State v. McNeely

• Decision Date: 06 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. SC 91850.,SC 91850.
• Citation: 358 S.W.3d 65
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Tyler G. McNEELY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

358 S.W.3d 65

STATE of Missouri, Appellant,
v.
Tyler G. McNEELY, Respondent.

No. SC 91850.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Jan. 17, 2012.Rehearing Denied March 6, 2012.

[358 S.W.3d 66]

John N. Koester Jr., Cape Girardeau County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Cape Girardeau, for State.

Stephen C. Wilson, Wilson & Mann LC, Cape Girardeau, for McNeely.

Stephen D. Bonney, Kansas City, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri and American Civil Liberties Union of Western Missouri.Talmage E. Newton IV, St. Louis, for amicus curiae Missouri Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

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James B. Farnsworth, Jefferson City, for amicus curiae Attorney General's Office.PER CURIAM.

Tyler McNeely (Defendant) refused to consent to an alcohol breath test or a blood test after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The arresting patrolman, without seeking a warrant from a judge, ordered a medical professional to draw Defendant's blood. The trial court sustained Defendant's motion to suppress the results of the blood test as the nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The issue before the Court in this interlocutory appeal is: Under what “special facts” is a nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw in a DWI case a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment?

This Court recognizes the two competing interests involved in answering that question, namely, society's interest in preventing the harms caused by drunken driving and an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his or her person and to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.

The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in the landmark case of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). There, the Supreme Court provided a limited exception to the warrant requirement for the taking of a blood sample in alcohol-related arrests. Id. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The holding, which was expressly limited to the facts of that case, ultimately rested on certain “special facts” that might have led the officer to reasonably believe he was faced with an emergency situation in which the delay in obtaining a warrant would threaten the destruction of evidence. Id. at 770–71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The threat of evidence destruction was caused by the fact that the percentage of alcohol in a person's blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops and because time had to be taken both to investigate the accident scene and transport the defendant to the hospital. Id. These events left no time for the officer to seek out a judge to secure a search warrant. Id. Schmerber held that these “special facts” permitted a warrantless blood draw. Id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826.

The patrolman here, however, was not faced with the “special facts” of Schmerber. Because there was no accident to investigate and there was no need to arrange for the medical treatment of any occupants, there was no delay that would threaten the destruction of evidence before a warrant could be obtained. Additionally, there was no evidence here that the patrolman would have been unable to obtain a warrant had he attempted to do so. The sole special fact present in this case, that blood-alcohol levels dissipate after drinking ceases, is not a per se exigency pursuant to Schmerber justifying an officer to order a blood test without obtaining a warrant from a neutral judge.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.¹

I. Facts

A Missouri state highway patrolman, while performing his patrol, stopped Defendant's truck for speeding at 2:08 a.m. As the patrolman spoke with Defendant during the routine traffic stop, he noticed

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that Defendant displayed the tell-tale signs of intoxication—bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. These observations changed the nature of the patrolman's investigation from a routine traffic stop to a DWI investigation. He asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle and to perform standard field-sobriety tests. Defendant performed the tests poorly, and the patrolman placed Defendant under arrest for driving while intoxicated. After securing Defendant in the patrol car, the patrolman asked him if he would consent to a breath test. Defendant refused.

The patrolman testified that, in his more than 17 years of experience, he had obtained warrants when he needed to test the blood of DWI suspects. This time, however, he was influenced by an article he previously had read, written by a traffic safety resource prosecutor, in “Traffic Safety News.” He testified that the article asserted officers no longer needed to obtain a warrant before requiring DWI suspects to submit to nonconsensual blood tests because of recent changes in Missouri's implied consent law.² Based on this understanding, the patrolman did not seek a warrant and drove Defendant to the local hospital to test his blood to secure evidence of his intoxication. There, Defendant refused to consent to a blood draw. Over Defendant's refusal, the patrolman directed a phlebotomist to draw Defendant's blood for alcohol testing at 2:33 a.m. The blood sample was analyzed, and the results revealed that Defendant's blood-alcohol content was well above the legal limit.

Defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood test as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court sustained the motion. The State brings this interlocutory appeal.³

II. Standard of Review

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007). This Court defers to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations and considers all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. Whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Id.

III. Analysis

The issue before this Court is whether the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence is alone a sufficient exigency to dispense with the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without

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prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

An exception to the general rule requiring a search warrant is when exigent circumstances are present. United States v. Cisneros–Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.2010). Exigent circumstances exist if the time needed to obtain a warrant would endanger life, allow a suspect to escape, or risk the destruction of evidence. Id.

Every Fourth Amendment analysis requires the balancing of two competing interests: (1) the right of the individual to be secure in his or her person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) society's interest in discovering and eliminating criminal activity. Schmerber recognized this essential and inevitable struggle of the Fourth Amendment:

Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search “be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.

384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)) (internal citations omitted).

A. Schmerber v. California

Schmerber provides the backdrop to this Court's analysis in the case at hand. In Schmerber, the defendant was driving a vehicle that skidded off the road. Id. at 758 n. 2, 86 S.Ct. 1826. He and his passenger were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment. Id. At the hospital, the defendant was arrested and, without his consent or a warrant, an officer directed a physician to take a sample of the defendant's blood. Id. at 758, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Analysis of the blood sample revealed that the defendant was intoxicated. Id. at 759, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The defendant objected to the trial court's receipt of the blood sample evidence, contending that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.

The Supreme Court reasoned that drawing an individual's blood for evidentiary purposes is a search that implicates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 769–70, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Ordinarily a search warrant would be required to perform a blood draw when a person does not consent. Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The circumstances in Schmerber, however, led the Supreme Court to carve out a very limited exception to the warrant requirement for a blood draw in alcohol-related cases. Id. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The limited exception of Schmerber ultimately rested on certain “special facts” that might have caused the officer to reasonably believe he was faced with an emergency situation in which the delay in obtaining a warrant would threaten the destruction of evidence. Id. at 770–71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The threat of evidence destruction was caused by the fact that the percentage of alcohol in a person's blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops and because there was an accident requiring time to be...