Van v. Portneuf Medical Center

• Decision Date: 07 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 34888.,34888.
• Citation: 147 Idaho 552,212 P.3d 982
• Parties: Mark VAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, Pat Hermanson, Hospital Administrator, Pam Humphrey, EMS Program Director, Gary Alzola, Director of Operations, Ron Fergie, Chief Pilot/Safety Officer, Barry Nielson, Pilot, and Does I-X, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

212 P.3d 982

147 Idaho 552

Mark VAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, Pat Hermanson, Hospital Administrator, Pam Humphrey, EMS Program Director, Gary Alzola, Director of Operations, Ron Fergie, Chief Pilot/Safety Officer, Barry Nielson, Pilot, and Does I-X, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 34888.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, June 2009 Term.

July 7, 2009.

Nick L. Nielson, Pocatello, for appellant.

Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, Boise, for respondents. Paul D. McFarlane argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

Mark Van appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claims for wrongful termination. We affirm the district court's decision with respect to Van's contract claims, vacate with regard to the Whistleblower Act claim, and remand for further proceedings on the latter claim.

I.

Portneuf Medical Center (PMC) hired Mark Van in 1986 as a mechanic for its Life Flight Program. In 1997 he became the director of maintenance for Life Flight and was responsible for the maintenance of PMC's Life Flight helicopter. In 2001, the Life Flight helicopter crashed while attempting a rescue mission. Van witnessed the crash and rushed to the scene to rescue the pilot. The National Transportation Safety Board ultimately determined that the crash was caused by pilot error and not maintenance issues. Nevertheless, Van felt that the media and the public blamed the crash on the maintenance department and he became protective of its reputation.

After the helicopter crash, Van began reporting numerous perceived violations of state and federal law in what he felt was a defense of the maintenance department's image. Among other things, Van reported his beliefs that pilots had: accumulated too much time on duty; flown the helicopter too low; taken off with ice on the helicopter's rotor blades; and overflown the helicopter by exceeding inspection time intervals. Additionally, while PMC was negotiating the purchase of a new helicopter, Van was asked to review the proposed maintenance contract (the COMP contract) with the vendor, Agusta Helicopter, and recommend what aircraft would be best suited for Life Flight. After reviewing the COMP contract, Van notified PMC he thought there were several loopholes by which Agusta could escape its maintenance responsibilities and he therefore asserted that entering into the COMP contract amounted to a waste of public funds.

Several meetings were scheduled to address the mounting concerns expressed by Van. Shortly after a meeting in April 2005, Van was terminated. PMC asserts that its decision to terminate Van was due to his inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his colleagues and to foster a positive team environment. In response, Van filed this lawsuit and alleged in count one that he had been wrongfully terminated in violation of Idaho's Whistleblower Act. I.C. §§ 6-2101 to 2109. In count two Van alleged breach of his employment contract and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

During the discovery process Van requested, and PMC refused to provide, a copy of the COMP contract between PMC and Agusta. PMC moved for a protective order and, after Van failed to object, the district court granted PMC's motion. Six months later Van moved for reconsideration, arguing that the COMP contract was relevant, but the district court denied that motion. Van appeals that determination to this Court.

PMC moved for summary judgment against Van arguing that Van (1) did not comply with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), (2) failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination under Idaho's Whistleblower Act, and (3) failed to establish a prima facie case of breach of employment contract. The district court granted PMC's motion and Van appeals that decision to this Court.

II.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review used by this Court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 (2007).

This Court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However, the nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. Id. at 896-97, 155 P.3d at 697-98. A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. Id. at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. Instead, the nonmoving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).

B. The District Court Erred in Holding that Van's Whistleblower Act Claim was Subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act

In its memorandum decision and order, the district court, noting that PMC "is a governmental entity or political subdivision covered under the ITCA," found that Van's "wrongful termination claims, including his whistleblower claims, were covered under the [ITCA] since the Whistleblower Act created an action separate from the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and is not exempt from the notice requirements of the ITCA." The district court emphasized that it deemed liability under the Whistleblower Act to be a separate cause of action from the wrongful termination cause of action predicated on the alleged breach of Van's at-will employment contract. It did not, however, explain why it deemed Van's Whistleblower Act claim to be an action covered by the ITCA.

Van argues the district court erred by dismissing his whistleblower claim on the basis that he had not complied with the notice requirements of the ITCA. Van insists that his whistleblower claim is a contract claim and not a tort claim, and therefore is not subject to the ITCA. PMC asserts the district court correctly recognized that Van's whistleblower claim is governed by the ITCA and, therefore, Van's undisputed failure to comply with the notice provisions of the ITCA defeats his claim.¹

The ITCA, found at Idaho Code sections 6-901 through -929, was enacted in 1971. The Act abrogates sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions. Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). Generally, the ITCA makes governmental entities subject to liability for money damages under specified circumstances.² Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419, 196 P.3d 325, 337 (2008). In order to bring a lawsuit against a governmental entity under the ITCA, a plaintiff must comply with the ITCA's notice requirements.³ Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 620, 586 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1978). Pursuant to the ITCA:

All claims against a political subdivision [subdivision] arising under the provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.

I.C. § 6-906. Not all actions are covered by the ITCA. Instead, the ITCA covers any "claim," which it defines as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or its employee when acting within the course or scope of his employment." I.C. § 6-902(7).

It is undisputed that Van did not give adequate notice of his claims under the ITCA. However, such notice is only required if the claims he asserts are covered by the ITCA. Van's complaint alleged two causes of action: wrongful termination of employment in violation of the Whistleblower Act and breach of an at-will employment contract, including breach of the "implied contract of good faith and fair dealing." Clearly, the second claim — involving contract claims — is not subject to the notice requirements of the ITCA. See Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (1996); City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 203, 899 P.2d 411, 416 (1995) ("Because Chubbuck's claim is based on Pocatello's breach of a contractual obligation, rather than negligent or wrongful conduct, the Idaho Tort Claims Act is inapplicable"); County of Kootenai v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 916, 750 P.2d 87, 95 (1988) ("Since this action is based upon rights held and responsibilities due under an insurance contract, it is unnecessary to pursue the issue of the applicability of the Idaho Tort Claims Act."). Therefore, our decision on this question will not affect count two. The remaining question is whether count one, a claim for wrongful termination under the Whistleblower Act is covered by the ITCA.

Idaho's Whistleblower Act was enacted in 1994 and "seeks to `protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of...