Commonwealth v. Nichols

• Decision Date: 22 December 1938
• Citation: 18 N.E.2d 166,301 Mass. 584
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. NICHOLS. SAME v. THOMPSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

301 Mass. 584

18 N.E.2d 166

COMMONWEALTH

v.NICHOLS.

SAME

v.THOMPSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Dec. 22, 1938.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Burns, Judge.

Elmira Nichols and Pauline Thompson were convicted of violating a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution upon streets of handbills or similar papers, and they bring exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.A. B. Cenedella, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Milford, for the commonwealth.

S. S. Grant, of Boston, for defendants.

QUA, Justice.

Each defendant has been convicted and fined $5 for violation of c. 36, s. 12, of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Worcester, which reads as follows: ‘No person shall distribute in or place upon any street or way, any placard, handbill, flyer, poster, advertisement or paper of any description. No person shall transport through the streets of the City any rubbish without first covering or fastening such rubbish so as to prevent the same from being blown or scattered about in the streets.’

At the beginning of the trial, before any evidence was introduced, each defendant moved ‘to quash and dismiss' the complaint against her on the ground that it did not charge the commission of any crime and that the ordinance was unconstitutional and void. In each case the only exception is to the denial of the motion. In each case the only point raised and argued is that the ordinance is void on its face in that it interferes with the freedom of the press as guaranteed by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1, and by art. 16 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. We confine our discussion to this point, and we assume in accordance with the trend of recent decisions that freedom of the press is a ‘liberty’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by State law; that, for present purposes, a duly authorized city ordinance is a State law; and that liberty of the press extends to the kinds of printed matter to which the ordinance refers and includes distribution as well as publication. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, and cases cited.

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Kimball, Mass., 13 N.E.2d 18, 114 A.L.R. 1440, we had occasion to consider the validity of an ordinance of Fall River the main portion of which, exclusive of a proviso at the end, was substantially the same as the ordinance here involved. We there held that the ordinance, considered apart from the proviso, was valid. On page 21 we said, ‘The distribution of handbills or similar papers in streets tends to annoy travelers and abutters, to obstruct the streets, and to litter them with paper. It seems to us a valid exercise of the power to maintain the ‘internal police’ of a city, to prohibit such distribution entirely.' Many cases were cited in support of that statement. Although there are cases to the contrary, we felt and we still feel that the cases cited represent the sounder view. Reference to the original papers in the Kimball Case shows that the same contention was argued there that is urged here. That case is a precedent upon the issue here presented. Ordinarily we would regard such a precedent as decisive and would forbear further discussion. But it is pressed upon us that the case of Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, decided a few weeks after the Kimball Case was decided, is inconsistent with that case, and it therefore becomes our duty to consider whether we are now required to modify our views.

Freedom of the press is a necessity in our political system. It must be sedulously guarded against subtle encroachments under the guise of specious pretexts. But like other constitutional rights it is subject to reasonable rules formulated to serve the public interest and to prevent abuse in the manner of the exercise of the right, so long as the right itself is neither denied nor impaired. This principle is fully recognized in recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 667, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138;Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095;Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484;Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707, 708, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357;De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278. See Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313,15 Am.Dec. 214;Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, 103 N.E. 923, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 879, Ann.Cas.1915B, 659; Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 219 Mass. 30, 106 N.E. 556, L.R.A.1915B, 706, Ann.Cas.1916D, 846;Commonwealth v. Anderson, 272 Mass. 100, 106, 172 N.E. 114, 69 A.L.R. 1097. ‘Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.’ Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567, 31 S.Ct. 259, 262, 55 L.Ed. 328. The question before us is whether we can properly say that the ordinance is not a reasonable regulation of the use of the streets affecting only incidentally one method of distributing printed matter, but that it is an actual impairment of the constitutional freedom of the press. We are justified in overriding the judgment of the city's legislative body only if its action is clearly beyond the scope of its power. Commonwealth v. Mulhall, 162 Mass. 496, 498, 39 N.E. 183,44 Am.St.Rep. 387.

The wording of the section of the ordinance as a whole indicates that it was directed to the object of preventing the accumulation of litter and rubbish in the streets and preserving the comfort and preventing the annoyance of travellers, and that it was not directed against the liberty of the press. Properly construed, we see no reason why in practical operation it should extend beyond the legitimate purpose for which it was designed. It does not prevent the casual passing of papers from one traveller to another in isolated instances. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 158 Mass. 555, 33 N.E. 651. It forbids persons to ‘distribute.’ This implies an offering to many people, with the consequent probability of littering the neighborhood with papers which, if not painstakingly gathered by someone, will become unsightly, annoying and obnoxious. We think that the word ‘distribute,’ in connection with the other language used and in view of the apparent object of the section, does not include sale, and that the ordinance does not forbid the sale of newspapers or other printed matter in the streets....