Joyner v. Com.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1970
• Citation: 260 N.E.2d 664,358 Mass. 60
• Parties: Camille E. JOYNER v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 664

260 N.E.2d 664

358 Mass. 60

Camille E. JOYNER v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 5, 1970.

Decided July 1, 1970.

A. Van C. Lanckton, Cambridge, for petitioner.

James O. Druker, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

KIRK, Justice.

By this petition for a writ of error the petitioner seeks to have reversed a judgment of conviction in the Third District Court of Eastern Maddlesex (District Court) on a complaint charging that she was 'a stubborn child' in violation of G.L. c. 272, § 53. The case came before the single justice who reserved and reported it without decision upon the pleadings, return and assignments of error.

The petition alleges the following facts which are admitted by the answer of the Commonwealth. On January 6, 1968, a complaint was filed in the District Court by one Sarah Bell charging, in the form prescribed by G.L. c. 277, § 79, that 'Camille E. Joyner, a minor, during the three months next before the making of this complaint was a stubborn child and stubbornly refused to submit to the lawful and reasonable commands of said complainant, said Sarah Bell, whose commands said minor was bound to obey.' The petitioner pleaded not guilty, and was convicted on January 22, 1968. After the filing of an initial petition for a writ of error the case was remanded to the District Court for final disposition, and on March 7, 1969, the petitioner was sentenced to ten days in the house of correction. The sentence was suspended.

The petitioner contends, first, that the 'stubborn children' provision of G.L. c. 272, § 53, as appearing in St.1959, c. 304, § 1, ¹ is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and uncertain; second, that the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and third, that since she was over eighteen years of age at the time of the conduct complained of, she was not a 'child' within the meaning of the statute.

We dispose of the case on the third ground, i.e., that the petitioner was not a 'child' within the meaning of G.L. c. 272, § 53.

The uses and definitions of the terms 'child' and 'children' are many and varied. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 388 (1961). 14 C.J.S. Child or Children, p. 1106. In Nelson v. Cushing, 2 Cush. 519, 533--534, the term 'children' was contrasted with 'youth,' the latter term being characterized as 'referring to and embracing young persons of somewhat more advanced age and proficiency * * *.' In G.L. c. 149, § 1, 'child' is defined, for the purposes of the chapter regulated labor and industries, as 'a person under eighteen.' Compare G.L. c. 76, § 1; c. 175, § 128; c. 269, § 12A; c. 272, § 28.

No definition of 'child' or 'children' is given in G.L. c. 272, § 53, nor has that provision been judicially construed. The statutory form of complaint, G.L. c. 277, § 79, requires an allegation that the person complained of is 'a minor.' We do not think, however, that the term 'children' in c. 272, § 53, even when read with c. 277, § 79, can be said to include all those who have not yet reached their twenty-first birthday. In G.L. c. 119, § 52 (as amended through St.1960, c. 353, § 1), a 'delinquent child' is defined as 'a child between seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or who commits any offence against a law of the commonwealth.' A 'wayward child' is also defined in terms of 'a child between seven and seventeen years of age.' Proceedings against children of those ages are governed by G.L. c. 119, §§ 52--63, inclusive, and jurisdiction in the first instance lies exclusively in the juvenile session. See G.L. c. 119, § 74, as amended through St.1964, c. 308, § 6. ² See also Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 156 N.E.2d 649; D'Urbano v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 466, 187 N.E.2d 831. 'Limited jurisdiction over juveniles who have passed their seventeenth birthday is provided in § 72, but it remains expressly only jurisdiction in respect of 'children.' There is no provision which in terms gives jurisdiction over a child apprehended when under seventeen and not brought to trial until after eighteen. There are indications that jurisdiction ends when the child attains eighteen * * *.' D'Urbano v Commonwealth, supra, 345 Mass. at 470, 187 N.E.2d at 834. ³

It is clear that the term 'children' in c. 119, §§ 52 et seq., does not include those who have attained their eighteenth birthday. We think that the term should be given the same meaning in c. 272, § 53. An anomaly would arise if the petitioner could on the one hand be legally married by a magistrate or clergyman despite the objections of her parents (G.L. c. 207, § 7), and on the other hand be sentenced to the house of correction for refusing to obey her parents' command not to see her intended husband.

In view of the fact that the statute as we construe it does not apply to the petitioner, we need not decide the other issues raised by the petitioner. See Cole v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 312 Mass. 523, 526, 45 N.E.2d 400, app. dism. sub nom. Cole v. Violette, 319 U.S. 581, 63 S.Ct. 1204, 87 L.Ed.2d 1599; reh. den. 320 U.S. 810, 64 S.Ct. 28, 88 L.Ed. 489; Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 245, 69 N.E.2d 115, and cases cited; ...