conclusion. Petitioner's proposed construction of this language, suggesting the general counsel is an agent of the board and his decisions are therefore imputable to the board, cannot be accepted. It is apparent, when this language is viewed in context as following the words "he shall have final authority," that the phrase "on behalf of the board" was intended to make it clear that any implied power the board might otherwise have to issue complaints was vested in the general counsel, not the board. Only the general counsel has authority to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. (Lab.Code, § 1149.) Charges of unfair labor practices must be filed with the general counsel or his agents. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, pt. II, ch. 2, former § 20205.2, see present § 20208.) A complaint based upon such charges may be issued only by the general counsel (id. former § 20210.1, see present § 20220), not by the board. (See Lincourt v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 170 F.2d at p. 307.) ³

Petitioner contends we should not adhere to the federal limitation on review because the 30-day statute of limitations addition in section 1160.8 is not found in federal law and because the NLRA does not contain an exclusivity provision comparable to section 1160.9.

The 30-day statute of limitations does not sufficiently alter the identity between the state and federal provisions so as to negate the legislative intent to adopt the federal rule limiting review. The purpose of the 30-day period is to avoid backlogging cases with the resulting delay experienced under the NLRA. (Levy, The Agricultural Relations Act of 1975 La Esperanza de California Para El Futuro, supra, 15 Santa Clara Law. 783, 803-804.) Obviously, the 30-day provision is irrelevant to the issue of review of the general counsel's decision.

NLRA's lack of statutory provision similar to section 1160.9 also does not render the rule of construction inapplicable. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the NLRA as providing the...