People v. Eubanks

Decision Date05 December 2019
Docket NumberDocket No. 123525
Citation442 Ill.Dec. 663,160 N.E.3d 843,2019 IL 123525
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Ralph EUBANKS, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Shortly before 9 p.m. on December 21, 2009, Maria Worthon was killed by a hit-and-run driver near the intersection of Greenview and Greenleaf Avenues in Chicago. Worthon's son, Jeremiah, was seriously injured in the accident. The State charged defendant, Ralph Eubanks, with numerous offenses arising out of the incident. A jury ultimately convicted defendant of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2008)), failure to report an accident involving death or injury ( 625 ILCS 5/11-401(b), (d) (West 2008)), and aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) (id. § 11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C), (d)(1)(F) (driving with any amount of a controlled substance in the person's blood, breath, or urine)). Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, reversed defendant's aggravated DUI conviction, holding that section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (id. § 11-501.2(c)(2)) is facially unconstitutional because it permits compelled chemical testing without a warrant "in all cases where an officer has probable cause to believe that a driver under the influence has caused death or personal injury to another." 2017 IL App (1st) 142837, ¶ 66, 429 Ill.Dec. 467, 124 N.E.3d 977. The court also reversed defendant's conviction for first degree murder and remanded for a new trial, holding that the Cook County circuit court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a reckless homicide instruction. Finally, the court reduced the felony class of defendant's conviction of failure to report an accident. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Motions to Suppress and to Declare Statute Unconstitutional

¶ 4 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of blood and urine testing that was done against his will. Defendant contended that he did not consent to chemical testing of his blood and urine, the police did not have a warrant for the testing, and no exigent circumstances were present that would have prevented the police from obtaining a warrant. Accordingly, defendant alleged that the testing amounted to an unconstitutional search. Defendant also moved to declare section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutional on its face and as applied to his case. At the relevant time, this statute provided as follows:

"Notwithstanding any ability to refuse under this Code to submit to these tests or any ability to revoke the implied consent to these tests, if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof has caused the death or personal injury to another, that person shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof or the presence of any other drug or combination of both.
This provision does not affect the applicability of or imposition of driver's license sanctions under Section 11-501.1 of this Code."1 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2008).

Defendant contended that this section was unconstitutional under Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), as it allowed the police to obtain chemical testing in the absence of a case-specific determination of exigency.

¶ 5 At the hearing on defendant's motions, the parties stipulated to the following facts. On December 21, 2009, defendant was arrested in connection with a hit-and-run accident that resulted in the death of Maria Worthon and injuries to her son, Jeremiah. The police had probable cause for the arrest. Defendant was initially taken to district 24 but was eventually transferred to area 3 for processing and questioning. An officer informed him that he was being charged with DUI, read him the DUI motorist warnings, and asked defendant to take a breath test. Defendant refused. Defendant also refused to submit to blood and urine testing. An officer noted the time of the refusal at 12:05 a.m.

¶ 6 Defendant was left alone in the interview room until 1:37 a.m., when Officer Michael Deneen told him that he was going to take him to the hospital because he was required to give blood and urine samples. At 2:53 a.m., an officer took defendant to the hospital. At the hospital, defendant refused to comply with the blood test, and he was physically restrained by hospital security. His wrists were cuffed to separate rails of a hospital bed, and blood was forcibly taken from him at 4 a.m. A nurse then asked him to provide a urine sample, and defendant refused. The nurse threatened to take the urine with a catheter, and she ordered a catheter at 4:56 a.m. When the nurse approached defendant with the catheter, defendant agreed to provide a urine sample. Defendant provided the sample at 5:20 a.m.

¶ 7 The blood and urine samples were sent to the Illinois State Police crime lab for analysis. The blood tested negative for alcohol or any illegal substance. The urine tested positive for cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine metabolite.

¶ 8 The trial court denied both motions. The court found that the statute was valid under Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and People v. Jones , 214 Ill. 2d 187, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239 (2005). In Jones , this court interpreted Schmerber as allowing compulsory blood testing when the police have probable cause to believe that a person has been driving while intoxicated. Jones , 214 Ill. 2d at 195-96, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239. The court acknowledged the later authority of McNeely but found that McNeely had reasserted the validity of Schmerber . With respect to the motion to suppress, the court found that the totality of the circumstances presented a sufficient exigency that the police were justified in taking the blood and urine without defendant's consent and without a warrant.

¶ 9 Trial

¶ 10 The following facts were developed at trial. Shortly before 9 p.m. on December 21, 2009, Chicago police officers Brian Murphy and Chris Wertepny were on routine patrol in the Rogers Park neighborhood when they saw a green Pontiac, with no headlights on, traveling at a high rate of speed. The officers activated their emergency lights and began following the vehicle. The officers could see two individuals in the vehicle. The car eventually stopped, and the officers approached it on foot. As the officers got to the car, the driver sped away and did not stop at any stop signs. The officers attempted unsuccessfully to follow the vehicle but were able to obtain its license plate number. Officer Murphy gave a description of the vehicle and its license plate number to dispatch.

¶ 11 Shortly after losing sight of the vehicle, the officers came across what appeared to be an accident involving two pedestrians near the intersection of Greenleaf and Greenview Avenues. Witnesses described the vehicle that had hit the pedestrians, and the information matched the description of the vehicle that had fled the traffic stop. Two of the witnesses that approached the officers were Calvin Tanner and Dennis Jeter. Tanner had blood on his face.

¶ 12 Shortly before 9 p.m. on that same evening, Felix Worthon went to meet his wife, Maria, at the bus stop. The Worthons' six-year-old son, Jeremiah, was with him. After Maria got off the bus, the three of them began walking home. As they passed a church near Greenleaf and Greenview Avenues, they saw a man whom they knew from church, Maurice Glover. Maria and Jeremiah stopped to talk to Glover, and Felix crossed Greenview Avenue. Felix thought that he heard something and went back to Greenview to see what it was. As he crossed the street, he was almost hit by a car with no headlights on. Felix then saw the vehicle strike his wife and son. The car did not appear to apply the brakes at all and kept going after it struck Maria and Jeremiah. Felix got to Jeremiah first and found him bleeding from the back of the head and spitting up blood. Felix eventually found his wife almost a block from where he found Jeremiah. The top of Maria's head was gone. Felix described her face as "unrecognizable" and testified that blood was coming "from everywhere." After an ambulance arrived, Felix heard a paramedic tell the police that Maria was gone. Jeremiah suffered permanent injuries.

¶ 13 Maurice Glover witnessed the accident. He saw Maria and Jeremiah cross the street between two parked cars, and he also saw a dark car without its headlights on coming down the street. He estimated that the car was going 80 to 90 miles per hour. He heard a scream and a boom. He saw Maria's body come down out of the air, and gray matter and parts of her brain landed on the street. The car that hit her never stopped.

¶ 14 Madeline Moratto and Alex Montejo also witnessed the accident. They were walking down Greenview Avenue on the sidewalk. Moratto described the area as a quiet residential neighborhood, and she said there were a few other people out walking at the time. After they passed the Worthon family on the sidewalk, they heard the sound of a car's engine revving and tires squealing. They heard the sound of a loud impact and then saw a woman flipping head over heels in the air. Moratto estimated that the woman was thrown 30 feet in the air. The woman's body landed approximately 100 feet from where it was hit. Moratto saw a dark sedan with its headlights off keep driving past the body at about 80 miles per hour. The car did not stop at the stop sign at the intersection of Greenview and Greenleaf. Montejo...

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