Barlow v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1915
• Citation: 214 N.Y. 116,107 N.E. 814
• Parties: BARLOW v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

214 N.Y. 116

107 N.E. 814

BARLOW

v.LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 5, 1915.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by James H. Barlow against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (158 App.Div. 768,143 N.Y.Supp. 1053), affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 161 App.Div. 903,145 N.Y.Supp. 1112.

Peter F. McAllister of Ithaca, for appellant. Clayton R. Lusk, of Cortland, for respondent.

MILLER, J.

The only question which survives the unanimous affirmance by the Appellate Division is that presented by the exception to the submission of the case to the jury under federal Employers' Liability Act April 22, 1908, c. 149 (35 Stat. 65, as amended by Act April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291 [U.S.Comp.St.1913, §§ 8657-8665] ). The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, an interstate and intrastate carrier, as an engineer on a switch engine at its yards in Cortland, N.Y. At the time of, or just before, the accident his crew were, or had been, engaged in placing three cars of supply coal upon a trestle where the coal was to be dumped into pockets, from which it was to be taken indiscriminately to coal engines employed in interstate or intrastate commerce. The three cars of coal had been transported over the defendant's own road from Sayre, Pa., to Cortland, and had arrived at the Cortland yards and been placed on sidings at different times a few days before they were placed on the trestle. The plaintiff was reaching under the engine to examine a brake beam, which was down, when the fireman, who had taken his place in the cab, suddenly backed the engine and inflicted the injuries for which the plaintiff has recovered. That movement of the engine was either to uncouple it from the cars or to back it down the incline just after it had been uncoupled.

The plaintiff's right to recover under the federal act is maintained on two grounds: (1) that the transportation of the coal from Sayre, Pa., though for the defendant's own use, was interstate commerce, and was not completed until the cars were actually placed on the trestle to be unloaded; (2) that the act of placing the cars on the trestle, so that the coal could be dumped into pockets from which it could be transferred to the tenders of engines engaged in interstate commerce was so closely connected with and related to interstate commerce as to be a part of it. We think the action may be sustained upon both theories.

Transportation, if not strictly commerce, is at least the particular part of commerce in which the defendant is engaged and which said act was intended to regulate. It is not practical in determining the application of the federal or the state law to distinguish between the transportation of supplies from one state to another for the carriers' own use and the transportation of merchandise for sale or exchange. Enough difficulties from conflicting laws and authorities in the case of carriers engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce now exist without unnecessarily creating others. Congress has undertaken to regulate the liability of carriers to their employés while engaged in interstate commerce, and modern conditions require that all interstate transportation be regarded as commerce or an agency of commerce, subject to the federal statute and under the supervision of the federal authorities. See Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 24 L.Ed. 708. It has been held that the hauling of empty cars from one state to another is interstate commerce. See Nor. Car. R.R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248, 259, 34 Sup.Ct. 305, 58 L.Ed. 591, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 159. Certainly, then, the hauling of cars loaded with supplies for the carrier's own use is commerce within the meaning of the act and subject to the jurisdiction of Congress.

The transportation was not completed until the cars reached their destination, the trestle where they were to be unloaded. The interstate transportation was interrupted, but not terminated, when the cars were put on the siding in the Cortland yards. The case in that aspect is precisely the same as though that interruption had occurred at some other point in the route. Work in a yard such as switching interstate cars, taking their numbers or preparing an engine to move interstate freight, is a part of interstate commerce. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 21, 25 Sup.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363;McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 u.S. 543, 26 Sup.Ct. 722, 50 L.Ed. 1142;St.L., San Francisco & Texas Railway Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 33 Sup.Ct. 651, 57 L.Ed. 1129, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 156; Nor.Car. R.R. Co. v. Zachary, supra.

If the plaintiff had actually...