Eaves v. County of Cape May

• Decision Date: 24 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-5096,00-5096
• Citation: 239 F.3d 527
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2001) PAMELA D. EAVES v. COUNTY OF CAPE MAY; WILLIAM E. STURM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN ELECTED MEMBER AND DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF CAPE MAY COUNTY, NEW JERSEY; EDMUND GRANT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF CAPE MAY; BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF CAPE MAY COUNTY; JOHN DOES, I TO X; (fictitious names of persons or organizations more fully described herein); jointly severally and in the alternative County of Cape May, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 527

239 F.3d 527 (3rd Cir. 2001)

PAMELA D. EAVES v. COUNTY OF CAPE MAY; WILLIAM E. STURM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN ELECTED MEMBER AND DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF CAPE MAY COUNTY, NEW JERSEY EDMUND GRANT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF CAPE MAY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF CAPE MAY COUNTY; JOHN DOES, I TO X; (fictitious names of persons or organizations more fully described herein); jointly severally and in the alternative County of Cape May, Appellant

No. 00-5096

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2000

Filed January 24, 2001

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle (D.C. No. 95-CV-04574)

William M. Tambussi (Argued) Brown & Connery, Westmont, NJ, Counsel for Appellee Pamela D. Eaves.

Marc I. Bressman (Argued) Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg & Sade, Cherry Hill, NJ, Counsel for Appellant County of Cape May.

Before: McKEE, RENDELL, and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The County of Cape May ("the County") appeals the District Court's ruling awarding the plaintiff, Pamela Eaves ("Eaves"), post-judgment interest on the Court's award of $254,248.57 in attorney's fees and expenses from August 11, 1998, the date that the District Court first stated that she was entitled to such an award "in an amount to be determined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)." The legal issue presented in this employment discrimination action is whether post-judgment interest on a judgment awarding attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k) runs from the date that the District Court rules initially that the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, or alternatively, from the date that the District Court actually quantifies the amount awarded, where those determinations are made at separate times.

Based upon our construction of the applicable federal post-judgment interest statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a), we hold that post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee award runs from the date that the District Court actually quantifies the award. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's January 27, 2000 order insofar as it awarded post-judgment interest from August 11, 1998, and will remand the matter to the District Court for the entry of an appropriate order. However, because we find no merit in the County's other challenges relating to certain rulings made in the Court's January 27, 2000 order, we will affirm those rulings without further discussion.¹

II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS

Eaves is an American citizen of Chinese national origin. She was employed as the Treasurer of Cape May County, but was demoted to County Comptroller on July 8, 1994. After Eaves filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") based on her demotion and an alleged hostile work environment, the County eliminated her County Comptroller position.

Eaves then filed a Complaint in the District Court on August 30, 1995, alleging that the County, its Board of Freeholders, William E. Sturm and Edmund Grant violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621-634 (1998) ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1998) ("Title VII"), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1993) ("NJLAD"). On May 1, 1998, a jury found in Eaves's favor on the Title VII and NJLAD retaliation claim against the County, but found for the defendants on the remaining claims.² On May 11, 1998, Eaves filed post-trial motions seeking prejudgment interest pursuant to Title VII, and attorney's fees under Title VII and the NJLAD. On August 11, 1998, the District Court entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of Eaves, and against the County, for $90,000, together with prejudgment interest in the amount of $12,602.46, "together with attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P." App. at 5. The order accompanying the judgment stated that "attorney's fees and costs shall be awarded in an amount to be determined by the court upon plaintiff 's presently pending motion." App. at 8.

On January 27, 2000, the District Court resolved the outstanding motion for attorney's fees.³ After reviewing Eaves's counsels' billing records, the Court calculated the lodestar, reduced it by 25 percent to account for Eaves's limited success, applied a contingency enhancement of 15 percent under the NJLAD, and quantified the attorney's fee award. Ultimately, the Court awarded plaintiff 's counsel $254,248.57 in fees and expenses. It also addressed the question of post-judgment interest on the award. We recount the Court's analysis on this point In the Judgment entered on August 11, 1998, the Court entered "judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, County of Cape May, in the amount of $90,000.00 together with attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P." The amount of fees and related expenses has, more than 16 months later , been determined. Since the attorney's fees were determined as of the judgment date (August 11, 1998), the plaintiff is also entitled to recover interest upon that sum since that date, as post-judgment interest accounting for delay in payment. It was the Court's intent, in entering the Judgment on August 11, 1998, that the plaintiff was found to be entitled to recover her attorney's fees, with only the amount to be determined. The accompanying Order will therefore amend the August 11, 1998, Judgment to insert this amount, together with post-judgment interest from August 11, 1998. This adjustment further recognizes that plaintiff and her counsel have been deprived of the benefit of the payment of this sum since it was due and that the fee award is calculated upon plaintiff 's counsel's 1998 billing rates rather than current rates.

App. at 56. On the same date, the Court entered the "Amended Judgment" which incorporated its quantification of the attorney's fee award, and its statement that post-judgment interest on the jury verdict and the fee award was to run from August 11, 1998. App. at 58. The County filed a timely notice of appeal.⁴

III. DISCUSSION

The County argues that the District Court erred in "backdating" the post-judgment interest award on the fee amount to August 11, 1998, the date the Court ordered that attorney's fees and costs would be awarded "in an amount to be determined" by the Court. It contends that the Court's decision to award post-judgment interest from that date ignores the fact that the amount of the award was not quantified until nearly a year and a half later, and unfairly penalizes the County because the delay was apparently caused by court backlog rather than dilatory tactics on the County's part. The County cites Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 21-23 (1st Cir . 1991), and MidAmerica Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 962 F .2d 1470, 1475 (10th Cir. 1992), in support of its position, claiming that both decisions held that post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee award accrues from the date the amount of the award is quantified. It further asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), is consistent with the reasoning in Foley and MidAmerica . Appellant's Br. at 15-16.

Eaves responds that "the majority rule among the circuit courts of appeals is that post-judgment `interest accrues from the date that the party becomes unconditionally entitled to fees, even if those fees are not yet quantified.' " Appellee's Br. at 21 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 1273, 1275 (8th Cir. 1991); Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 760 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam), overruled in part on other grounds by Int'l Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp. 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)). In other words, according to Eaves, post-judgment interest accrues on an attorney's fee award "from the date establishing the right to the award, not the date of the judgment establishing its quantum." Appellee's Br. at 21 22 (citing Mathis, 857 F.2d at 760). The justification for commencing the post-judgment interest period from the earlier of two judgments is grounded in equitable considerations:

"[Postponing the accrual of post-judgment interest] would effectively reduce the judgment for attorney's fees and costs, because a certain sum of money paid at a certain time in the future is worth less than the same sum of money paid today. Failing to allow awards of attorney's fees to bear interest would give parties against whom such awards have been entered an artificial and undesirable incentive to appeal or otherwise delay payment."

Appellee's Br. at 22 (quoting Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1276). Eaves claims that these same policy considerations should guide us in determining the date from which post-judgment interest should run in this case because the end result-- the delay in receipt of funds rightfully due to her counsel--is the same, regardless of whether the delay was caused by the District Court or a litigious defendant.⁵

Preliminarily, we point out that the County does not dispute that post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a) accrues on a judgment awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing party such as Eaves just as it would any other "money judgment" to which S 1961(a) applies. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35; Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1982); see Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 927 (3d...