Brewster v. Shasta County

• Decision Date: 28 December 2001
• Docket Number: PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,No. 01-15118,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,01-15118
• Citation: 275 F.3d 803
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2001) THOMAS BREWSTER,, v. SHASTA COUNTY, A PUBLIC ENTITY; BRAD MCDANNOLD, AN INDIVIDUAL; D. COMPOMIZZO, AN INDIVIDUAL,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 803

275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2001)

THOMAS BREWSTER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SHASTA COUNTY, A PUBLIC ENTITY; BRAD MCDANNOLD, AN INDIVIDUAL; D. COMPOMIZZO, AN INDIVIDUAL, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

No. 01-15118

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted July 9, 2001

Filed Dec. 28, 2001

John Hagar, Law Office of John Hagar, San Francisco, California, for the defendants-appellants.

David A. Prentice, Prentice & Schaap, Sacramento, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

James H. Thebeau, Deputy County Counsel, Bakersfield, California, for amicus curiae California State Association of Counties.

Stephen Yagman, Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann, Venice Beach, California, for amicus curiae Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Lawrence K. Karlton, Chief District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-98-02157-LKK

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Kim McLane Wardlaw, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

HALL, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to decide whether the Shasta County Sheriff's Department, when investigating crime, acts on behalf of the state of California or on behalf of Shasta County. If the sheriff is a county actor, Shasta County may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the sheriff's constitutional torts. We conclude that the sheriff's department, when investigating crime, acts for the county, and therefore that the county is subject to section 1983 liability.

BACKGROUND

Appellee Thomas Brewster brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 against the County of Shasta and two Shasta County Sheriff's Department deputies. Appellee alleged that the deputies violated his civil rights during the investigation of a murder and sexual assault by manipulating a witness into giving a false identification, failing to test physical evidence, and ignoring exculpatory evidence. Appellee argued that the county is liable under Monell for his injuries caused by the deputies' execution of the Sheriff's policies on arrests and crime investigations because the Sheriff is a final policymaker for the county. Shasta County moved for summary judgment.

Relying on McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), Shasta County argued that the Shasta County Sheriff functions as a state, not a county, official when investigating crime, and therefore the county cannot be sued under section 1983 for the alleged constitutional torts of the sheriff. The district court concluded that a sheriff acts as a county official when investigating crime, and denied the County's motion for summary judgment. Brewster v. County of Shasta , 112 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1191 (E.D. Cal. 2000). The district court certified its order denying summary judgment for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(b). On December 18, 2000, this court granted the County permission to appeal the order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(b).

DISCUSSION

A.

A county is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 if its policies, established by the county's lawmakers or "by those whose edicts or acts . . . may fairly be said to represent official policy," caused the constitutional violation at issue. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The parties agree that the sheriff is the relevant policymaker. The question is whether he is a policymaker on behalf of the state or the county; if he is a policymaker for the state, then the county cannot be liable for his actions. See, e.g., Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 559 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 59 (2001). We review the district court's denial of the County's motion for summary judgment de novo. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).

Our analysis is governed by the analytical framework set out in McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), in which the Supreme Court concluded that Alabama sheriffs act as policymakers for the state, not the county, when investigating crime. This court applied the McMillian analysis to California sheriffs in Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001), to conclude that the Los Angeles County Sheriff acts as the final policymaker for the county when administering the county's policy for release from the local jails. McMillian instructs, however, that we must inquire "whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area or on a particular issue." 520 U.S. at 785. Our analysis in Streit thus does not resolve the question of Shasta County's liability in this case, because the sheriff's function of investigating crime was not at issue in Streit.¹ McMillian further instructs that although the question of county liability under section 1983 is a question of federal law, "our inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law," including the state's constitution, statutes, and case law. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786. Thus, although Streit does not resolve the question presented in the instant case, the analysis of California law governing sheriffs already undertaken in Streit provides the starting point for our own analysis.²

B.

The question in Streit was whether a California sheriff, in administering the county's policy for release from county jails, acted for the county or the state. We began our analysis with an examination of the California Constitution, which identifies California sheriffs as county officials. Unlike the Alabama Constitution that the Supreme Court considered in McMillian, "the California Constitution does not list sheriffs as part of `the state executive department.' " Streit, 236 F.3d at 561 (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 787) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Instead, Article XI, section 1(b) of the California Constitution designates sheriffs as county officers." Id. Further, "there is no provision in the California Constitution that states that the [sheriff] acts for the state when managing the local jails." Id.

We next determined that several provisions of the California Code support the conclusion that the sheriff acts for the county when administering the local jails. Importantly, "[u]nder California law, monetary damages for section 1983 claims are paid by the County and not the state. " Id. at 562 (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2). This "crucial factor" weighed "heavily" toward our conclusion that the sheriff functioned for the county, rather than the state, when managing the local jails. Id. The Supreme Court explained in McMillian that it was "critical" for the case and "strong evidence in favor of the . . . conclusion that sheriffs act on behalf of the State" that a judgment against an Alabama sheriff would be a suit against the State, and that the county would not be liable for a sheriff's acts under respondeat superior. 520 U.S. at 789; see also Streit, 236 F.3d at 562. Here, however, California law places liability on the county. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2; Streit, 236 F.3d at 562.

Further, California Government Code section 25303 grants the county boards of supervisors broad fiscal and administrative powers for the management of county jails. Streit, 236 F.3d at 561. Under California Government Code section 23013, the counties also "retain the power to transfer control of a county jail from the sheriff to a county-created department of corrections." Id. The California Code also provides that California sheriffs are elected county officers. Id. at 562 (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 24000(b); Cal. Elec. Code §§ 314). Sheriffs are required to maintain their offices at the county seat with other county officers. Id. (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 24250). Sheriff vacancies are filled in the same manner as other elective county officers. Id. (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 24205). The services of the sheriff may be contracted out by the county--not the state. Id. (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 53069.8). We found that "[t]hese various state provisions lead inexorably to the conclusion that the [sheriff] is tied to the County in its political, administrative, and fiscal capacities." Id.

Finally, we examined California case law and concluded that the relevant cases further supported our holding that the county was liable for the sheriff's actions. Id. at 562-63 (discussing Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 86869 (Cal. 1974) (holding that the county was liable for the sheriff's failure to release a prisoner who had completed a sentence), and Beck v. County of Santa Clara, 251 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that control over the local prisons is within the authority of the individual counties)). We rejected the county's reliance on County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters), 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860 (Ct. App. 1998), in which the California Court of Appeal held that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department was a state actor and therefore immune from section 1983 liability. We noted that the cases presented distinct factual scenarios. Streit, 236 F.3d at 564. Moreover, we explained that we were not bound by the conclusion of the California Court of Appeal in Peters, because the question regarding section 1983 liability ultimately implicated federal, not state, law. Id. Our examination of "the precise function at issue in conjunction with the state constitution, codes, and case law" led us to"conclude that the [sheriff] acts as the final policymaker for the county when administering the County's release policy." Id. at 564-65.

C.

It requires little extension of Streit for us to conclude that the Shasta County Sheriff acts for the County, not the state, when investigating crime in the county. As we explained in Streit, the California Constitution clearly identifies the sheriff as a county officer. Streit, 236 F.3d at 561 (citing Cal. Const. art. XI, §§ 1(b)). That designation is not limited to the sheriff's function of managing the county jails. Moreover, as in Streit, nothing in California's cons...