Opinion of Justices to Senate and House of Representatives

• Decision Date: 12 March 1925
• Citation: 251 Mass. 569
• Parties: OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (Opinions of the Justices.)
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

251 Mass. 569

OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (Opinions of the Justices.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

March 12, 1925

The General Court constitutionally may enact legislation, requiring as a condition precedent to the right of an owner to register a motor vehicle or trailer for operation on the ways of the Commonwealth, that the owner of such motor vehicle or trailer shall provide security for (a) the discharge of his liability for personal injuries or death at any time resulting from the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or trailer upon the ways of the Commonwealth, and for (b) the discharge of the liability of any person responsible for the operation of such motor vehicle or trailer with the express or implied consent of the owner for such personal injuries or death.

The selection, by legislation of the character above described, of owners of motor vehicles as the only persons required to provide security for injuries caused by such property would not violate constitutional provisions.

The General Court constitutionally may enact legislation prescribing that security of the character above described shall conform to requirements carefully defined in the act.

Proposed legislation of the character above described would not be rendered unconstitutional

(1) By reason of the fact that it does not apply to nonresident operators operating in this Commonwealth motor vehicles or trailers which have not been registered under G.L.c. 90;

(2) Nor by reason of the fact that it does not apply to motor vehicles or trailers owned by the Commonwealth or by a corporation subject to the supervision and control of the department of public utilities or by a street railway company under public control;

(3) Nor by reason of the fact that it requires that the operators of certain motor vehicles as common carriers subject to G.L.c. 159 Section

45, shall furnish a liability policy or bond as above described in addition to the bond for property damage required by certain amendments to G.L.c. 159, Section 46, set out in the bill;

(4) Nor by reason of the fact that it expressly excludes from its protection employees covered by the workmen's compensation law;

(5) Nor by reason of the fact that it provides for security for claims for personal injuries or death resulting from the ownership operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles or trailers on the ways of the Commonwealth and not upon private property;

(6) Nor by reason of the fact that it requires that such security shall be provided only in respect to claims for personal injuries or death and not in respect to claims for damage to property;

(7) Nor by reason of the fact that it provides that the maximum security in the case of the cash deposit above referred to shall be $5,000 while the security in the case of the policy of insurance or bond shall be $5,000 for death or personal injuries of any person and $10,000 for personal injuries or death of more than one person in the same accident;

(8) Nor by reason of the fact that it is made applicable equally, excepting for motor vehicles owned by the Commonwealth or by a corporation subject to the supervision and control of the department of public utilities or by a street railway company under public control, to all classes and kinds of motor vehicles and trailers whether operated for pleasure or private business including the business of operating taxicabs, or by common carriers of passengers;

(9) Nor by reason of the fact that it does not expressly exclude from its operation motor vehicles or trailers engaged wholly or in part in interstate commerce.

The General Court constitutionally may enact legislation regulating the form of motor vehicle liability policies or bonds above described and requiring that any such policy or bond shall contain the following provisions:

(1) That the policy or bond shall not be cancelled by the insured or principal during its term except upon the transfer, loss, theft or destruction of the motor vehicle or trailer covered thereby or upon the substitution of a deposit of cash or securities for such policy or bond;

(2) That no statement made by the insured or in his behalf and no violation of the terms of the policy shall operate to defeat the claim of any judgment creditor of the insured proceeding under the provisions of G.L.c. 175, Section 113, and G.L.c. 214, Section 3, cl. 10, so as to bar a recovery within the limits of indemnity provided in the policy;

(3) That the policy or bond shall cover, subject to the limitations above described, all claims, irrespective of number, for such personal injuries or death occurring during its term.

The General Court constitutionally may enact legislation providing that policies or bonds of the character above described shall not contain any exclusions or exceptions as to specified accidents or injuries or causes thereof.

The General Court constitutionally may enact legislation relating to the approval by the commissioner of insurance of premiums to be charged by insurance or surety companies issuing policies of liability insurance or bonds as above described, of classifications of risks, and of modification or altering or revising of such classifications of risks or premiums, but such legislation must provide for a judicial review of the premiums thus to be established; subject to such condition, such legislation constitutionally may provide that

(1) Such premiums shall be approved in writing by the commissioner of insurance as adequate, just, reasonable and non-discriminatory for the risks to which they respectively apply and that no insurance or surety company shall issue such policy or bond until such approval is obtained;

(2) The commissioner of insurance in determining the adequacy, justness and reasonableness of the said premiums and whether or not discrimination is being practiced relative thereto shall not allow a loading for commissions to be paid to insurance agents or brokers negotiating or issuing said policies or bonds in excess of fifteen per cent of such premiums;

(3) The premium rates and classifications of risks approved by the commissioner of insurance shall be used by all the insurance companies issuing such policies or acting as surety on such bonds;

(4) The commissioner of insurance may from time to time modify, alter or revise any such classification of risks or premiums;

(5) The decision of the commissioner of insurance, in the matters above described, shall be final, except for the requirement as to a judicial review above described.

If no provision were made in the proposed legislation for a judicial review of the decisions of the commissioner of insurance in approving, disapproving, modifying, altering or revising premium rates as above described, the act would be unconstitutional.

The General Court constitutionally may enact legislation having, besides the provisions above described, provisions establishing a board of appeal to hear and determine complaints of persons aggrieved by the cancellation of a policy or bond by a company or a refusal on its part to issue a liability policy or to act as a surety on a bond, under the provisions of the act, and in such legislation constitutionally may provide that

(1) The decision of such board on the question, whether the cancellation or refusal was proper or reasonable and whether the complainant was a proper person to whom to issue a policy or bond shall be "final and binding upon the parties," since such provision would mean and must be construed to mean that findings of fact by the board would be final and not that there would not be some means of correcting crucial errors of law;

(2) If an insurance or surety company fails to comply with the decision of such board in favor of the complainant, the complainant may present a certified copy of the decision of the board to the Superior

Court, which shall enter a decree in accordance therewith and notify the parties; as such provision would be interpreted to mean, in order to save its constitutionality, that such decree should be entered after such a judicial examination and inquiry as would be required by the law in the light of that finding;

(3) Such decree of the Superior Court "shall be final"; as the decree, notwithstanding such provision, would be subject to the limited review available by writ of certiorari or, in appropriate instances, by a bill of review;

(4) If a foreign insurance company fails to abide by such decree of the Superior Court or a justice thereof, the commissioner of insurance shall suspend its license to transact business in the Commonwealth until it complies with such decree;

(5) If a domestic insurance company fails to abide by such decree the commissioner shall proceed to have it enjoined from the further transaction of its business until it complies with said decree.

Provisions of the character above described relating to a board of appeal would be unconstitutional if there were no provision for an appeal from a decision of said board of appeal adverse to the insurance or surety company or to the complainant.

Having discussed a long list of particular questions presented to them in an order adopted by the Senate and House of Representatives in concurrence relating to an accompanying bill entitled "An Act requiring owners of certain motor vehicles and trailers to furnish security for their civil liability on account of personal injuries sustained by their motor vehicles and trailers," which covered more than eighteen printed pages, the Justices of this court in giving their opinions under c. 3, art. 2 of the Constitution, asked to be excused from making further answer to a question, "Would...