Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp.

• Citation: 229 N.Y. 313,128 N.E. 209
• Parties: LINCOLN TRUST CO. v. WILLIAMS BLDG. CORPORATION.
• Decision Date: 07 July 1920
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

229 N.Y. 313

128 N.E. 209

LINCOLN TRUST CO.

v.WILLIAMS BLDG. CORPORATION.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 7, 1920.

Action by the Lincoln Trust Company against the Williams Building Corporation. From judgment of Appellate Division (183 App. Div. 225,169 N. Y. Supp. 1045) reversing with two of justices dissenting, a judgment of Special Term, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment of Appellate Division reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

Joseph M. Proskauer, of New York City, for appellant.

Charles C. Peters, of New York City, for respondent.

McLAUGHLIN, J.

This action is brought by a vendor against a vendee to procure a judgment directing specific performance of a contract for the purchase and sale of real estate in the city of New York. The complaint contains the usual allegations pertaining to such an action and a copy of the contract is annexed to and made a part of it. The contract was dated August 21, 1916. The purchase price was $50,000, $2,000 of which was paid at the time of the execution of the contract, $3,000 agreed to be paid on delivery of the deed, and the balance to be secured by mortgages. The answer did not put in issue the material allegations of the complaint, but alleged that the contract provided the property was to be conveyed ‘free from all incumbrances' except certain ones specified, and that it was, in fact, subject to an incumbrance by virtue of a resolution of the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York, entitled, ‘A resolution regulating and limiting the height and bulk of buildings hereafter erected, and regulating and determining the area of yards, courts and other open spaces, and regulating and restricting the location of trades and industries, and the location of buildings designed for specified uses and establishing the boundaries of districts for the said purposes,’ which justified defendant in refusing to accept the title. The plaintiff asked that defendant be required to specifically perform and defendant asked that the complaint be dismissed and plaintiff be required to return the amount paid. The reply put in issue the validity of such resolution.

[1] The resolution referred to was passed July 25, 1916, pursuant to chapter 466 of the Laws of 1901, as amended by chapter 470 of the Laws of 1914, and as further amended by chapter 497 of the Laws of 1916. The restrictions imposed are due to the so-called Zoning Law. The defendant, according to the findings, did not, when it entered into the contract, have actual knowledge of the existence of the resolution, but, nevertheless, both parties were presumed to have such knowledge.

No evidence was offered tending to show that the resolution affected in any way the value of the property contracted to be conveyed, or that by reason thereof, if defendant took the title it would sustain any damage. Riggs v. Pursell, 66 N. Y. 193, 203. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's contention. The Appellate Division reversed and sustained the defendant's contention.

The resolution divided the real estate into three districts, ‘residence district,’ ‘business district,’ and ‘unrestricted district.’ The land which the defendant contracted to purchase was in the residence district. The question presented is whether the resolution constituted an incumbrance which would relieve the purchaser from its obligation to complete the purchase as provided in the contract.

[3][4] In a great metropolis like New York, in which the public health, welfare, convenience, and common good are to be considered, I am of the opinion that the resolution was not an incumbrance, since it was a proper exercise of the police power. The exercise of such power, within constitutional limitations, depends largely upon the discretion and good judgment of the municipal authorities, with which the courts are reluctant to interfere. The conduct of an individual and the use of his property may be regulated. Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. E. 480, 10 L. R. A. 178, 19 Am. St. Rep. 490; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343,4 Am. St. Rep. 465;Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636. In the exercise of the police power the uses in a municipality to which property may be put have been limited and also prohibited. Thus, the manufacture of bricks (Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed. 348, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 927); the maintenance of a livery stable (Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 35 Sup. Ct. 511, 59 L. Ed. 900); a dairy (Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361, 24 Sup. Ct. 673, 48 L. Ed. 1018); a public laundry (Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. 1145); regulating billboards (Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 190, 61 L. Ed. 472, L. R. A. 1918A, 136, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 594); a garage (Matter of McIntosh v. Johnson, 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E. 414, L. R. A. 1915D, 603); the installation of sinks and water closets in tenement houses (Tenement House Dept. of N. Y. City v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231,70 L. R. A. 704, 103 Am. St. Rep. 910,1 Ann. Cas. 439, affirmed 203 U. S. 538,27 Sup. Ct. 781, 51 L. Ed. 328); the exclusion of certain business (Grumbach v. Lelande, 154 Cal. 679, 98 Pac. 1059); a hay barn, wood yard, or laundry (Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714); a stone crusher, machine shop, or carpet beating establishment (Matter of Montgomery, 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pac. 1070, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 130); the slaughter of animals (Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318, 37 Am. Rep. 564); the disposition of garbage (City of Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N. Y. 309, 105 N. E. 548, L. R. A. 1915D, 209, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 483); registration of plumbers (People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686,27 L. R. A. 718); prohibiting the erection of a billboard exceeding a certain height (City of Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510, 58 N. E. 673,53 L. R. A. 548, 79 Am. St. Rep. 659;Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 190, 61 L. Ed. 472, L. R. A. 1918A, 136, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 594); Regulating the height of buildings (Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923); compelling a street surface railroad corporation to change the location of its tracks (People ex rel. City of Olean v. W. N. Y. & Pa....