United States v. Platt

• Citation: 31 F. Supp. 788
• Decision Date: 06 March 1940
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 7724.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. PLATT et al.
• Court: United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas

31 F. Supp. 788

UNITED STATES v. PLATT et al.

Cr. No. 7724.

District Court, S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

March 6, 1940.

Douglas W. McGregor, U. S. Dist. Atty., and George O'Brien John, Asst. U. S. Dist. Atty., both of Houston, Tex., for the Government.

William Z. Rozan, of Houston, Tex., for defendants.

ALLRED, District Judge.

The named defendant, along with two others, is charged by indictment with violation of the Federal Firearms Act, Title 15, Secs. 901(6) and 902(f), U.S.Code, 15 U.S. C.A. §§ 901(6), 902(f), it being alleged that prior to the commission of the instant offense, the defendants had been convicted of crimes of violence (the named defendant having been convicted on July 6, 1933, of the crime of robbery by use of firearms in Jefferson County, Texas); and that on or about November 14, 1939, the defendants "did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully receive a firearm, to-wit: one Smith & Wesson revolver .38 caliber * * * which firearm had theretofore been shipped and transported by persons to the grand jurors unknown in interstate commerce, that is to say, the said defendants, at the time and place aforesaid, did have in their possession and under their control the said firearm described as aforesaid." (Italics supplied.)

The named defendant moves to quash and demurs to the indictment on two grounds: first, that both sections of the Federal Firearms Act, under which the indictment is brought, are in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States as set out in the Fifth Amendment; second, that the Statute operates as an ex post facto law in so far as the named defendant is concerned.

First: The applicable portion of the Federal Firearms Act reads as follows:

"Sec. § 902. * * *

"(f) It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by such person in violation of this chapter."

It will be observed at the outset that the statute making it an offense to receive any firearm which has been shipped, or transported, in interstate commerce is not applicable to all persons, but only to those of a certain class, to-wit: "any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice."

Defendant makes no attack upon the reasonableness of this classification, or the right of Congress to prohibit the receiving of a firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce by such person. In any event, it would appear that Congress has the right to regulate interstate commerce in this regard since the act forbids the use of such commerce as an agency to promote the spread of well known evils throughout the nation. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699, 37 A.L.R. 1407, (sustaining the constitutionality of the motor vehicle theft act. Title 18, Sec. 408, U.S.Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 408).

The evils sought to be corrected by Congress through the Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., are well known — the practices of roaming racketeers and predatory criminals who know no state lines — a situation beyond the power of control by local authorities to such an extent as to constitute a national menace. Many of these traveling thugs are ex-convicts, men who have been convicted of crimes of violence and presumably would not hesitate to repeat them. After such a convict has completed his term he is no longer subject to parole or supervision. Even in cases of probation or parole, the records are replete with violations of the conditions imposed, in some instances false reports as to whereabouts and activities being made to the supervising officers. It is but natural for such ex-convicts to cross state lines and put as much distance behind them as possible; especially in cases of former inmates of state prisons. Sec.Record of Hearings on H.R. 9066 before The Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 73rd Congress.

The Act has never been construed. It is the outgrowth of a program suggested to Congress by the Attorney General in 1934, resulting in an act approved on June 26, 1934 (48 Stat. 1236-1240, Incl., Tit. 26, U.S. Code, Sec. 1132 et seq., 26 U.S.C.A. § 1132 et seq.), levying a tax upon certain firearms and regulating interstate traffic therein. This act was held to be constitutional and not an invasion of the reserved powers of the state, or violative of the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution, guaranteeing the right of the people to keep and bear arms. United States v. Miller et al., 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206.

Defendant's proposition, as briefed and argued before the Court, is as follows: "The Federal Firearms Statute (U.S.C.A., Title 15, Sec. 901(6), Sec. 902(f),) providing that proof of a prior conviction of a crime of violence, and proof of the defendant's possession of a firearm subsequent to the prior conviction shall constitute prima facie or presumptive evidence that the firearm was shipped, transported, or received in interstate or foreign commerce, constitutes a denial of due process of law as provided for under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." (Italics supplied.)

Both the defendant and the Government cite the well known line of cases holding that legislation declaring that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the existence of another fact is valid if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred; and that if the presumption is not unreasonable and not made conclusive of the rights of the person against whom raised, it does not constitute a denial of the due process clause; and, conversely, that if the connection is irrational or unreasonable, such a statute does constitute such a denial. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 215, 73 L.Ed. 575; McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Company, 241 U.S. 79, 36 S.Ct. 498, 60 L.Ed. 899; Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1, 42 S.Ct. 204, 66 L.Ed. 431; Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 48 S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632; Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 191; Mobile J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136, 55 L.Ed. 78, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 226, Ann.Cas.1912A, 463, etc.

The question is, therefore, in this case: Is there a rational connection between the fact proved (possession of the firearm) and the ultimate fact presumed (that the firearm was shipped, transported, or received in interstate commerce)? And is the inference of transportation or receipt in interstate commerce from the fact of possession so unreasonable as to be purely an arbitrary mandate? These questions are not easy.

Criminal statutes creating presumptions generally deal with such questions as knowledge and intent; such as guilty knowledge upon a charge of receiving and concealing stolen property. There are numerous authorities upholding the validity of state statutes creating such presumptions. A statute providing that proof of possession of stolen goods would be prima facie evidence of the theft of such goods would probably be valid; but such a statute would not dispense with the necessity of proving that the particular goods had actually been taken from the possession of the owner without his consent.

Here, however, the presumption is not that the defendant received the firearm with guilty knowledge that it had been unlawfully transported in interstate commerce; but the presumption created is that, since he possessed it, it had theretofore been transported or shipped in interstate commerce. The Government only has to prove that the defendant, having been before convicted of a crime of violence, had in his possession a pistol, then the law presumes that it was transported in interstate commerce; and the burden is cast on the defendant to explain such possession to the satisfaction of the jury; otherwise the evidence is sufficient to convict.

The Government cites Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 471, 69 L.Ed. 904, convicted of concealing a quantity of opium in August, 1923, after it was unlawful to import it and with knowledge that it had been unlawfully introduced into the United States contrary to the Act of Feb. 9, 1909, as amended (35 Stat. 614, Ch. 100, as amended Jan. 17, 1914; 38 Stat. 275, Ch. 9; Tit. 21, Sec. 171 et seq., U.S.Code, 21 U.S.C.A. § 171 et seq.).

This Act prohibited, with exceptions, the importation of opium in any form after April 1, 1909; and prohibited the concealment of such opium after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law. The Act contained two presumptive provisions: (1) that whenever the defendant is shown to have, or to have had, possession of such opium, "such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the jury;" and (2) that on and after July 1, 1913 (more than four years after the Act went into effect) "all smoking opium or opium prepared for smoking found within the United States shall be presumed to have been imported after the first day of April, nineteen hundred and nine, and the burden of proof shall be on the claimant or the accused to rebut such presumption."

The Supreme Court said: "We think it is not an illogical inference that opium, found in this country more than 4 years (in the present case, more than 14 years) after its importation had been prohibited, was unlawfully imported." (Italics supplied.)

Certainly no one could argue that it was unreasonable for Congress to provide that after more than four years had...