Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 03 November 1953 |
| Citation | 115 N.E.2d 461,330 Mass. 490 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | KUZMESKUS v. PICKUP MOTOR CO., Inc. |
Maurice J. Levy, Burton Winer, Greenfield, for appellee.
Neil J. Moriarty, John F. Moriarty Holyoke, for defendant.
Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and WILLIAMS, JJ.
This is an action of contract to recover the amount of a money deposit made by the plaintiff with the defendant on orders for the purchase of four motor buses. The defendant claims in 'recoupment and set-off' damages for failure by the plaintiff to complete the purchase of the buses. The facts, as reported by an auditor whose findings are final, are summarized as follows.
The plaintiff, a resident of the town of Montague, was the successful bidder for a contract with the town to furnish transportation for school children. The contract was awarded on July 28, 1949, one of its terms being that the plaintiff should provide five new school buses. The defendant was a dealer in Dodge trucks and buses in Holyoke and in pursuance of its 'sales promotion' had assisted the plaintiff in obtaining information respecting school buses and in preparing his bid for the contract. Late in the evening of July 28, and within an hour after the plaintiff had been informed of the acceptance of his bid, the general manager and a salesman of the defendant called on the plaintiff and discussed with him the terms of a purchase by him from the defendant of five new Dodge school buses. Following the determination of price, model, and date of delivery of the buses the plaintiff signed five orders to the defendant on forms presented by the general manager, each of which was an order for the purchase of a Dodge school bus. After discussion one of the orders was then and there cancelled. The remaining orders were on printed forms with the words 'Pickup Motor Company, Inc. Holyoke, Mass.' at the top of each form. Each contained the words 'Enter my order for one New Dodge School Bus' or 'one New Dodge Bus' with a statement of the price and a description of the vehicle. Each concluded with the provision, 'This order is not binding unless authorized by an officer of the company, and purchaser's credit has been OK'd by Finance Company.' Immediately beneath this clause was the word 'Purchaser' with a place for a signature and below that the words 'Authorized by' with a line for a signature. The plaintiff gave his check drawn in the amount of $1,000 to the defendant's agents, this amount representing a deposit of $250 on each of the four buses. At about 9 o'clock on the following morning the plaintiff telephoned the defendant's general manager that he was cancelling the orders of the previous evening and requested that he be refunded his $1,000. He confirmed the cancellation by telegram within an hour and attempted to stop payment on his check but found that the defendant had caused it to be certified. The plaintiff moved for judgment on the auditor's report, and a judge of the Superior Court entered a finding for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,180 and also a finding for him as defendant in set-off. An appeal by the defendant under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 96, brings the case here. The issue between the parties is whether there were binding agreements of purchase and sale. The defendant contends that the written orders were only memoranda of oral contracts which previously had been completed, but, if not, that the orders became contracts when physically received with the deposit by the general manager.
The auditor made no specific findings in terms upon the question whether there were completed contracts but stated in detail the facts upon which he considered that question to rest and left the determination of it to the court, see Wellington v. Apthorp, 145 Mass. 69, 74, 13 N.E. 10. His report is the equivalent of a case stated, Merrimac Chemical Co. v. Moore, 279 Mass. 147, 151-152, 181 N.E. 219; Monaghan v. Monaghan, 320 Mass. 367, 369, 69 N.E.2d 476, from the reported facts of which we may draw such inferences as might have been drawn therefrom at a trial. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 126; Union Old Lowell National Bank v. Paine, 318 Mass. 313, 315, 61 N.E.2d 666. Although it appears that before the award the defendant was interested in having the plaintiff obtain the transportation contract from the town and engaged in preliminary negotiations with him as to the purchase of school buses if he were successful in his bid, the defendant makes no contention that these negotiations constituted any agreement of purchase and sale....
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...binding, but only expressive of a present intention." Varadian, 419 Mass. at 850, 647 N.E.2d 1174 (quoting Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., 330 Mass. 490, 493, 115 N.E.2d 461 (1953)). In Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 419 Mass. 841, 647 N.E.2d 1174 (1995), the Supreme Judici......
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...of the company and her signature on the front of the form reasonably denoted such approval. Compare Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., 330 Mass. 490, 493, 115 N.E.2d 461, 464 (1953) (contract proffered by company's general manager, which contained clause requiring authorization by seller's corp......
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