Klapproth v. Turner

• Decision Date: 20 March 1968
• Citation: 156 Conn. 276,240 A.2d 886
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Sherman F. KLAPPROTH v. James TURNER.

Page 886

240 A.2d 886

156 Conn. 276

Sherman F. KLAPPROTH v. James TURNER.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 20, 1968.

Michael P. Koskoff, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Theodore I. Koskoff, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Charles H. Fischer, Jr., West Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Herbert D. Fischer, West Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM, RYAN and COVELLO, JJ.

ALCORN, Associate Justice.

The facts are undisputed. The defendant, a builder, had employed two or more employees, including the plaintiff, for several months prior to August 20, 1965. On August 20, the defendant discharged two employees, and from that date until Saturday, August 28, the plaintiff was the defendant's only employee. On Tuesday, August 31, the defendant rehired one of the discharged employees, and on the following day he hired two more employees. From September 1, 1965, until well into the month of December, 1965, the defendant had two or more employees. On August 28, however, while the plaintiff was working alone, he sustained a serious back injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The plaintiff applied for, and the workmen's compensation commissioner awarded him, compensation for this injury. The defendant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the award, and the defendant has taken this appeal from that judgment.

Before October 1, 1961, the Workmen's Compensation Act appeared as chapter 566 in the 1958 Revision of the General Statutes and embraced, as amended in 1959, §§ 31-139 through 31-221a. Section 31-139 defined an employer, so far as now material, as 'any person * * * within the state using the services of another for pay.' Section 31-148 abolished common-law defenses in an action to recover damages for the injury or death of an employee arising out of the employment. Section 31-149 specified that the provisions of § 31-148 should 'not apply to actions to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by employees of any employer having regularly fewer than two employees.'

In 1961, the General Assembly repealed chapter 566 of the 1958 Revision of the General Statutes, as amended in 1959, in its entirety (Public Acts 1961, No. 491 § 82) and, in its place, enacted what is now chapter 568 of the General Statutes encompassing §§ 31-275 through 31-355. Public Acts 1961, No. 491 §§ 1-81. Under the statutes as so amended, § 31-275 defines an employer, so far as now material, as 'any person * * * within the state using the services for pay of two or more employees.' Section 31-284 provides in part that '(a)n employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained.'

This appeal arises as a result of the variation in the phraseolgy of the quoted sections of the statutes. Because the plaintiff was injured while working alone, the defendant, his employer, disclaims any liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The claim, in short, is that the act prior to the 1961 amendment applied to an employer who 'regularly' employed two or more employees and that, by the omission of the word 'regularly' in the present law, the employer is not subject to the act unless at least two employees are actually employed at the time of the injury. We note in passing that a more accurate statement would have been that, prior to 1961, the statute which abolished common-law defenses did not apply to an employer who regularly employed fewer than two employees.

The defendant tacitly concedes that, under the statutes as they existed before 1961, he would be required to pay compensation to the plaintiff because he would be an employer who 'regularly' employed two or more employees. He denies, however, that the law as it now stands imposes any responsibility on him.

The purpose of the workmen's compensation law has always been to provide compensation for an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment regardless of fault, and the statutes are to be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose. Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 146, 93 A. 245. The underlying objective is to provide for the workman and those dependent on him. Reid v. Hartford Fuel Supply Co., 120 Conn. 541, 546, 182 A. 141; Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co., 105 Conn. 297, 299, 135 A. 574. We can properly presume that the General Assemply acted in 1961 with the knowledge of this long-standing construction which this court has given to the objective and purpose of legislation in this field. Forman Schools, Inc. v. Town of Litchfield, 134 Conn. 1, 6, 54 A.2d 710.

What then was the purpose and effect of the amendment made to the law by the General Assembly in 1961? It is a recognized presumption that an amendatory act does not change the law further that is expressly declared or necessarily implied. City of Norwalk v. Daniele, 143 Conn. 85, 89, 119 A.2d 732. A comparison of the statutes indicates that the 1961 amendment adopts a positive phrasing of the subject matter rather than the negative phraseology used before 1961. Under § 31-139, an employer was anyone within the state 'using the services of another for pay.' This statute was followed by § 31-148, which, in broad terms, abolished common-law defenses in all actions to recover damages for the injury or death of an employee arising out of the employment. The generality of § 31-148 was then limited by § 31-149, which provided that § 31-148 should not apply to such actions 'by employees of any employer having regularly fewer than two employees.'

The language used in the 1961 amendment takes a different approach. Undre § 31-275, an employer is 'any person * * * whthin the state using the services for pay of two or more employees.' Section 31-284 then provides that such an employer 'shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his...