State v. Cohen
| Decision Date | 11 February 1992 |
| Citation | 604 A.2d 846 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Parties | STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Charles M. COHEN, Defendant. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. James Allen RED DOG, Defendant. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Robert Allen GATTIS, Defendant. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Joseph SHIELDS, Jr., Defendant. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Jermaine WRIGHT; Lorinzo Dixon, Defendants. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Meri-Ya M. BAKER; Bryon S. Dickerson, Defendants. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Henry L. De JESUS, Defendant. . Submitted: |
On Certification of Questions of Law from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County. QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr. (argued), and Loren C. Meyers, Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for plaintiff.
Nancy Jane Perillo (argued), J. Dallas Winslow, Edward C. Pankowski, Jr., John H. McDonald, Richard M. Baumeister, Raymond J. Otlowski, Brian J. Bartley (argued), and Bernard J. O'Donnell, Office of Public Defender, Wilmington, Jeffrey K. Bartels (argued), and John Willard, Bartels and Willard, Wilmington, for defendants.
Bruce M. Stargatt and Bruce L. Silverstein, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for amicus curiae, ACLU, in support of defendants' arguments.
Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.
Defendants await trial for first-degree murder, and the State intends to seek the death penalty as to each of them. Issues concerning the construction and constitutionality of Delaware's death penalty statute, as modified by 68 Del.Laws Ch. 181 (codified at 11 Del.C. § 4209) (the "new law"),1 are presented in these questions certified to us by the Superior Court under Supreme Court Rule 41. With the exception of the charges against Henry L. De Jesus, all of the alleged murders occurred before the new law became effective. The defendants raise numerous constitutional objections to the new law and its application to them. We find the new law valid in all respects and fully applicable to all the defendants. The certified questions are answered in accordance with these conclusions.
The following questions of law have been certified by the Superior Court and accepted by us:
1. Does the new law mandate imposition of a death penalty, if the sentencing court makes its findings required under 11 Del.C. § 4209(d)(1)(a) and (b) against the defendant?
2. If the answer to certified question 1 is "yes", does the new law violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the Cruel Punishments' Clause of Article I, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution?
3. If the answer to certified question 1 is "yes", does the new law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution and/or the Cruel Punishments' Clause of Article I, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution, in that a death sentence is mandated without a finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt?
4. Does the new law, by designating the court as the sentencing authority in capital cases here, violate the defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and/or Article I, Section 4, and Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution and related Delaware statutory and court rule provisions, to a trial by jury on the issue of punishment?
5. Should the new law be found constitutionally infirm under any of the grounds set forth in certified questions 2, 3 or 4, what law applies to the sentencing of defendants convicted of murder first degree for offenses committed prior to the effective date of those provisions?
6. Should the new law be found constitutionally infirm under any of the grounds set forth in certified questions 2, 3 or 4, what law applies to the sentencing of defendants convicted of murder first degree for offenses committed after the effective date of those provisions?
7. Should the revised provisions of the new law be found constitutionally or otherwise infirm in any limited respect, are those provisions severable?
8. Is the application of the new law to all defendants tried or sentenced after its effective date violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution or any other provision of the United States Constitution?
9. Is the application of the new law to all defendants tried or sentenced after its effective date violative of the Due Process Clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution with respect to the determination of punishment or any other provision of the Delaware Constitution?
10. Since the new law provides that the jury make a recommendation only, does the jury have to be "death qualified"?
On November 4, 1991, the Governor signed Senate Substitute 1 for Senate Bill 79 ("Bill") which had been passed by the General Assembly on October 24, 1991. The Bill revised Delaware's death penalty statute in several respects. Most significantly, the new law changed the roles of the judge and jury in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. Thus, the jury now functions only in an advisory capacity. The judge, after taking the jury's recommendation into consideration, has the ultimate responsibility for determining whether the defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
The new law was enacted under a suspension of legislative rules on the day it was introduced. There was little debate in either house of the General Assembly. The catalyst for these rapid developments was the imposition of life sentences on defendants by a New Castle County jury in a much publicized capital murder case involving the execution style murders of two armored car guards. Similar legislation, however, had been pending in the State Senate since March 26, 1991.
We accepted certification of the foregoing questions by the Superior Court to resolve important issues regarding the construction and constitutionality of the new law. Pending these proceedings, the President Judge of the Superior Court has stayed all capital murder trials.
As to Certified Question No. 1:
The new law mandates imposition of the death penalty if the sentencing court finds: 1) at least one statutory aggravating circumstance; and 2) the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d). There is no ambiguity in that provision. The clear language of the new law provides that "[a] sentence of death shall be imposed ... if the Court finds" that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Id. (emphasis added).
Defendants contend that the new law should be interpreted so as to include a separate "totality of the circumstances" analysis prior to the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the new law would only mandate a death sentence if, under the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that death is the appropriate penalty. We reject that interpretation for the following reasons.
First, the defendants' totality of the circumstances analysis is encompassed within the weighing process required by the new law. Prior to imposing sentence the trial court is required to weigh the aggravating factors against those in mitigation. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d)(1)(b). The defendants argue that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is simply a mechanical process devoid of judgment. That contention is meritless.
In interpreting the Florida death penalty statute upon which the new law is patterned, the Florida Supreme Court noted that:
The procedure to be followed by the trial judges and juries is not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and which can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of the circumstances present.
State v. Dixon, Fla.Supr., 283 So.2d 1, 10 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); see also Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 419, 543 A.2d 1068, 1075 (1988) (). We cannot conceive of a relevant factor in a totality of the circumstances analysis which would not also be weighed as a mitigating or aggravating factor under the new law. Thus, any distinct totality of the circumstances analysis would be redundant.
Second, the new law clearly provides that a death sentence shall be imposed if the trial court finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d). While the new law does not explicitly provide for a separate totality of the circumstances analysis, it is subsumed in the weighing process. Beyond that observation, it is not our province to impose a wholly separate analysis contrary to the statute's clear and unambiguous language.2 See Spielberg v. State, Del.Supr., 558 A.2d 291, 293 (1989) ("Where the intent of the legislature is clearly reflected by the unambiguous language in the statute, the language itself controls").
Accordingly, Certified Question 1 is answered in the affirmative.
As to Certified Question No. 2:
The new law as drafted by the legislature and interpreted by this Court does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or the Cruel Punishments' Clause of the Delaware Constitution.
The mandatory aspect of the new law has previously been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3056, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Blystone...
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