Yanco v. US, 00-5058.

• Decision Date: 24 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-5058.,00-5058.
• Citation: 258 F.3d 1356
• Parties: Pamela H. YANCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

258 F.3d 1356

Pamela H. YANCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-5058.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Decided July 24, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey L. Allen, of Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Kyle E. Chadwick, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. On the brief were David M. Cohen, Director; Kathryn A. Bleecker, Assistant Director; and Elizabeth W. Newsom, Attorney. Of counsel on the brief were Gregory C. Brady, Deputy General Counsel; and Lila Sultan, Attorney Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.

Before SCHALL, GAJARSA, and LINN, Circuit Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge.

Pamela H. Yanco is the widow of William Yanco, who served as a public safety officer with the Wellesley, Massachusetts police force. Following her husband's death by suicide, Ms. Yanco submitted a claim to the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance ("BJA") seeking death benefits under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976 (the "Benefits Act" or "Act"), Pub.L. No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796-3796c (1994)). After BJA denied her claim, Ms. Yanco brought suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims.

In due course, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment based upon the administrative record. After considering the motions, the Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government and dismissed Ms. Yanco's complaint. The court ruled that recovery under the Benefits Act was barred because Officer Yanco had not died as the result of a "personal injury" within the meaning of the statute, as interpreted by BJA regulations. Yanco v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 782, 792-93 (2000). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I.

The Benefits Act provides a one-time cash payment to survivors of public safety officers who die in the line of duty. Section 3796(a) states in pertinent part:

In any case in which the Bureau of Justice Assistance ... determines, under regulations issued pursuant to this subchapter, that a public safety officer has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty, the Bureau shall pay a benefit of $100,000 ... as follows:

(1) if there is no surviving child of such officer, to the surviving spouse of such officer;

(2) if there is a surviving child or children and a surviving spouse, one-half to the surviving child or children of such officer in equal shares and one-half to the surviving spouse;

(3) if there is no surviving spouse, to the child or children of such officer in equal shares; or

(4) if none of the above, to the parent or parents of such officer in equal shares.

42 U.S.C. § 3796(a) (1994). For a survivor or survivors to qualify for the payment, the public safety officer (1) must have suffered a "personal injury" within the meaning of the Act, (2) the injury must have been suffered "in the line of duty," and (3) the death must have been "the direct and proximate result" of the personal injury.

Section 3796a sets forth specific restrictions upon entitlement. It provides as follows:

No benefit shall be paid under this subchapter —

(1) if the death or catastrophic injury was caused by the intentional misconduct of the public safety officer or by such officer's intention to bring about his death or catastrophic injury;

(2) if the public safety officer was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of his death or catastrophic injury;

(3) if the public safety officer was performing his duties in a grossly negligent manner at the time of his death or catastrophic injury;

(4) to any individual who would otherwise be entitled to a benefit under this subchapter if such individual's actions were a substantial contributing factor to the death or catastrophic injury of the public safety officer; or

(5) to any individual employed in a capacity other than a civilian capacity.

42 U.S.C. § 3796a (1994). Among other things, § 3796a prohibits the payment of benefits to the dependents of an officer who intentionally brings about his or her own death.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3796c(a), BJA is "authorized to establish regulations and procedures as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subsection." Pursuant to this authority, regulations have been promulgated to implement the Benefits Act. In the regulations, "personal injury" is defined as "any traumatic injury, as well as diseases which are caused by or result from such injury, but not occupational diseases." 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(e) (1997). "Traumatic Injury" is defined as "a wound or the condition of the body caused by external force, including injuries inflicted by bullets, explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects or other physical blows, chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious diseases, radiation, and bacteria, but excluding stress and strain." 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(g) (1997). Thus, the regulations exclude stress and strain from the definition of "personal injury."

