Bradey v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina

• Decision Date: 20 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 21378,21378
• Citation: 275 S.C. 622,274 S.E.2d 418
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Max BRADEY, Respondent, v. The CHILDREN'S BUREAU OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Appellant.

Page 418

274 S.E.2d 418

275 S.C. 622

Max BRADEY, Respondent, v. The CHILDREN'S BUREAU OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Appellant.

No. 21378.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 20, 1981.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Deputy Atty. Gen. Raymond G. Halford, Asst. Atty. Gen. Russell D. Ghent, and Staff Atty. Evans Taylor Barnette, Columbia, for appellant.

Robert M. Holland, Spartanburg, for respondent.

HARWELL, Justice:

This action was brought by Max Bradey to compel the Children's Bureau of South Carolina to disclose the identity of his natural parents. The action was instituted pursuant to Section 15-45-140(c) which provides:

"(c) All files and records pertaining to the adoption proceedings in the Children's Bureau in the State of South Carolina, or in the Department of Social Services of the State of South Carolina, or in any authorized agency, shall be confidential and withheld from inspection except upon order of court for good cause shown."

The trial judge found that Bradey's emotional distress, anxiety and earnest desire for the truth constituted good cause under the provision. Having so found "good cause" the court granted tentative relief to Bradey. The sealed names and record information on the natural parents were ordered to be delivered to the court for an in camera review. Following a court ordered confidential investigation, the court proposed to hold a further hearing with the attorneys involved to further ascertain the existence of compelling reasons not to disclose the information. The information would then be divulged to Bradey by a final order together with any pertinent restrictions. We reverse, concluding that the trial judge's finding of good cause, and consequent order, was an abuse of discretion, inasmuch as the record does not support those findings.

The respondent was born in this State in 1947. His natural mother placed him for adoption with the Bureau while he was an infant. With the Bureau's approval, he was adopted by the Bradeys, a couple with no other children. The adoptive father is now deceased but the adoptive mother resides with the respondent and his family.

At the hearing below, Bradey stated that he has been interested in learning the identity of his natural parents since his teens and has actively pursued this interest for several years. The Bureau has cooperated in providing Bradey significant nonidentifying information, ¹ but has been precluded from unsealing the names of the biological parents.

The record shows that Bradey's request for the identifying information is founded on a basic desire to know his identity. He took care to characterize this not as mere curiosity but rather as a deep personal need to know the truth. He asserts that the process he has undergone has made him emotionally unstable, a statement echoed by his wife who testified that her husband's preoccupation has had a sort of distracting effect on him. Despite this, Bradey has not suffered emotional or physical distress such as to have warranted the securing of medical assistance. Nor has his employment been adversely affected by this experience.

The Bureau argues that Bradey made an insufficient showing of good cause and that the trial judge gave insufficient consideration to the privacy rights of the natural parents. We agree for the reasons set forth herein.

Adoption is a creation of statutory law in this State. Akers v. Hard, S.C., 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980). Recognizing that children are at times born into circumstances wherein their natural parents cannot or will not care for them, the State in its role as parens patriae developed the adoption process to assure stable homes for these children. To this end the adoption statutes Sections 15-45-10, et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), are designed to promote policies and procedures necessary for the protection of all the parties involved in an adoption. Without doubt, Section 15-45-140, which generally requires that the adoption records be sealed, serves all the parties in the adoption process: the adoptee, the adoptive parents, the natural parents and society at large.

Bradey concedes that the respective interests of the natural parents and the adoptive child must be weighed in determining whether or not good cause has been established to warrant release of biological information. While partially correct, this does not go far enough. Even though the surviving adoptive parent here has ostensibly consented to unsealing the record, the lower court would nevertheless have the responsibility to determine the circumstances of that consent. And even beyond the impact on the immediate parties, due consideration must be given to the impact that each case may have on the viability of the adoption process.

In order to properly weigh the competing interests, we must be mindful of the rationale for confidentiality in the adoption process. Not only does confidentiality insulate and nurture the newly formed adoptive family, In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511 (R.I.1979), it also may be assumed to provide the impetus for a traumatized natural parent to come forward to allow the process to take place rather than resort to other less desirable means of dealing with prospective parenthood, Application of Sage, 21 Wash.App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978). The natural parent or parents must feel secure in the knowledge that their identity will usually remain confidential. This offers the parent a fresh start, confident that the personal information will be disclosed only for good cause on order of the court. This expectation of confidentiality arising from the statute is constitutionally protected as a right of privacy. Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F.Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y.1978); affirmed, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995, 100 S.Ct. 531, 62 L.Ed.2d 426 (1979); Mill v. Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J.Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (Ch.Div.1977). See, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969).

As has been recognized by the legislature, the rights of the natural parents cannot be made absolute. Other parties may have countervailing interests which may necessitate disclosure despite the normal assurance of secrecy. For this reason, the statute allows a party to come forward and make a showing of good cause. By "good cause" we believe the party must demonstrate a compelling need for the identifying information. As noted, nonidentifying information is already available to a party in the discretion of the agency for proper cause shown. See, Section 15-45-140(d). What constitutes a compelling need for identifying information depends upon the circumstances of each case.

Even while weighing the interests of the parties, we must recognize that the State's primary concern is in maintaining an effective...