Hachadourian's Case
| Decision Date | 11 December 1959 |
| Parties | Constantine HACHADOURIAN'S CASE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Thomas L. Goggin, Springfield, for claimant.
Arthur E. Quimby, Springfield, for insurer.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.
The employee in this workmen's compensation case appealed from a decree of the Superior Court which dismissed the claim of the employee after a ruling that 'the employee has failed to sustain the burden of proving that he was partially incapacitated for work from February 12, 1954, to June 6, 1955.' There was no error.
The employee contended that on April 10, 1952, while engaged in his regular work, he was injured as the result of having been struck on his right shoulder by a heavy bundle of steel wire which a fellow employee was moving. The employer's report of the injury was filed with the Industrial Accident Board on May 6, 1952, and the employee's claim for compensation was filed on April 16, 1954.
After hearing, the single member found that 'the employee sustained a personal injury [on April 10, 1952] which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was causally related thereto; and as a result thereof the employee has been partially incapacitated from his regular employment as a wire worker from February 12, 1954, to date and continuing.' The reviewing board affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member except as to the duration of the employee's incapacity. It determined that the partial incapacity existed only from February 12, 1954, to June 6, 1955, and awarded compensation accordingly. Upon certification to the Superior Court by the insurer, a decree was entered, as we have said, dismissing the claim.
The evidence before the single member shows that the employee had been employed as a welder by the Cheney Bigelow Wire Works for a period of about twelve years prior to February 12, 1954, when he was laid off because of a reduction in the work force. He never returned to work there. On Thursday, April 10, 1952, while at work he was injured in the manner we have already described. He stayed away from work on Friday and Saturday and on his return on Monday he notified his foreman of his injury. He continued to work steadily until February 12, 1954, when he was laid off for reasons we have indicated. He contended that thereafter he was unable to obtain any employment because of pain and limitation of movement in his right shoulder.
On the Monday following the accident he was sent by a nurse at his work place to the doctor for his employer and he was treated by him. From then on, both before and after February 12, 1954, he was treated intermittently by several other doctors.
An orthopedic surgeon, whose qualifications as an expert were admitted by the insurer, testified before the single member in behalf of the employee. He first examined him on June 6, 1955. He said he found an industrial disability in the right shoulder of the employee which had prevented him from working from the time he was laid off up to the date of the examination. He also said that in his opinion the incapacity had ceased when he examined the employee so that he could do the same work then which he was doing when he was laid off. In his opinion the incapacity of the employee to work from February 12, 1954, to June 6, 1955, was causally related to the injury of April 10, 1952, because the condition of the right shoulder could have been precipitated by trauma. In a written report of his examination which was in evidence he stated in part that in his opinion it was reasonable to assume that the employee had a degenerative disturbance of his right shoulder, both inside and outside of the joint, which amounted to definite arthritis and peri-arthritis and that accounted for the symptoms of which he complained. 'It seems * * * reasonable to me to assume that, while fundamentally due to changes instant to age and years of use, * * * the precipitating factor was the alleged injury of [a] direct blow with the subsequent disturbance produced by this severe concussion.'
He further testified in cross-examination as follows: He further testified that he would consider it not only possible but presumably reasonable. That was as far as he wanted to go. In redirect examination he was asked, 'In this case, Doctor based upon the history and your physical findings, did you have any opinion as to whether or not the accident * * * was a precipitating factor in the conditions of which the man complained * * * [on] June 6, 1955?' His answer was 'That it was possible that it did.'
In concluding his testimony he was asked in redirect examination by counsel for the employee, 'Then,...
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