State v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 04 August 1944
• Docket Number: No. 33725.,33725.
• Citation: 218 Minn. 247,15 N.W.2d 554
• Parties: STATE v. KELLY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

15 N.W.2d 554

218 Minn. 247

STATE v. KELLY.

No. 33725.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

August 4, 1944.

Appeal from District Court, Freeborn County; Norman E. Peterson, Judge.

J. A. Kelly was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquors for sale in a prohibition county, and he appeals.

Reversed and new trial granted.

Moonan & Moonan, of Waseca, for appellant.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Ralph Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William P. Sturtz, Co. Atty., of Albert Lea, for respondent.

STREISSGUTH, Justice.

On September 11, 1943, the sheriff of Freeborn county, in which prohibition is in force, on his own verified complaint charging that defendant, at his dwelling house in the city of Albert Lea, had intoxicating liquors in his possession for the purpose of selling or otherwise disposing of the same, procured a search warrant commanding a search of such dwelling house for intoxicating liquors. Armed with the warrant, the sheriff on Sunday, September 12, at about noon, appeared at defendant's home and exhibited the warrant. Asked if he had any liquor, defendant stated that he had a case, and led the sheriff to the garage attached to his dwelling and there pointed out a case of Scotch whiskey. Also found in the garage was an empty carton marked with the trade-mark "Wilken Reserve Blended Whiskey." A thorough search was then made of both house and garage, but without further discovery of either liquor or incriminating evidence thereof. Defendant's automobile, at anchor nearby, was next searched. The glove compartment in the car was locked, but, upon request, defendant furnished the sheriff with the key. Inside the compartment were found three half-pint bottles of gin. No other liquor was found. The defendant told the sheriff that he, the defendant, had purchased the liquor for his own consumption.

On September 20, 1943, a criminal complaint, under Minn.St.1941, § 340.36, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 3200-51, charging defendant with the possession of intoxicating liquors for sale in a prohibition county, was filed in justice court. The justice, instead of trying defendant on the charge, conducted a preliminary hearing and bound him over to the district court for trial. At the trial the details and results of the search, as we have related them, were shown. The sheriff admitted that he "had no evidence that he [defendant] had made a sale."

1-2. The principal question presented is whether the proof was sufficient to justify a conviction. The trial court, in denying defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, considered itself bound by Minn.St.1941, § 340.66, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 3200-82, but stated, "it is a drastic proposition and a close question." That section provides: "The finding of any such intoxicating liquors in the possession of any person, by means of search warrant shall be prima facie evidence that such person had possession of such liquors for the purpose of selling, * * * the same without first having obtained license therefor * * *."

Squarely presented, therefore, is the question of the validity of the quoted statute as applied to a fact situation such as is disclosed by the record. That question does not involve the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It concerns only his constitutional rights. The law of the land is the only yardstick which can be allowed to gauge the liberties of citizens, whatever may be their just or ill desert.

Statutes creating artificial presumptions of fact and prima facie proof are by no means new or even modern.¹ They have long been recognized and enforced by this court. State ex rel. Robertson v. New England F. & C. Co., 126 Minn. 78, 147 N.W. 951, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 932, Ann. Cas.1915D, 549; Thorpe v. Pennock Merc. Co., 99 Minn. 22, 108 N.W. 940, 9 Ann.Cas. 229. Their function in criminal cases has been said to be "to make it possible to convict where proof of guilt is lacking." Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 64 S.Ct. 792, 798, 88 L.Ed. ___, ___. In fact, of recent years there has been such a marked increase in the creation of this statutory device for use in criminal prosecutions as to suggest not only a design to minimize the labor of investigators and prosecutors, but a legislative trend — supported by judicial adherence to the dictum that there are no vested rights in rules of evidence² — to consider the fundamental rights of the individual as secondary to the demands of society. See O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," 11 St. John's L.Rev. 167; Brosman, "The Statutory Presumption," 5 Tulane L.Rev. 178; Chamberlain, "Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney," 14 A. B. A. Jour. 287.

Such statutes are of two general types: those creating conclusive presumptions of law or fact, and those creating rebuttable presumptions of fact or "prima facie" proof. Those of the first type have met the almost uniform fate of being declared unconstitutional, as denying due process of law. See 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 10; Juster Bros., Inc., v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108, 7 N.W.2d 501. Those of the second type have met a varying fate, some withstanding and others succumbing to attacks on diverse grounds, viz., that the statute violated the due process clauses of state and federal constitutions; denied equal protection of the laws; impaired the right of trial by jury; deprived the accused of the presumption of innocence; compelled him to give testimony against himself; or encroached upon the powers of the judiciary. It would be a redundant task for this court to undertake a complete review and analysis of the many decisions passing upon the validity of such statutes, in view of the many exhaustive opinions, commentaries, and annotations which can be consulted for that purpose.³ However since the precise question here involved has not previously been presented to this court, we shall refer to many of the authorities in the course of our opinion.

The definite judicial trend has unquestionably been to allow the legislature a comparatively free hand in declaring that proof of certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of the commission of a crime, or of a criminal intent, or of some act constituting an essential ingredient of a crime. Courts generally agree, however, that the legislative power is not unlimited, and, in testing the validity of statutes creating prima facie proof, both federal and state courts have of recent years quite uniformly applied the rule comprehensively stated in Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43, 31 S.Ct. 136, 138, 55 L.Ed. 78, 80, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 226 229, Ann.Cas.1912A, 463, 464, 2 N.C.C.A. 243, 248 (a civil case), as follows:

"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not, under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed.

"If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself, prescribing a rule of evidence, in either criminal or civil cases does not shut out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue there is no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied him."

Since the Turnipseed case was decided in 1910, the test therein laid down has been applied by the United States Supreme Court, with varying results, in criminal as well as in civil cases involving the validity of presumptions and prima facie cases created by state as well as by federal statutes.⁴ The latest pronouncement by that court is Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519. There the court had under consideration the validity of § 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 902(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251, which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by such person in violation of this Act."

In a prosecution under the act, instituted in New Jersey, the government's evidence was limited to proof that in 1925 Tot had been convicted in another state of assault and battery, that in 1932 he pleaded non vult to a charge of burglary, and that in 1938 he was found in possession of a loaded automatic pistol. After denial of a motion for a directed verdict, Tot took the stand and testified that he purchased the pistol in 1933 or 1934. He admitted the criminal record charged in the indictment and other convictions. In rebuttal, the government produced testimony that the pistol had been manufactured in 1919 and shipped by the maker to Chicago, Illinois.

In United States v. Delia, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519, disposed of by the same decision, the court considered the validity of Delia's conviction in Michigan under the same act. The government's case against Delia consisted in proof that he had been previously convicted of robbery, was in possession of a loaded revolver manufactured in Massachusetts prior to 1920, and that some of the cartridges in the revolver had been manufactured in Ohio and some in Germany. Delia testified that he had, at about the time of his arrest, picked up the revolver when it was dropped by a person who attacked him, but there was testimony which tended to contradict this defense.

The question up for decision in both cas...