Wilson v. Kittoe
Decision Date | 07 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 5:01CV00032.,5:01CV00032. |
Citation | 229 F.Supp.2d 520 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Parties | Michael Thomas WILSON, Plaintiff, v. Barry A. KITTOE, and Anthony S. Tokach, Defendants. |
George Lynwood Freeman, Jr., Fairfax, VA, for Michael Thomas Wilson.
William Thomas Kennard, Rockville, MD, Alexander Francuzenko, O'Connell & O'Connell, Rockville, MD, for Barry A. Kittoe.
Alexander Francuzenko, O'Connell & O'Connell, Rockville, MD, for Anthony S. Tokach.
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he was arrested by the defendants without probable cause and imprisoned in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that no constitutional right held by the plaintiff has been violated and that both officers are protected from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Oral arguments were heard on October 28, 2002, and this Motion is ripe for resolution.
Around three o'clock in the morning of April 14, 1999, the plaintiff, Michael T. Wilson ("Wilson"), awoke to what sounded like a car backfiring. After hearing the noise for the third time, Wilson got out of bed to try and discover the source of the commotion. Wilson looked out his bedroom window and saw two cars pulling into his neighbor's driveway. The second car was idling in the driveway with its lights on. Wilson got dressed and went downstairs to see if there was a problem at his neighbor's house.
It was still dark outside, so Wilson flipped on his outside lights and walked out onto his driveway. The first thing Wilson saw was his neighbor's son, Seth Woolever ("Woolever"), in the custody of a police officer, Officer Barry A. Kittoe ("Kittoe"), in the Woolever's driveway.1 Wilson believed that Woolever had already been placed into handcuffs, as his arms were down by his side. Wilson could tell that the police officer was talking to Woolever. However, it was difficult to hear the conversation between the two men, as the engine of the cruiser was idling and the two were standing on the other side of the police cruiser away from where Wilson around thirty feet away from where Wilson was standing.
Wilson stood there for a minute or two before Officer Kittoe realized his presence. Officer Kittoe asked Wilson who he was, and Wilson told Officer Kittoe that he lived next door. Officer Kittoe then asked Wilson if he had called in a complaint. When Officer Kittoe heard that Wilson had not made any complaint, he told Wilson to "get out of here" as he was "interfering with [the] investigation."
Wilson did not respond to Officer Kittoe and instead asked Woolever if he was "okay." Woolever said he "wasn't sure." Wilson then asked Woolever if he wanted Wilson to represent him, as Wilson was an attorney, and he had performed legal services for the Woolever family on prior occasions. Woolever was a little more responsive to this question, answering "I'll be looking at needing the services of an attorney" and "I want you to represent me."
At this point, while Woolever was in custody, Wilson asked Officer Kittoe if, after the Officer was finished with what he was doing, he could have a moment to speak with his client and give him one of his business cards. Officer Kittoe responded by telling Wilson that he was interfering with his investigation. Wilson told Officer Kittoe that he would go back into his house and get some identification. Wilson walked into the house and left the door open.
What happened next is the subject of some dispute. Wilson states that when he returned to the scene a minute or two later holding his wallet and card case, he noticed that another officer, Officer Timothy Smedley, had arrived in a second cruiser which was parked in the street between Wilson's driveway and the Woolever driveway where Officer Kittoe and Woolever were standing. Wilson testifies that he proceeded down his driveway to the second cruiser without talking to Officer Kittoe because he knew that Officer Kittoe was busy. In any event, Wilson walked up to Officer Smedley, who was standing in the street next to the second police cruiser.
Wilson introduced himself to Officer Smedley as a lawyer, and he handed the Officer one of his cards. Wilson asked Officer Smedley if he could speak to his client when the officers were done with him. Officer Smedley told Wilson that he was just on the scene to assist; Officer Kittoe was in charge. After this conversation, Wilson and Officer Smedley simply stood there for a moment next to the second cruiser.
At this point, Officer Kittoe left Woolever in handcuffs and walked down to where Wilson and Officer Smedley were standing. Officer Kittoe approached Wilson and informed him again that he was interfering with his investigation. Officer Kittoe ordered Wilson to leave the area. Wilson told Officer Kittoe that he understood that Officer Kittoe "had a job to do," but that, as an attorney, "he had a job to do as well." Wilson explained to Officer Kittoe that he just wanted to speak with Woolever for a moment when Officer Kittoe was finished doing "whatever it was" that he was doing. Then Wilson informed Officer Kittoe that "any information" that he elicited from Woolever as a result of questioning "will be suppressed at trial under the Exclusionary Rule."2
After this exchange, Officer Kittoe stared at Wilson for a few seconds before telling him that he was under arrest. Wilson was handcuffed and put in Officer Smedley's police cruiser. Soon after the arrest, a third police vehicle, driven by Lieutenant Anthony S. Tokach, arrived on the scene. Wilson testifies that he saw Lieutenant Tokach get out of his vehicle and go over to Officer Kittoe. Lieutenant Tokach and Officer Kittoe allegedly spoke for a moment or two before the Lieutenant walked over to Officer Smedley. After speaking with the Lieutenant, Officer Smedley came over to the police cruiser and offered to remove the handcuffs from Wilson.
Wilson was eventually driven to the regional jail where he was again handcuffed before entering the jail. Once inside the jail, Wilson's shirt and shoes were removed, and he sat, handcuffed, until 6:30 in the morning, at which time he was issued a summons and released.3
The defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Upon motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 236-37 (4th Cir.1995). The party seeking summary judgment must come forward and demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The Fourth Circuit has identified the importance of resolving the question of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage rather than at trial. See Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir.1992) (). However, the importance of summary judgment in qualified immunity cases "does not mean ... that summary judgment doctrine is to be skewed from its ordinary operation to give special substantive favor to the defense, important as may be its early establishment." Id. at 313. The standard for summary judgment in qualified immunity cases remains whether (1) there is any genuine issue of material fact and (2) on the undisputed facts the defendant as movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court laid out the modern objective standard for evaluating qualified immunity claims. 457 U.S. 800, 813-14, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In so doing, the Court identified the pressures which prompted the use of a doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials acting in their official capacities: Id.
The need for a dispute mechanism to satisfy the legitimate claims of individuals who have had their constitutional rights violated by government officials while preventing illegitimate claims from overburdening the justice system is heightened in the context of police officials acting to protect the safety of the public. See Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir.1991) () . While cases like Torchinsky mainly focus on the impact of illegitimate claims on the justice system when examining suits against police officers, it is important to remember that the constitutional rights side of the qualified immunity balance is equally heightened when police officers are involved. Police officers, as the primary arbiters of constitutional justice imbued with a great degree of discretion, always carry with them the...
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