300 Gramatan Ave. Associates v. State Division of Human Rights

• Decision Date: 13 July 1978
• Citation: 45 N.Y.2d 176,408 N.Y.S.2d 54,379 N.E.2d 1183
• Parties: , 379 N.E.2d 1183, 96 A.L.R.3d 488 300 GRAMATAN AVENUE ASSOCIATES, Respondent, v. STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (complaint of Harold Johnson), Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 54

408 N.Y.S.2d 54

45 N.Y.2d 176, 379 N.E.2d 1183, 96

A.L.R.3d 488

300 GRAMATAN AVENUE ASSOCIATES, Respondent, v. STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (complaint of Harold Johnson), Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 13, 1978.

Alan J. Saks and Ann Thacher Anderson, New York City, for appellant

Louis I. Kravitz, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Judge.

Petitioner, 300 Gramatan Avenue Associates, owns an apartment building with about 96 units in the City of Mount Vernon. In March of 1975, one of its tenants, Frank Interdonti, a postal worker, told Harold Johnson, a Black friend who served as passport agent and registry clerk at the same post office, that there was an apartment available upstairs at his address. Johnson went to the premises on March 10, 1975, examined a vacant five-room apartment and, after talking with the superintendent, attempted to rent it. Told a bit later that day that the apartment was "under litigation" and not available for rental, Johnson filed a complaint two days later with the State Division of Human Rights.

The commissioner of said division, after a hearing, determined that petitioner, in violation of the Human Rights Law, had discriminated against Johnson because of his race and color, by refusing to consider him as a prospective tenant for an available apartment. The State Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed. In a proceeding under section 298 of the Executive Law to review the order of the appeal board, the Appellate Division, one Justice dissenting, held that the determination of the commissioner as affirmed by the board was not supported by substantial evidence and that the findings made were arbitrary and capricious, granted the petition of the owner, on the law, annulled the order and dismissed the complaint.

Underlying this appeal is the issue of whether the order of the commissioner was "supported by substantial evidence on the whole record", to which the review of the appeal board was limited (Executive Law, § 297-a, subd. 7, par. d; see, also, par. e). If the findings of fact, on which the order of the appeal board was based, were "supported by sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole", we are directed by statute that they are conclusive and that order should not be disturbed (Executive Law § 298; City of Schenectady v. State Div. of Human Rights, 37 N.Y.2d 421, 424, 373 N.Y.2d 59, 62, 335 N.E.2d 290, 292).

Generally speaking, upon a judicial review of findings made by an administrative agency, a determination is regarded as being supported by substantial evidence when the proof is "so substantial that from it an inference of the existence of the fact found may be drawn reasonably" (Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 273, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255; Labor Bd. v. Columbian Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660; see 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in New York 328-340; Advisory Comm. on Practice and Procedure (2d Preliminary Rep. 1958) 399). ^* This general rule, this statement of meaning, likewise applies to a judicial examination of findings of the State Commissioner of Human Rights (Matter of Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 44, 119 N.E.2d 581, 583). So too, where there is room for choice, neither the weight which might be accorded nor the choice which might be made by a court are germane upon an analysis for the presence of substantial evidence before the commissioner (State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia Univ. in City of N. Y., 39 N.Y.2d 612, 616, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21, 350 N.E.2d 396, 397; Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 267, 26 N.E.2d 247, 252, Supra ).

The concept of substantial evidence, a term of art as related to administrative decision making, is rather easily verbalized but, when put to use in respect to a particular determination, frequently causes difficulty and disagreement, as witnessed here by the divergence at the Appellate Division (see Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 274, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255, Supra ; see, also, Matter of Paulsen (Catherwood), 27 A.D.2d 493, 495, 280 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493). It is related to the charge or controversy and involves a weighing of the quality and quantity of the proof (Matter of Di Nardo v. Monaghan, 282 App.Div. 5, 7, 121 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121; McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 352); it means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact (New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Shattuck Co., 260 App.Div. 315, 317, 20 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951). Essential attributes are relevance and a probative character (Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126; Matter of Ralph v. Board of Estimate of City of N. Y., 306 N.Y. 447, 454, 119 N.E.2d 37, 40). Marked by its substance its solid nature and ability to inspire confidence, substantial evidence does not rise from bare surmise, conjecture, speculation or rumor (cf. Matter of Milea v. Easy Appliance Div., Murray Corp., 29 A.D.2d 730, 286 N.Y.S.2d 522). More than seeming or imaginary, it is less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt (see People ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 275 N.Y. 357, 370, 9 N.E.2d 961, 965; Matter of Erin Wine & Liq. Store v. O'Connell, 283 App.Div. 443, 446, 128 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367, aff'd 307 N.Y. 768, 121 N.E.2d 614; Matter of Paulsen (Catherwood), 27 A.D.2d 493, 495, 280 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493, Supra; cf. State v. Randecker, 79 Wn.2d 512, 517-518, 487 P.2d 1295; District of Columbia v. Heman Ward, Inc., 261 A.2d 836, 840 (D.C.App.)).

