Lawton v. City of Pocatello

• Decision Date: 02 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 20830,20830
• Citation: 126 Idaho 454,886 P.2d 330
• Parties: George Riley LAWTON and Kimberly Lawton, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The CITY OF POCATELLO, Defendant-Appellant, and Antonio Baca Garcia and John and Jane Does 1-3, Defendants. Pocatello, September 1994 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 330

886 P.2d 330

126 Idaho 454

George Riley LAWTON and Kimberly Lawton, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The CITY OF POCATELLO, Defendant-Appellant and Antonio Baca Garcia and John and Jane Does 1-3, Defendants.

No. 20830.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Pocatello, September 1994 Term.

Dec. 2, 1994.

[126 Idaho 457] Jones, Chartered, Pocatello, for appellant. Jesse C. Robison argued.

Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, for respondents. Gary L. Cooper argued.

TROUT, Justice.

This is a personal injury action which arose from a motorcycle accident that occurred in Pocatello, Idaho. The Respondents, George and Kimberly Lawton, recovered from the City of Pocatello (the City) on the theory that it was negligent in the design of the intersection where the accident occurred and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. The City has appealed.

I. BACKGROUND

The accident giving rise to this appeal took place on Oak Street in Pocatello, Idaho. Because the layout of the streets in the area surrounding the accident site is somewhat confusing, a brief description may be helpful together with reference to a drawing of the site which is appended to this opinion. The accident occurred a short distance east of the point where Jefferson Avenue intersects Oak Street from the north at a right angle. Movement of traffic through this intersection is controlled by a traffic light. Less than 100 feet east of the light, 13th Avenue intersects Oak from the south at a 45 degree angle. A stop sign controls traffic entering Oak Street from 13th Avenue.

On July 30, 1990, George Lawton (Lawton) was driving a motorcycle eastbound on Oak Street. Shortly after he passed through the light at the Oak-Jefferson intersection, he collided with a van driven by Antonio Baca Garcia (Garcia). Garcia, whose view of oncoming traffic was obstructed by vehicles stopped at the Oak-Jefferson intersection, was attempting to cross Oak from a private driveway on its north side to reach 13th Avenue. The collision occurred when Garcia's van crossed the eastbound lane of Oak. Lawton and his wife sued both Garcia and the City. They claimed that Garcia was negligent in failing to yield to the oncoming motorcycle. Garcia admitted his negligence. The Lawtons also sought to hold the City liable for the negligent design of the intersection.

The Lawtons' claim against the City was based on its failure to implement certain safety measures as outlined in the 1972 Traffic Operations Program to Increase Capacity and Safety (TOPICS) report. This report, adopted by the City in an attempt to secure federal highway funds, included a proposal for installing a raised median down the center of Oak Street on the east side of the Oak-Jefferson intersection. The purpose of the median was to prevent left turns onto Oak from 13th Avenue by requiring all traffic exiting 13th Avenue to turn right. However, it would also have prevented the maneuver attempted by Garcia. When federal funds were unavailable, the City directed its city engineer to implement design improvements, including improvements to the Oak-Jefferson area, as available funds allowed. The city engineer ultimately decided not to install a raised median on Oak Street.

Cross-motions for summary judgment by the Lawtons and the City were denied by the district court and the case was tried to a jury. At the close of evidence, the City moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that it was immune from liability and that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a negligence cause of action. The Lawtons moved for a directed verdict on the issue of the City's immunity from liability. The trial court denied the City's motion, but granted the Lawtons', preventing the immunity defense from going to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the Lawtons allocating fault at seventy percent to Garcia and thirty percent to the City. Damages were assessed at $537,000. The City then made a motion for JNOV and a motion for new trial, both of which were denied. After costs were awarded and the verdict was reduced by the percentage attributable to Garcia's negligence, the total judgment entered against the City was $174,987.59. The City appealed.

II.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY UNDER IDAHO CODE § 6-904(7)

In granting the Lawtons' motion for directed verdict, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that the City was not entitled to governmental immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The City challenges this ruling.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act, I.C. §§ 6-901--929, abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions. However, it preserves the traditional rule of immunity in certain specific situations. See Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 214-15, 723 P.2d 755, 758-59 (1986). At trial, the City claimed immunity pursuant to both I.C. §§ 6-904(1), (7). Although it is not clear whether it relied on one provision or both, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict on the issue of immunity. On appeal, the City contends that this issue should have at least gone to the jury.

A directed verdict is proper only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion: that the moving party should prevail. Accordingly, where a non-moving party produces sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could find in its favor, a motion for directed verdict should be denied. See, e.g., Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc., 112 Idaho 76, 78, 730 P.2d 996, 998 (1986). On appeal, our standard of review is the same. Id. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether, in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the City, reasonable minds could find in its favor on the issue of governmental immunity.

In examining the propriety of the district court's ruling, we must first ascertain what the City was required to establish to be accorded immunity under § 6-904(7). ¹ Prior to its amendment in 1988, subsection (7) then numbered subsection (8), provided immunity for claims:

Aris[ing] out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design, approved in advance of the construction ... by the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such approval.

In Bingham v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 117 Idaho 147, 786 P.2d 538 (1989), we interpreted this language to require a plan or design that conformed with existing design standards and that was approved in advance of construction. Thus, to gain immunity under former subsection (8), three elements must have been met: the claim must have arisen from (1) a plan or design for construction or improvement; (2) prepared in substantial conformance with existing engineering or design standards; and (3) approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body exercising discretion to give authority for such approval. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 307, 805 P.2d 1223, 1231 (1991) (citing Bingham ).

In its current form, I.C. § 6-904(7) provides immunity to a governmental entity for any claim which:

Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such approval. (emphasis added).

The addition by the legislature of the word "or" to I.C. § 6-904(7) clearly indicates that immunity is available under the provision if the governmental entity shows substantial conformance or advance approval. Therefore, under I.C. § 6-904(7) as amended, the City was required to establish (1) the existence of a plan or design that was (2) either prepared in substantial conformance with existing engineering or design standards or approved in advance of construction by the legislative or administrative authority. This interpretation is consistent with common usage of the word "or" and with our prior decisions. ² See, e.g., Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 227, 723 P.2d 755, 771 (1986) (use of the disjunctive "or" demonstrates that the two clauses contained in I.C. § 6-904(1) describe mutually exclusive conduct).

In applying this test, it is clear that there was sufficient evidence to raise factual questions regarding subsection (7) immunity and preclude a directed verdict. First, the Lawtons argue that no plan existed because the written TOPICS report was approved for the purpose of gaining federal funding. After it became clear that federal funding was unavailable, the changes actually made to the Oak-Jefferson area were not incorporated into a written plan formulated specifically for that purpose. However, I.C. § 6-904(7) does not require a written plan. The City produced evidence that after it was aware there would be no federal funding, its city engineer was directed to proceed with cost-effective improvements to the area in question. This could plausibly constitute a "plan or design for ... improvement to the ... streets" and we find that a reasonable juror could so conclude.

Second, although the Lawtons produced expert testimony that the modifications made to the area surrounding the accident site did not meet then existing engineering standards the City's experts testified that the decision not to use a raised median was in compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). ³...