Judkins v. Sadler-Mac Neil
| Citation | 61 Wn.2d 1,376 P.2d 837 |
| Decision Date | 13 December 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 36247,SADLER-MAC,36247 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | Leander E. JUDKINS, Respondent, v.NEIL, a partnership consisting of Crawford A. 'Pat' Sadler and Don Mac Neil, Appellants. |
Horton & Wilkins, Kennewick, for appellants.
Peterson, Taylor & Day, Pasco, for respondent.
This is an appeal by the defendants from that portion of the judgment, in an action for damages for the conversion of personal property, which relates to a cash item of $1,400 for which the plaintiff has been permitted a recovery.
Omitting many psychologically interesting and important (and probably decisive, jury-wise), but legally irrelevant, details the substance of the matter is that the plaintiff traded in his 1951 Ford pickup to the defendants as part of a transaction whereby the plaintiff acquired from the defendants a 1957 Cadillac. In the pickup, when the defendants took possession, were a number of personal items belonging to the plaintiff.
At some time in the early afternoon of the Sunday on which this transaction occurred, and after the papers transferring title had been signed, the plaintiff left the pickup in front of the defendants' place of business, retaining the keys in his possession. The plaintiff testified that at some time later that afternoon, it is not clear just when,
The plaintiff thereafter attempted to take the pickup to his home, and the defendants' employees refused to let him do so. The plaintiff then left and returned with a policeman some time after 6:00 p. m. In the meantime the pickup had been moved into the defendants' shop or garage. The officer asked if the plaintiff could get his personal belongings out of the truck, and the defendants' employees refused the plaintiff access to the pickup.
On Tuesday, accompanied by his attorney, the plaintiff went to see one of the defendants about the return of his personal property in the pickup. For the first time, the defendants were told that included in the personal property was a large sum of money, a diamond ring, and a watch. The defendants then informed plaintiff that all the personal property in the pickup had been placed in the trunk of the Cadillac, which had been left at his home.
The plaintiff, after examining the personal property in the Cadillac, claimed that four items were missing: $1,400 in cash, a diamond ring worth $1,000, a watch worth $100, and a trailer hitch and electric braking equipment worth $90, and brought an action for the conversion of those items.
The jury found that there had been a conversion of the $1,400 cash and of the electric brake and trailer hitch, but not of the diamond ring and the watch. (That the defendants removed the brake and hitch is conceded.)
The defendants' appeal is only on the cash item.
They urge that if the $1,400 was in the pickup (and there is no evidence that it was except the testimony of the plaintiff 1) when they took possession of it, the legal relationship was that of bailor and bailee and that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on bailment.
They further urge that an essential element of conversion was missing: an intent to deprive the owner of his property, and that the trail court erred in instructing that intent is not an essential element of conversion.
We shall consider the latter contention first. Plaintiff's cause of action is founded upon the unwarranted interference with his right to the possession of his property.
It is said in Salmond on the Law of Torts (9th ed. 1936), § 78, p. 310:
'A conversion is the act of wifully interferring with any chattel, without lawful justification, whereby any person entitled thereto is deprived of the possession of it.'
This is quoted in Wilson v. Wilson (1958), 53 Wash.2d 13, 16, 330 P.2d 178, 179; and Martin v. Sikes (1951), 38 Wash.2d 274, 278, 229 P.2d 546, 549.
Proof of the defendants' knowledge or intent are not essential in establishing a conversion. An excellent statement on this proposition, typifying a long line of authority, is found in Poggi v. Scott (1914), 167 Cal. 372, 375, 139 P. 815, 816, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 925 ...
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