II.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. William Yanco was a member of the Wellesley, Massachusetts police force from 1971 until his death in 1992. He served as a Safety Officer, a Drug Abuse Resistance Education Officer, and a Youth Officer. In all three positions he designed programs to promote child health and safety and prevent juvenile delinquency. Yanco, 45 Fed. Cl. at 783. As part of his authorized duties as a Youth Officer, Officer Yanco counseled troubled children and their families, often in their homes. Id.

On May 28, 1992, the mother of a ten-year old boy whom Officer Yanco was counseling accused Officer Yanco of engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior with the boy. Officer Yanco immediately reported the allegation to his supervisor, and there ensued investigations by the Internal Affairs Office of the Wellesley Police Department, the Wellesley Department of Social Services, and the District Attorney of Norfolk County, Massachusetts. Id. at 784. The accusation and resulting investigations drew significant media attention. Id. Each investigation concluded that Officer Yanco did not engage in any misconduct, and at the time of his death, Officer Yanco was aware of the results of at least two of the investigations. Id.

In the wake of the allegation against him, Officer Yanco "appeared acutely distressed." Id. He "suffered pervasive mood disturbances that resulted in crying spells, loss of sleep, appetite and the capacity for enjoyment." Id. Ms. Yanco urged her husband to seek professional help, but he refused. Id. at 785.

On June 22, 1992, Officer Yanco left work early, leaving on his computer a note for his wife and another note for his children. At about 2:00 p.m., he telephoned the Police Department from his home. While on the phone, he fatally shot himself. Id.

III.

Following her husband's death, Ms. Yanco applied to the Town of Wellesley Retirement Board for pension benefits, basing her claim on the ground that her husband's death had occurred in the line of duty. Id. A psychologist and a psychiatrist submitted reports in support of the claim, stating that Officer Yanco's suicide was causally related to his work as a police officer. Id. Based on these reports, on August 26, 1993, the Board held that Officer Yanco had died in the line of duty, entitling his widow to benefits. Id. at 785-86. The Massachusetts Division of Public Retirement Administration affirmed the Wellesley Retirement Board's decision on September 20, 1993, and awarded state pension benefits to Ms. Yanco. Id. at 786.

On June 9, 1993, Ms. Yanco filed a claim for death benefits with the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act Office ("PSOBO"), a unit of BJA. PSOBO denied her claim on October 26, 1993, and Ms. Yanco filed a notice of appeal. Id. In accordance with BJA regulations, the matter was referred to a Hearing Officer, who received evidence and held a hearing.¹ On December 6, 1995, the Hearing Officer rendered a decision in which he determined that Officer Yanco's suicide was the result of an injury sustained in the line of duty, entitling his widow to benefits. Id. at 787. In reaching his decision, the Hearing Officer concluded: "Officer Yanco's post traumatic stress disorder and major depression qualify as personal injuries. That is, they were traumatic injuries, wounds inflicted upon his mind, triggered by the allegation of sexual misconduct, an external force." He also concluded that Officer Yanco's impaired mental state rendered his suicide unintentional. On review, however, the Director of BJA reversed the Hearing Officer's decision.² In a decision dated February 18, 1997, the Director concluded that the term "traumatic injury" in BJA's implementing regulations does not encompass stress. As a result, the Director stated: "Officer Yanco's `injury' is not encompassed within the definition of `personal injury,' and is therefore not cognizable under the Benefits Act." Id. at 788. The Director also concluded that Officer Yanco's death was not sustained "in the line of duty," as required by § 3796(a), because, when Officer Yanco shot himself, he was not performing an action which he was "obligated or authorized by rule, regulations, condition of employment or service, or law to perform." 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(c)(1) (1997); see also Yanco 45 Fed. Cl. at 788. The Director further concluded that, even if Officer Yanco's death could be viewed as a result of traumatic injury, benefits would not be payable to Ms. Yanco because of the prohibition in the Benefits Act against paying benefits when an officer's death is intentional. Yanco, 45 Fed. Cl. at 788.

IV.

Ms. Yanco timely filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims to challenge BJA's denial of her claim under the Benefits Act. As noted above, in due course, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment...