Bar Ass'n of City of Boston v. Casey

Citation211 Mass. 187,97 N.E. 751
PartiesBAR ASSOCIATION OF CITY OF BOSTON v. CASEY.
Decision Date29 February 1912
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
COUNSEL

A. D. Hill and A. G. Grant, for petitioner.

Peter J. Casey, pro se.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

This was a petition filed in the superior court by the Bar Association of the City of Boston for the disbarment of the respondent for alleged misconduct therein set forth. In response to an order of notice the respondent appeared and filed an answer. There was a hearing on the merits, and on April 9, 1906, an order of disbarment was entered. The respondent appealed, and at his request the case was reported to this court for the determination of the question whether under the findings of fact made by the justice 'the order of disbarment was justified by law.' After full argument in this court the order of disbarment was affirmed. 196 Mass 100, 81 N.E. 892. Thereupon the respondent filed in the superior court a motion to vacate the order of disbarment and in arrest of judgment, and afterwards a motion for a new trial and several other motions which were heard and determined adversely to the respondent; and upon appeals seven in number, the respondent again brought the case to this court, where, after due hearing, the orders appealed from were all affirmed and it was ordered that judgment be entered in the superior court in accordance with the order of disbarment of April 9, 1906. 204 Mass. 331, 90 N.E. 584. After the issue of the rescript and before final judgment in the superior court, the respondent filed there a motion to set aside all orders, decisions and findings theretofore made in that court, and also a motion in arrest of judgment.

At the hearing on these motions it appeared that Mr. Justice Fessenden, who issued the original order to show cause, Mr. Justice Fox, who heard the cause on the merits, and made the finding thereon and the order of disbarment of April 9, 1906, and Mr. Justice Pierce, who made a certain order as to the disbarment, were respectively, at the times in which they thus acted, honorary members of the Bar Association of the City of Boston, in whose name the petition was filed. The respondent in substance asked the court to rule that these several judges being such members were thereby disqualified to sit in the cause. The court refused so to rule and ruled that upon all the evidence neither of these judges 'was disqualified to act and find as [he] did find, by reason of interest or otherwise.' The respondent also asked for a ruling 'that all the orders and findings in the proceedings in the said petition are null and void.' This also the court refused to give, and denied the motion. To these refusals to rule and to the ruling actually made the respondent excepted. It is doubtful whether this last request, fairly construed, is intended to cover any other ground for the nullity of the acts of the court except that arising from the alleged disqualification of the judges. The respondent's brief, however, touches upon some other reasons why the acts are null and void; but even if he relies upon any such other reasons they raise only such questions as have been heretofore determined in this case, or such as are no longer open to him at this stage. The only question open to him now is whether the judges being honorary members of the incorporated bar association were thereby disqualified to act.

It is urged by the prosecution that even this is not now open to him; that, notwithstanding his affidavit that he was ignorant of the relation until after the last rescript from this court, he has not shown due diligence in ascertaining the facts about the association and the relation of the justices to it. But we are not inclined to decide the case upon so narrow a ground, even if it were possible to do so. The question is likely to arise in the future, and for the information and guidance of the members of the courts who may be called to act in similar cases it is better that it should be squarely met, duly considered and finally settled.

There is substantially no dispute about the material facts. The Association was incorporated under the laws of this commonwealth. St. 1886, c. 22. This statute (section 1) provides that the members of the Bar Association of the City of Boston heretofore an unincorporated association, and all persons who shall hereafter be associated with them, shall be a body corporate under the same name, 'for the purpose of promoting social intercourse among the members of the bar, of insuring conformity to a high standard of professional duty, and of making the practice of the law efficient in the administration of justice'; that (section 2) for attaining the objects and carrying into effect the purposes of the corporation it may acquire, receive and hold real and personal estate, including a suitable building, library and furniture, not exceeding $500,000 in value; that (section 3) it may adopt a constitution, by-laws and rules for the admission, government, suspension and expulsion of its members, the collection of fees, the election of officers and defining their duties, and for the management of the affairs of the corporation; and that (section 4) all interest of any member shall terminate and vest in the corporation upon his ceasing to be a member 'by death, resignation, expulsion or otherwise.'

By the constitution it appears (article 3) that every member must be an attorney. The constitution further provides (article 4) for the appointment of various officers and committees, among which is a committee on grievances, and defines their respective duties; also that (article 6) there shall be an admission fee and an annual fee. The method of dealing with a person accused of professional misconduct, whether or not he be a member of the Association, is set out partly in the constitution and partly in the by-laws. So far as material to this case it is substantially as follows: The complaint is not laid before the Association, but is referred to the committee on grievances consisting of 7 members, who after such hearing as they deem expedient shall report the facts and their recommendations to the council, a larger committee consisting of at least 21 regular members including the president, vice president, treasurer and secretary, and shall thereupon institute such proceedings against offenders as the council may order. The committee on grievances shall keep a record of their proceedings, which shall not be shown to any person not a member of the Association, 'except that any member of the bar not a member of the Association shall be entitled to an examination of any proceedings of the committee affecting him.' All meetings of the committee on grievances and of the Association shall be private, and the cost of all proceedings before this committee shall be paid by the treasurer of the corporation on the order of the chairman of the committee. By-law No. 3. The committee shall institute and carry on such proceedings against offenders, whether or not members of the Association, and to such extent as the council or the Association may order, and shall employ suitable counsel or agents for that purpose, the cost of such proceedings to be paid as in the case of the cost of hearings before the committee on grievances. Const. art. 4, § 7, pt. 3.

One of the purposes of the incorporation is 'to insure conformity to a high standard of professional duty,' and one of the methods adopted to this end is a systematic course of procedure for the detection and disbarment of unworthy attorneys, whether members of the Association or not. Without stopping to dwell upon the features of this system, it is sufficient to say that in devising and pursuing it the Association is engaged in a praiseworthy work, and that the system seems well calculated as well to protect the reputation of the person against whom an unjust complaint is made as to detect and expose the person justly accused.

The Association has a large library and commodious rooms. Among its active members are many of the prominent members of the bar in this vicinity. There are no shares of stock and no pecuniary profits. The relation of honorary members is thus set forth...

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5 cases
  • In re Steen
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
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  • Matter of Doe
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
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    ...(per curiam); Anne Arundel County Bar Ass'n v. Collins, 272 Md. 578, 582-83, 325 A.2d 724, 727 (1974); Bar Ass'n of Boston v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 191-93, 97 N.E. 751, 753-54 (1912); In re Rerat, 232 Minn. 1, 4-5, 44 N.W.2d 273, 274-75 (1950); In re Mills, 539 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Mo.1976) (en......
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    ...in its name, was not thereby disqualified from sitting in such proceeding. [Also see Ex parte Lewis, 288 P. 354, and Boston Bar Assn. v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 191-3.] Certainly the commissioner in this proceeding, authority did not extend beyond the taking and returning of testimony therein......
  • Collins v. Godfrey
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    ... ... Matter of Association of the ... Bar of City of New York, 222 App. Div. (N. Y.) 580 ... ("ambulance chasing" and ... proceeding is in the nature of an inquest. Boston Bar ... Association v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187 , 191. Matter of ... Keenan, ... ...
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