Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1926
• Citation: 135 A. 574,105 Conn. 297
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BASSETT ET AL. v. STRATFORD LUMBER CO. ET AL.

135 A. 574

105 Conn. 297

BASSETT ET AL. v. STRATFORD LUMBER CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 16, 1926

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Alfred C Baldwin, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lena Bassett and Charles L. Doherty, administrator of the estate of Louis P Bassett, claimants, opposed by the Stratford Lumber Company and others. An award was made by the Compensation Commissioner in favor of Lena Bassett. On appeal to the superior court by Charles L. Doherty, administrator, the question was reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court. Superior court advised to render judgment dismissing appeal and confirming award of Commissioner.

Samuel Reich, of Bridgeport, for Lena Bassett.

Joseph V. Esposito, of New Haven, for Doherty.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and CURTIS, MALTBIE, HAINES, and HINMAN, JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The administrator on the estate of Louis P. Bassett, and Lena Bassett, widow of Louis P. Bassett and his dependent presented to the commissioner for the Fourth district their claim to the balance unpaid upon an award against defendants made to Bassett for a partial disability suffered for the loss of vision in his left eye; the award having been made for 104 weeks at $17 a week. Of this award the defendants had paid Bassett for 20 3/7 weeks up to December 25, 1925, when he died from causes not connected with the injury for which the award had been made, leaving a balance of the award which had neither been paid nor matured for 83 4/7 weeks. The commissioner adjudged that the defendants pay the claimant widow, as the sole dependent of the deceased, the sum of $17 per week, the same being one-half of the average weekly wages of the deceased employee, for the unexpired balance of the period of the award, 83 4/7 weeks. The administrator appealed from this award principally upon the ground that the balance of the award should not be paid to the widow dependent, but should be paid to his estate.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1918, § § 5339-5414) was enacted in order to give to the workman, or those dependent upon him, compensation for a part of the loss occasioned by his disability or death, arising in the course of and out of his employment, and not due to his willful and serious misconduct.

" Compensation acts are founded on the theory of compensation, not only to the injured workman, but to his dependents in case of his death." Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, vol. 1, § 70; In re Nelson, 217 Mass. 467, 105 N.E. 357.

The theory of such legislation is that the great majority of injuries in industry arise through no fault of either employer or employee, and that if all such be charged against the industry it will operate as an overhead charge and ultimately be paid by the consumer. Piccinim et al. v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 93 Conn. 423, 106 A. 330. The beneficiaries under most Workmen's Compensation Acts in this country are the injured employee and his dependents. We find in no act either in those like our own, of the contract or voluntary kind, or in the compulsory kind, unless it be that of Ohio, any specific provision by which the award made may, in any contingency, become a part of the estate of the injured employee, or the award be obtained by the administrator or executor of his estate for its benefit. Nor are provisions found in these acts from which, by fair implication, the unmatured award can be held to become a part of the deceased workman's estate, or the administrator or executor obtain it for the benefit of his estate. We find, as in Kansas, an instance where the representative of the deceased employee may maintain his action to recover an award, but only for the benefit of the dependents. Smith v. Boiler Works Co., 104 Kan. 591, 180 P. 259.

In our own act there is no specific provision that, in any contingency, any award under the act shall become the property of the estate of the injured employee, nor is there provision giving the executor or administrator of the estate the right to secure by suit, or otherwise, the award or any part of it for the estate, or for the dependent. Unless the act specifies otherwise, the employee has no vested right to the unmatured compensation awarded, and hence it cannot pass to his personal representatives. Our act does not purport, either expressly or by necessary implication, to confer in any case any right to the award upon any person other than the injured employee, or his dependent. Construction of the act, giving the award to other than the employee or his dependents, would defeat its primary purpose. It would impose upon the industry a charge, not in compensation for the loss of wages, not for the benefit of the injured workman or his dependents, but for the benefit of persons who had not been injured in the industry, or lost support by reason of the injury to one who had furnished them with support. If this charge were ultimately transferred to the consumer, it would require him to pay, not for the support of those who might otherwise become a public charge, but for the benefit of those who were not liable to become public charges by having the support, upon which they had depended, taken from them. It would thus enrich strangers to this employment and this industry, and strangers to the only class of persons whom the act seeks to benefit.

