Commonwealth v. Libbey

• Decision Date: 09 January 1914
• Citation: 103 N.E. 923,216 Mass. 356
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. LIBBEY; COMMONWEALTH v. CRANE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

216 Mass. 356

103 N.E. 923

COMMONWEALTH

v.LIBBEY;

COMMONWEALTH

v.CRANE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Jan. 9, 1914.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; Frederic H. Chase and John F. Brown, Judges.

Walter M. Libbey and J. F. Crane were separately convicted of advertising for employés without stating that a strike existed, and except. Exceptions overruled.

Henry C. Attwill, Dist. Atty., of Lynn, and A. C. Webber, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth.

D. D. Corcoran, of Boston, for defendant Crane.

Roger Clapp and J. J. Feely, both of Boston, for defendant Libbey.

RUGG, C. J.

St. 1910, c. 445, in substance requires that every employer who, during a strike or labor disturbance among his employés, publicly advertises in newspapers for persons to work in place of the strikers, ‘shall plainly and explicitly mention in such advertisements * * * that a strike, lockout or other labor disturbance exists.’ The defendants were found guilty of infractions of this act. The chief question is whether it is within the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Legislature to enact the statute.

[1] The Legislature may ‘make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome orders, laws, statutes and ordinances' not repugnant to the Constitution. Part 2, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution. This is strong language, and it always has been interpreted broadly in its application to statutes enacted from time to time by the Legislature to satisfy the changing needs of society. But the Constitution also guarantees to all citizens the blessings of liberty and the right to happiness and safety, and the right to acquire and possess property. In general terms also the federal Constitution gives substantially the same assurances. The liberty which thus has such ample constitutional security does not signify absolute and unrestrained license to follow the dictates of an unbridled will. Constitutional freedom means a liberty regulated by law. The right of the individual is subject to reasonable restraints made by general law for the common good. Said Mr. Justice Hughes, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567, 31 Sup. Ct. 259, 262 (55 L. Ed. 328): ‘Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.’

[2] The present statute interferes with individual liberty to some extent. But the state, in the exercise of the police power, may legislate for the public health, the public safety and the public morals, and in a certain qualified sense for the public welfare, and thus restrict the freedom of the individual. Com. v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 550, 78 N. E. 136,11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 968,6 Ann. Cas. 842;Com. v. Beaulieu, 213 Mass. 138, 99 N. E. 955;Opinion of Justices, 208 Mass. 619, 94 N. E. 1044,34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 771.

It is often difficult to draw the line between the rights of the citizen to pursue and enjoy liberty, to seek and obtain happiness and to acquire and possess property, on the one side, and the right of the state to enact laws in the general interests of all the people, on the other side. The law must not be arbitrary; it must be reasonable and general in its operation, and have a manifest tendency to promote public health, safety and morality in some aspect. The governing constitutional principles have been discussed often and in great elaboration. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 86 N. E. 916, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746, 128 Am. St. Rep. 446, affirmed 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74, 56 L. Ed. 175;Dewey v. Richardson, 206 Mass. 430, 92 N. E. 708;John P. Squire & Co. v. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18, 69 N. E. 312,102 Am. St. Rep. 322;Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925,23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439;Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 494, 29 Sup. Ct. 174, 53 L. Ed. 295;Griflith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. 132, 54 L. Ed. 1151;Com. v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719,67 L. R. A. 935; s. c., 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643, 3 Ann. Cas. 765;Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 53, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133;Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764;Laurel Hill Cemetery Co. v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 30 Sup. Ct. 301, 54 L. Ed. 515;Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 33 Sup. Ct. 715, 57 L. Ed. 1022;Minn. Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 26 Sup. Ct. 159, 50 L. Ed. 322.

[3][4] This statute is not open to the objection that it is class legislation. It applies to all employers similarly circumstanced. It is not arbitrary, and has a reasonable relation to the public interests. It does not destroy equality before the law, nor create special privileges. Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558,34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 604, and cases there cited; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128, 45 L. Ed. 186;Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 582, 33 Sup. Ct. 610, 57 L. Ed. 971;Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 522, 33 Sup. Ct. 985, 57 L. Ed. 1597;Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 33 Sup. Ct. 867, 57 L. Ed. 1190. ‘The Legislature is permitted to make a reasonable classification and before a court can interfere with the exercise of its judgment it must be able to say that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.’ Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 30, 33 Sup. Ct. 692, 693 (57 L. Ed. 1050). This statute does not interfere with the pursuit of happiness.

[5] It is urged that it hampers the right to conduct business beyond what is reasonable, and thus violates the right to acquire and possess property and to make contracts to that end. The situation in an industrial enterprise, when a strike, lockout or other labor disturbance is in progress, manifestly may be quite different from the standpoint of prospective workmen from what it is when peaceful conditions obtain. It is not necessary to enumerate them. Some of them have been adverted to in decisions of this court, and others of a different character readily can be imagined. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011,51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330;Nute v. Boston & Maine R. R., 214 Mass. 184, 100 N. E. 1099. The social and economic surroundings of an employment might be attractive in the absence of labor troubles, and repulsive when they exist, to considerable numbers of men. Possibly the opposite may be true as to others in society. The disinclination on the part of some to seek employment in place of strikers may arise from various causes. In view of these considerations it may have been thought that laborers ought to be given a true statement of the condition of labor in this regard, and that any advertisement should give this fact if it exists, as a protection to those who might...