Whether an administrative agency determination is shored up by substantial evidence is a question of law to be decided by the courts (Matter of Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 301 N.Y. 86, 90-91, 92 N.E.2d 903, 904, cert. den. 340 U.S. 933, 71 S.Ct. 498, 95 L.Ed. 673; Matter of McGuinn v. Woolworth Co., 277 App.Div. 1066, 100 N.Y.S.2d 617), it having been stated with some frequency that insufficient evidence is, in the eyes of the law, no evidence (Matter of Case, 214 N.Y. 199, 203-204, 108 N.E. 408, 409; Matter of 54 Cafe & Rest. v. O'Connell, 274 App.Div. 428, 431, 84 N.Y.S.2d 729, 732). Judicial review of the determination made by an administrative agency, such as the State Division of Human Rights, is limited to a consideration of whether that resolution was supported by substantial evidence upon the whole record (Matter of Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 44, 119 N.E.2d 581, 583, Supra ; see State Administrative Procedure Act, § 302, subd. 3; § 306, subd. 1; CPLR 7803, subd. 4; Matter of Kelly v. Murphy, 20 N.Y.2d 205, 209, 282 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257, 229 N.E.2d 40, 42); and allowance may not be made for information outside of it (Matter of Simpson v. Wolansky, 38 N.Y.2d 391, 396, 380 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634, 343 N.E.2d 274, 277). A practical test, employed in ascertaining whether the proof is "so substantial that from it an inference of the existence of the fact found may be drawn reasonably", is found in measuring the evidence against the standard of sufficiency such as to require a court to submit it as a question of fact to a jury (Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 273, 26 N.E.2d 247, Supra; Erin Wine & Liq. Store v. O'Connell, 283 App.Div. 443, 446-447, 128 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367-368, aff'd 307 N.Y. 768, 121 N.E.2d 614, Supra ).

A court reviewing the substantiality of the evidence upon which an administrative agency has acted exercises a genuine judicial function and does not confirm a determination simply because it was made by such an agency (Matter of McCormack v. National City Bank, 303 N.Y. 5, 8-9, 99 N.E.2d 887, 888). In final analysis, substantial evidence consists of proof within the whole record of such quality and quantity as to generate conviction in and persuade a fair and detached fact finder that, from that proof as a premise, a conclusion or ultimate fact may be extracted reasonably probatively and logically (cf. Matter of Di Nardo v. Monaghan, 282 App.Div. 5, 7, 121 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121, Supra; Matter of Thomas v. Codd, 51 A.D.2d 418, 420, 382 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484; Matter of Phinn v. Kross, 8 A.D.2d 132, 137, 186 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470; 24 Carmody-Wait 2d, Proceeding Against Body or Officer, § 145:350). Put a bit differently, "the reviewing court should review the whole record to determine whether there is a rational basis in it for the findings of fact supporting the agency's decision" (McCormick Evidence (2d ed), § 352, p. 847; see Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839, 313 N.E.2d 321, 325; Siegel, New York Practice (1978), § 560, p. 783).

As in Stork Rest., 282 N.Y., at p. 267, 26 N.E.2d, at p. 252 Et seq., we brief the testimony to the extent necessary to discover and decide whether there was evidence which adequately upholds the commissioner's and thus the appeal board's determination. Here, there was evidence, Inter alia : that in December, 1974 apartment D55 consisting of five rooms became vacant or abandoned, the former tenant having moved out in...