Alexander v. Macon-Bibb County Urban Development Authority and Urban Properties No. 47, MACON-BIBB
| Citation | 357 S.E.2d 62,257 Ga. 181 |
| Decision Date | 19 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 44495,MACON-BIBB,44525 and 44526,s. 44495 |
| Parties | ALEXANDER, Intervenor v.COUNTY URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND URBAN PROPERTIES # 47, et al. ALEXANDER v.COUNTY URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. ALEXANDER v.COUNTY URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Harriett M. Deal, John L. Taylor, Jr., John L. Schaub, Chorey & Taylor, Atlanta, for Thomas W. Alexander.
Willis Sparks III, Dist. Atty., Sell & Melton, Buckner F. Melton, Carl E. Lancaster, Jr., Macon, J.B. Barnard, Sr., Tri-State Inns, Inc., Thomas J. Ratcliff, Jr., Hinesville, for State of Ga. et al.
These three cases are appeals from the judgments of validation of certain revenue bonds issued to build a motel, a hotel, and a conference center in Bibb County. The appellant, Thomas Alexander, was permitted to intervene in the validation proceedings of each case. The cases were consolidated on appeal for review by this court.
The Development Authority of Bibb County (Authority) was created by resolution adopted in April, 1973, by the Board of Commissioners of Bibb County pursuant to the authority of 1976 Georgia Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. VIII Par. II (1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Par. III), and OCGA § 36-62-1 et seq., The Development Authorities Law. The stated purpose of the Authority is to promote the development of trade, commerce, industry and employment opportunities in Bibb County. In November, 1985, after considering the application of appellee, Macon Ventures, the Authority adopted a preliminary resolution to issue four million dollars in revenue bonds for the construction of a "motel, convention and trade show facility," to be known as "Shoney's Inn." During the following year the Authority met with representatives of Macon Ventures to discuss the proposed project. On December 1, 1986, the Authority finalized the resolution to issue bonds for this project, and thereafter the State of Georgia initiated a bond validation proceeding in accordance with OCGA §§ 36-62-8(g) and 36-82-60, et seq. Appellant, a taxpayer, was permitted to intervene in this proceeding. OCGA § 36-82-77. The trial court entered judgment determining that all requirements of the Constitution and laws of Georgia relating to the issuance of the bonds had been met, and validating the bonds and security. The taxpayer filed this appeal enumerating five errors.
1. The appellant argues the project is not a "convention facility" within the meaning of OCGA § 36-62-2(6)(H)(ii) and (vi). The appellant points out that the evidence shows the proposed project is for a 120-room motel with a meeting room which can accommodate 150 people. The appellant argues that as a matter of law a "meeting room" cannot transform a motel into a "convention facility."
The statute does not define "convention facilities." OCGA § 36-62-2(6)(H)(ii). "In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary significance shall be applied to all words...." OCGA § 1-3-1(b). We hold that the legislature intended for the word "convention" to be given its ordinary meaning which is, "a formal assembly or meeting of members, representatives or delegates of a group, such as a political party or fraternal society." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (1973). "Facilities" are "the means used to facilitate an action or process; convenience; [as] the facilities of a library...." Id.
A "convention facility" is therefore a means used to facilitate the assembly of members of a particular group. The evidence supports a finding that the purpose of this project is to attract groups of up to 150 persons meeting for a particular purpose, by offering lodging and a meeting room which will accommodate the group. We hold that the project is a "convention facility" within the meaning of OCGA § 36-62-2(6)(H)(ii) and (vi), and therefore is a permissible project under the Development Authorities Law.
2. OCGA § 36-62-9 provides, in part, The Authority here adopted such a resolution. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of this resolution at the validation proceeding, asserting that there was no evidence upon which the Authority could have based a determination that the project would further trade and commerce and maintain employment in Bibb County. At the validation hearing the appellant presented evidence, in the form of expert testimony and feasibility studies, tending to show that the project would impact negatively on these objectives. The Authority presented evidence, in the form of expert testimony and feasibility studies, tending to show that the project would further the stated objectives. The trial court concluded the project promoted the statutory objectives.
We hold that on appeal this court will not set aside a trial court's decision as to an issue of fact in a bond validation hearing if there is any evidence to support it. Because there is evidence to support the trial court's decision, we find no error.
3. Relying on Miller v. State of Georgia, 83 Ga.App. 135, 62 S.E.2d 921 (1951), appellant argues that the bonds should not have been validated because the resolution adopted by the Authority does not reasonably describe and define the proposed project. However, that case states "[it] is not absolutely necessary that an intricate and detailed set of plans be incorporated in the resolution, but enough facts concerning the proposed project or improvement must appear to afford a key from which the full picture of the project or improvement may be ascertained, such as, for example, a reference to reasonably specific plans, maps and specifications or their equivalent." Miller, at 141, 62 S.E.2d 921. We have studied the resolution in this case and find this requirement has been met. The fact that all final blueprints and specifications were not incorporated into the resolution does not require invalidation of the bonds.
4. OCGA § 36-82-75 requires the State to file a petition against the governmental body desiring to issue the bonds which states, inter alia, "the interest [the bonds] are to bear, how much principal and interest is to be paid annually ... and the security to be pledged to the payment of the bonds." Appellant maintains that these technical requirements have not been complied with. Specifically, appellant argues that because the petition states the interest rate "will not exceed 10 3/4%," the amount of interest due and annual interest payments cannot be calculated. There was testimony at the validation hearing that the interest rate will be set at the time of closing. Therefore the petition sets forth the interest rate with reasonable specificity under the circumstances. Appellant further argues that the petition does not clearly state the proposed security for the project. We agree with the trial court that the petition substantially complied 1 with the statutory requirements in these regards.
5. The appellant maintains the trial court erred in not granting his motions for discovery. However, the record shows that the Authority complied with appellant's every request for production of documents. The appellant contends the trial court erred in not continuing the validation proceedings so that he could depose the opposing parties. He states he was "entitled to discovery under the Civil Practice Act, which pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 5, should be open for a period of six months after the filing of the answer." Uniform Superior Court Rule 5 provides, "In order for a party to utilize the court's compulsory process to compel discovery, any desired discovery procedures must first be commenced promptly, pursued diligently and completed without unnecessary delay and within 6 months after filing the answer unless for cause shown the time has been extended or shortened by court order." (Emphasis supplied.) This rule does not, as appellant suggests, require that he be given 6 months in which to complete discovery. We find no error.
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