Gattis v. Snyder

Decision Date24 January 2002
Docket NumberNo. 99-9006.,99-9006.
Citation278 F.3d 222
PartiesRobert Allen GATTIS, Appellant, v. Robert SNYDER, Warden, Delaware Correctional Center.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Kevin J. O'Connell, (Argued), Wilmington, DE, Counsel for Appellant.

Loren C. Meyers, (Argued), Wilmington, DE, Counsel for Appellee.

Before BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Chief Judge.

This is a death penalty appeal which presents, inter alia, a question as to the method of dealing with a mixed motive Batson challenge. Robert Allen Gattis, a prisoner on Delaware's death row, appeals from the judgment of the District Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Gattis v. Snyder, 46 F.Supp.2d 344 (D.Del.1999). The District Court found all of his claims to be procedurally barred, meritless or noncognizable. However, it found the five claims which it addressed on the merits to meet the standards for a certificate of appealability. These claims are: (1) that trial delays denied Gattis the right to a speedy trial; (2) that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by an improper peremptory challenge; (3) that trial counsel were ineffective; (4) that the sentencing court violated Gattis' constitutional rights by sentencing him under Delaware's revised death penalty even though the crime of which he was convicted occurred prior to the statute's enactment; and (5) that the Delaware Supreme Court denied him due process when it affirmed his conviction and death sentence on collateral review based on a different factual basis from that argued to the jury. Because Gattis has not asked this Court to expand the scope of the certificate of appealability to include any of the other claims he presented in his habeas corpus petition, our review is confined to those five claims.

Gattis' contention that application of the amended death penalty statute to him violates the ex post facto clause because he committed the crime eighteen months prior to the enactment of the amendment has already been rejected. See Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 924, 121 S.Ct. 1365, 149 L.Ed.2d 293 (2001). Hence we need not discuss it further. We will, however, address each of Gattis' other contentions, and, finding them without merit, will affirm. The question of particular significance is the manner of dealing with an attack on a peremptory challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), where the prosecutor's motives related not only to the prospective jurors' race (or gender), but also to factors that were properly considered. We hold that the state courts' application of "dual motivation" analysis to Gattis' Batson challenge did not result in a decision that was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

I. Facts and Procedural History

In May 1990 a Delaware Grand Jury charged Gattis with first degree murder and related crimes arising out of the shooting of his girlfriend, Shirley Y. Slay. The Office of the Public Defender assigned Richard M. Baumeister and John H. McDonald to represent Gattis. Baumeister contacted Elizabeth Dewson, the Public Defender's Office's psycho-forensic evaluator, to interview Gattis and subsequently arranged further evaluation by Cono Galliani, Ph.D. The Superior Court initially set a trial date of November 1, 1990, but granted a continuance so that Gattis could be evaluated by a neurologist. The new trial date, March 20, 1991, was again postponed so that additional medical tests could be performed on Gattis. After the court set a new trial date of May 20, 1991, the state sought a postponement, to which Baumeister did not object because Gattis' psychological and neurological examinations would not be complete until July or August. At a hearing on May 29, 1991, Gattis expressed concern at the delays but agreed to postpone trial until November 26, 1991 to give counsel more time to prepare the case.

In the interim, on November 4, 1991, Governor Castle signed Senate Substitute 1 for Senate Bill 79, amending Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209 relating to the imposition of the death penalty; the terms of the amendments would apply to all defendants tried or sentenced after its effective date. Pursuant to the amended statute, at the penalty phase the jury recommends whether to impose the death penalty based on its response to the two questions set forth in the margin.1 The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation. Rather, section 4209, as amended, requires the judge to impose a death sentence after considering the recommendation of the jury if the judge finds:

a. Beyond a reasonable doubt at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance; and

b. By a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, that the aggravating circumstances found by the court to exist outweigh the mitigation circumstances found by the court to exist.

Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)a-b (1995). Pursuant to the version of § 4209 in existence before November 4, 1991, the death penalty could not be imposed unless the jury had unanimously recommended that sentence.

In the wake of this enactment, and pursuant to Delaware Supreme Court Rule 41, the Delaware Superior Court certified questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court concerning whether the amended statute violated the United States Constitution or the Delaware Constitution. Defendants awaiting trial for first degree murder whose alleged crimes occurred before the effective date of the new law were given an opportunity to participate in the certification process. Gattis participated. The Superior Court issued an Administrative Directive postponing all trials and penalty hearings in capital first degree murder cases while the Delaware Supreme Court considered the certified questions. In February 1992 the Delaware Supreme Court responded, finding that section 4209, as amended, did not violate either constitution. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992).

Meanwhile, in January 1992, the Office of the Public Defender moved for leave to withdraw as counsel. The court granted the motion and appointed Howard F. Gillis to represent Gattis, but Gillis withdrew from the case due to a health problem. On March 5, 1992, the court appointed Jerome M. Capone to represent Gattis. Five days later, the court scheduled trial to commence on September 9, 1992. On March 30, 1992, the court appointed Joseph M. Bernstein as co-counsel.

Trial finally commenced on September 1, 1992. On September 22, 1992, the jury found Gattis guilty of first degree murder, first degree burglary, possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and two counts of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. After the penalty hearing, the jury found unanimously that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of both of these statutory aggravating circumstances. Ten out of twelve jurors also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Based on his review of the jury's recommendation and additional argument from the parties, the trial judge determined that the state had established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, on October 29, 1992, the Court ordered that Gattis be executed by lethal injection.

On direct appeal, Gattis asserted various claims of error relating to the admissibility of evidence, that the death penalty was not proportionate to the offense, and that the jury was not randomly selected. After remand for an evidentiary hearing on one issue, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del.), cert. denied sub nom. Gattis v. Delaware, 513 U.S. 843, 115 S.Ct. 132, 130 L.Ed.2d 75 (1994).

Gattis then moved for post-conviction relief, which was denied, and also filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief.2 The Superior Court found all of Gattis' claims to be procedurally defaulted and/or meritless. However, the court granted Gattis' motion for reargument with regard to his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an accidental shooting defense before trial. Unpersuaded, the court later denied Gattis' motion for post-conviction relief.

On appeal of his collateral challenge, Gattis argued, inter alia, that a forensic scientist, Stuart H. James, would have testified at trial that the prosecution's theory of the case was physically impossible. After argument, the Delaware Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court to determine whether the state's theory was physically impossible. The court also directed the Superior Court to consider whether the state improperly excluded a potential juror, Wilfred Moore, for gender-related reasons. The Superior Court found both claims meritless. After the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174 (Del.1997), cert. denied sub nom. Gattis v. Delaware, 522 U.S. 1124, 118 S.Ct. 1070, 140 L.Ed.2d 130 (1998), the Superior Court rescheduled Gattis' execution for January 9, 1998.

On November 25, 1997, Gattis filed in the District Court for the District of Delaware a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he raised ten claims. The District Court granted Gattis' motions for a stay of execution, appointment of counsel and expansion of the record, but denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing. Importantly, after the respondent filed its answering brief, Gattis...

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