People v. Bouchee
| Decision Date | 02 June 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 57233,57233 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Lee BOUCHEE, Defendant-Appellant. 400 Mich. 253, 253 N.W.2d 626 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Donald A. Burge, Prosecuting Atty., Stephen M. Wheeler, Chief of Appellate Division, Kalamazoo, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jerkins, Plaszczak, Silaski & Hurley by John R. Hurley, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.
Willie Lee Bouchee was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit rape. 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 2
We granted leave to consider the defendant's claim that improper inquiry was made of him concerning his religious beliefs, that similar improper questions were asked of his character witness, that unfair inquiry was made concerning the legitimacy of his children, and that he was unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's argument to the jury.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
At trial the complainant testified inter alia that the defendant lured her to a secluded area under the guise of a post-luncheon employment interview and then attempted to rape her.
The defendant testified to having lunch with the complainant but stated that, while returning from a restaurant, she suggested they drive to a remote spot and later agreed to have sexual relations with him for $100. Mr. Bouchee said that he balked at the price and stepped out of his car for a moment, whereupon the complainant drove away. There were no other witnesses to the transaction.
The defendant asserts that certain questions put to him by the trial court during the prosecutor's cross-examination, and certain questions asked of his witness, Reverend Amos Williams, constituted improper inquiry relating "to his opinions on religion" contrary to M.C.L.A. § 600.1436; M.S.A. § 27A.1436 and our holding in People v. Hall, 391 Mich. 175, 215 N.W.2d 166 (1974). 3
The prosecutor argues that the statute and Hall are inapposite because the defendant first broached the subject of his religious practices by certain volunteered responses regarding his intention to tell the truth "so help me God", by his claimed church membership and attendance, and by asserting his strict belief in the Bible. The prosecutor urges us to affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that "the defendant's initiative in putting his religious credentials before the jury invited clarifying inquiry by the people". To hold otherwise, the prosecutor contends, would allow the defendant to offer unimpeachable religious credentials with impunity, irrespective of their substance.
In People v. Hall, supra, we held that a prosecutor's question to the defendant inquiring whether he believed in a Supreme Being, although it was merely an oblique reminder to the defendant that he was under oath, and despite no objection by defense counsel, violated Const.1963, art. 1, § 18 and M.C.L.A. § 600.1436; M.S.A. § 27A.1436 and amounted to reversible error. The constitutional provision states:
"No person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief."
The statute provides:
The Court observed:
"This statute leaves little room for discussion by this Court as to whether or not this cross-examination was improper. It clearly was so. As Justice Christiancy, in People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 319 (1858), stated:
'Under this section, it was clearly incompetent to question the witness in this case, in reference to her belief in a God, unless it can be shown that belief or disbelief in a God has no reference to "opinions on the subject of religion." Belief is a stronger term than opinion, and necessarily includes the latter. Belief or opinion in reference to the existence or non-existence of a Supreme Being, is, we think, not only a belief or opinion "on the subject of religion," but on the most important of all subjects of religion, and that which controls and gives form to all other religious opinions. We think, therefore, it was clearly the intention of the legislature to prevent the first step, and every subsequent step, in all inquiries of this kind; * * * ' (Emphasis added.)" 391 Mich. at 181-182, 215 N.W.2d at 170 (footnote omitted).
In the case at bar, near the conclusion of the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant, the trial court, after ruling on an objection, asked:
It appears that the court's question was designed to elicit an admission from the defendant that his claimed belief in the Bible was at odds with his testimony that he was willing to have consensual extramarital sexual relations with the complainant. The question, however, constituted an inquiry of the defendant whether his religious beliefs permitted or forbade such conduct. This type of inquiry concerning defendant's "opinions on religion" is forbidden by the statute.
We recognize that the defendant did indeed volunteer the testimony that he belonged to the Catholic Church, attended the Church of God in Christ and believed "strictly in the Bible", for the ostensible purpose of demonstrating that he was a religious, moral and God-fearing man, and thus was possessed of the qualities of character inconsistent with the criminal sexual conduct of which he was accused.
Assuming without conceding the relevance of such evidence as tending to prove that the defendant was possessed of the specific traits of good character relevant to rebut the charge, the evidence did not invite or justify the kind of "clarifying inquiry" made by the court.
The prosecutor was fully entitled to challenge the defendant's claim of good character, either upon cross-examination or through extrinsic evidence in rebuttal. Such challenge might have taken the form inter alia of evidence of prior convictions, testimony contradicting the claimed church membership and attendance, or reputation evidence tending to disprove the claim of religious, moral and God-fearing qualities, if indeed such evidence existed. It would not have been competent, however, for the prosecutor to inquire of the defendant concerning the nature, substance and content of his religious beliefs in order to show that such beliefs were inconsistent with the qualities of good character claimed. Nor was it competent for the court to conduct such an inquiry. Aside from the debatable relevance of such an inquiry to rebut the claim of a moral, God-fearing and religious character, such questioning is expressly forbidden by the statute and our holding in Hall, supra. 4
Equally offensive to the principle that a witness, particularly "an accused (,) is entitled to be tried and convicted without the question of his religious opinions ever being put in front of the judge or jury for their consideration", 5 was the following inquiry made of the defendant's character witness, Reverend Amos Williams, by the prosecuting attorney:
"Q. You wouldn't classify him as a religious man?
A. Let me say a Christian. Let me rephrase it; not religious but let me say Christian.
Q. Is that a person who believes and does not practice?
A. Religion is a duty. A Christian is a person who believes in Christ. You don't have to believe in Christ in order to be religious."
Although the statutory prohibition only precludes questioning a witness concerning his own religious beliefs, we have no hesitancy to extend the rationale and application of the rule to the instance in which a witness's religious opinions and beliefs are explored through the questioning of another witness.
At common law, religious credentials were offered on the issue of the competency of the witness. 6 Const.1963, art. 1, § 18 explicitly rejects the common-law requirement that belief in a Supreme Being is a prerequisite to testifying.
Many of the other common-law disabilities such as infancy, infamy and interest in the outcome of the litigation no longer operate in the modern law of evidence to disqualify a witness from testifying. 7 However, these disabilities persist in the form of methods of impeachment. 8 M.C.L.A. § 600.1436; M.S.A. § 27A.1436 expressly prohibits the use of religious beliefs even for impeachment by stating without qualification that "(n)o witness may be questioned in relation to his opinions on religion, either before or after he is sworn." We believe that the intention of the Legislature to prohibit this form of impeachment compels us to apply the proscription to intrinsic and extrinsic impeachment alike.
Reverend Williams was called by counsel for the defendant as a character witness. The direct examination was carefully confined to an inquiry concerning the defendant's reputation in the community for veracity. Upon cross-examination, however, in an effort to explain and justify his claimed knowledge of the defendant's reputation for veracity, Reverend Williams stated, "People who are connected with our church often says that Bouchee is a good man." The expression "good man" which was employed by the witness in an effort to explain the basis for his testimony concerning Bouchee's reputation for veracity did not offer justification for the prosecuting attorney to conduct a general inquiry concerning the defendant's entire character and specifically did not warrant any "clarifying inquiry" concerning the defendant's religious...
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