The provisions of our act evidence a contrary intent to that involved in the administrator's claim in this case. General Statutes, § 5375, provides:

" All sums due for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be exempt from levy, attachment and execution and shall be nonassignable before or after award."

The purpose of this provision is to give the enjoyment of all of the award to the employee and his dependents. It accomplishes its purpose, by placing the award out of the reach of creditors, and beyond the power of the employee or his dependent to part with it by any form of assignment.

The statute is a limitation upon the right of the employee or the dependent over the award. Its provisions are not the language applied to a vested right of ownership. The employee has no power of control over the unmatured part of the award. This conflicts with and, indeed, is repugnant to the idea that the award has vested in the employee, or in the executor, or administrator of his estate. Manifestly, the right to compensation under the act comes from the statute, both as to that awarded to the employee and that to the dependents; it does not come from the employee. Every award made under the Compensation Act is subject to revision and modification during the whole compensable period, and until completely performed. General Statutes, § 5355; Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works, 95 Conn. 354, 111 A. 193.

" The only limitation upon a commissioner's power to open an award is that it must be ‘ for any proper action thereon.’ " Thompson v. Towle, 98 Conn. 738, 742, 120 A. 503, 504.

It may be modified or it may be set aside. A vested interest cannot be predicated upon a property interest of so unstable a character.

These provisions of the Compensation Act very plainly indicate the legislative intention to confine the employee's interest to such part of the award as has accrued within his lifetime, and as to such portion of the award as did not mature in the employee's lifetime there is no survivorship in his estate. We anticipated this construction when we said, in Jackson v. Berlin Construction Co., 93 Conn. 155, 105 A. 326:

" The purpose of the statute is benefit to the dependent, not to the estate of the deceased employee."

In Corcoran, Adm'r, v. Farrel Foundry & Machine Company, 1 W. C. D. 42, Commissioner Williams held that the compensation provided for fatal injuries forms no part of the estate of the deceased and does not in any way inure to the administrator except as to the sum of $100 for burial expenses and such medical, surgical, and hospital bills as may have accrued within 30 days from an injury sustained by a decedent. Similarly, in Kilbride, Adm'x, v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 1 Conn. W. C. D. 688, it was held that, where an award for a total or partial incapacity would have continued for a period after the death of the employee from another cause, the estate of the deceased employee has no vested interest in the award accruing after his decease. Id. Blanchette v. Totokett Mfg. Co., 2 Conn. W. C. D. 248. These decisions were followed by the compensation commissioners down to the decision of Forkas v. International Silver Co., 100 Conn. 417, 123 A. 831.

It is generally held throughout our country that whether the case be one of partial or total incapacity, or death, the compensation acts do not give to the legal representatives of the employee any right to the award, or a right to recover the same for the benefit of the estate of the employee. As a rule, these cases interpret the Compensation Act of their jurisdiction as giving to the employee a right to compensation personal to him, and therefore upon his death not surviving to his estate or his heirs. Ray v. Industrial Insurance Commissioner, 99 Wash. 176, 168 P. 1121, L.R.A. 1918F, 561; Moore v. Lumbermen's R. Ass'n (1922 Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S.W. 1105; La Chapelle v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 29 Wyo. 449, 214 P. 587; Wenning et al. v. Turk et al., 78 Ind.App. 355, 135 N.E. 665; Smith v. Bluffton, 80 Ind.App. 574, 141 N.E. 532; Wozneak v. Buffalo Gas Co., 175 A.D. 268, 161 N.Y.S. 675; Conrad v. Glenham Embroidery Co., 213 A.D. 507, 210 N.Y.S. 701; Zahler v. Department of Labor, 125 Wash. 410, 217 P. 55; Lahoma Oil Co. et al. v. State Industrial Com., 71 Okl. 160, 175 P. 836, 15 A.L.R. 817; notes to 15 A.L.R. 821; 24 A.L.R. 441; 29 A.L.R. 1426. Ohio is...