Sylvester Coal Company v. City of St. Louis
Decision Date | 07 November 1895 |
Parties | Sylvester Coal Company et al., Appellants, v. The City of St. Louis et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
Leverett Bell for appellants.
(1) Proceedings by a municipal corporation under an ordinance which is entirely void may be restrained. 2 High on Inj sec. 1247; Mayor v. Radeke, 49 Md. 217; Davis v Fasig, 128 Ind. 271; Rushville v. Rushville, 28 N.E. 853; Hitchcock v. St. Louis, 49 Mo. 484; Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 416; Schopp v St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131. (2) The plaintiffs are entitled to maintain this action jointly and there is no misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Smith v. Swomsteadt, 16 How. (U.S.) 288; Newmeyer v. Railroad, 52 Mo. 81; Ranney v. Vader, 67 Mo. 476; Overall v. Ruenzi, 67 Mo. 203; Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 416. (3) In the following cases in Missouri, illegal and unreasonable ordinances have been held to be void: St. Charles v. Nolley, 51 Mo. 122; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 220; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145; Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; Springfield v. Springfield, 85 Mo. 674; Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 416; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131; Hannibal v. Telephone Co., 31 Mo.App. 23. (4) Sections 1593 and 1594 of the ordinance in question are invalid provisions of ordinance and of no force or effect, because the system established by them constitutes a tax on sales and deliveries of coal in St. Louis for fuel and exacts three cents for each load sold and delivered which sum is paid into the treasury of the city of St. Louis; because said system is an unlawful interference with and burden on the sale and delivery of coal as fuel in St. Louis; because said system is unauthorized by the charter of St. Louis and the law of the land; because said system and said ordinance regulations are unreasonable and oppressive; because the regulation requiring a ticket signed by the city register and countersigned by the city comptroller in blank to be delivered to the purchaser with each load of coal adds no security to the purchaser as to the weight of the coal delivered, nor does it operate as or constitute any check on the seller of the coal as to such weight.
W. C. Marshall for respondents.
(1) The petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Turner v. Maryland, 100 U.S. 38; Ritchie v. Boynton, 114 Mass. 431; Eaton v. Keegan, 114 Mass. 443; Durgin v. Dyer, 68 Me. 143; Woods v. Armstrong, 34 Ala. 150; Mobile v. Trulle, 3 Ala. (U.S.) 140; Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Me. 54. It has been held that a city ordinance may require hay or coal to be weighed by city weighers. Stokes v. New York, 14 Wend. 87; Yates v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 673; Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.), Law, 49; Paige v. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392; Mayor, etc., v. Nichols, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 209; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 237; Chicago v. Quinby, 38 Ill. 274; Howe v. Norris, 12 Allen (Mass.), 82; Libby v. Downey, 5 Allen (Mass.), 299. (2) The plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Mere apprehension of a threatened wrong will not entitle one to an injunction. Church v. Maschop, 10 N.J.Eq. 57; Jenny v. Crase, 1 Cranch, U.S.C. C. 443; Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. (N. Y.) par. 448; Watrous v. Rogers, 16 Tex. 410. (3) A party seeking an injunction must show a peculiar injury, distinct from that which he suffers in common with the public. Falls Village, etc., Co. v. Tibbetts, 31 Conn. 165; Hovelman v. Railroad, 79 Mo. 632.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, sustaining a demurrer to plaintiffs' petition. The material allegations of the petition are, that the plaintiffs, the Sylvester Coal Company, The Berry-Horn Coal Company, The St. Louis Fuel Company and the Lebanon Machine Association, are, respectively, corporations created under the laws of the state of Missouri and engaged in the business of selling and delivering coal by the wagon load, to be used as fuel in the city of St. Louis; that they are licensed merchants and have paid their tax as such; that each of the plaintiffs maintained in its business a private scale, on which all coal sold and delivered is weighed, the weigher of which has been approved by the mayor, taken an oath before the city register, and filed bond as required as weigher at public scales; that fifty other persons or corporations are engaged in the same business in like manner; that the city has adopted and there are now ordinances in force in said city as follows:
That said sections 1594 and 1608, aforesaid, are invalid and of no force or effect, because the system established by them constitutes a tax on sales and deliveries of coal in St Louis for fuel, and exacts three cents for each load so sold and delivered, which sum is paid into the treasury of the city of St. Louis; because said system is an unlawful interference with and burden on the sale and delivery of coal as fuel in St. Louis; because said system is unauthorized by the charter of St. Louis and the law of the land; because said system and said ordinance regulations are unreasonable and oppressive; because said regulation requiring a green ticket to be delivered with each load of coal adds no security to the purchaser as to the weight of the coal delivered, nor does it operate or constitute any check on the seller of the coal as to such weight; that the expense to each of these plaintiffs for green tickets so to be used by it respectively and purchased of the city of St. Louis, exceeds $ 150 annually; that the...
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