Comey v. Hill

• Decision Date: 30 July 1982
• Parties: , 41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1314 Keith E. COMEY v. Richard E. HILL et al 1 .
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 811

438 N.E.2d 811

387 Mass. 11, 41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1314

Keith E. COMEY v. Richard E. HILL et al ¹.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Worcester.

Argued April 5, 1982.

Decided July 30, 1982.

Dennis Pojani, Worcester, for plaintiff.

James E. Wallace, Jr., Worcester (William J. LeDoux and Vincent O'Rourke, Worcester, with him), for Automated Packaging Systems, Inc.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from judgments entered against him in favor of the defendants, trustees of R. E. Hill Co. (Hill Co.) and Automated Packaging Systems, Inc. (Automated). Automated cross-appeals from a judgment entered against it in favor of the plaintiff and from the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We transferred the appeals here on our own motion and we now affirm.

In June, 1977, the plaintiff, Comey, filed two complaints with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination alleging that Hill Co. and Automated discriminated against him on the basis of age in violation of G.L. c. 151B. Thereafter, Comey removed the case to the Superior Court for trial by jury pursuant to § 9 of c. 151 B.

The plaintiff's further amended complaint contained eight counts. Essentially, it alleges that Hill Co. violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that Hill Co. and Automated discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of age in violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) & (5), that Hill Co. and Automated were guilty of unfair and deceptive acts in violation of G.L. c. 93A, § 11, that Automated tortiously induced Hill Co. to breach its business relationship with the plaintiff, and that Hill Co. owed residual commissions to the plaintiff. The trial of the case spanned a two-week period. The presiding judge submitted eleven special questions to the jury after he instructed them on the law. ²

We summarize the evidence presented at trial to the extent pertinent to this appeal. At the time of trial, Comey was sixty-three years old. In 1970, after negotiations with Lysander Richmond, a trustee of Hill Co., Comey became associated with the Hill Co. as a sales representative on a commission basis. The Hill Co., located in Stoneham, acted as a manufacturer's representative for a number of companies, including Automated, which was located in Twinsburg, Ohio. Comey had no written contract with Hill Co. but was paid a commission for sales made. Hill Co. did not deduct withholding taxes or reimburse Comey for his travel expenses, although Hill Co. did reimburse Comey for his telephone expenses. Comey received leads from Hill Co. concerning potential Automated customers and, as a matter of course, pursued these leads. Comey was provided with two sets of business cards, one listing him as a sales representative of Hill Co. and another listing him as a sales representative of Automated. Sales meetings were frequently held at the Hill Co. headquarters.

By a letter dated February 28, 1977, Automated directed Hill Co. to prohibit Comey and two other salesmen, all over fifty years old, from selling Automated products. Hill Co., through Lysander Richmond, acquiesced in Automated's demand but offered to keep the salesmen on to service other accounts. Comey testified that he then terminated his relationship with Hill Co. because he was unable to make a living on the other sales lines.

There was testimony at trial through Comey, as well as one Clifford Blood who was also terminated from selling Automated's line, that the controlling reason for Automated's action was Comey's age. The greater part of this testimony related to alleged out-of-court statements showing age discrimination by representatives of Automated. The making of these statements was subsequently denied, under oath, by the alleged makers. Automated introduced testimony at trial that the reason for wanting the plaintiff removed from his position as a sales representative for Automated's products was Automated's dissatisfaction with Comey's sales performance, product knowledge, and customer service, as well as Comey's handling of other lines of products and his unwillingness to work with others.

Comey argues in his appeal that the judge erred in instructing the jury regarding the definition of an employer employee relationship and the burden of proof in Comey's G.L. c. 151B claim. Automated argues, in its cross-appeal, that the judge erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in entering judgment on Comey's claim of unlawful interference with an advantageous relationship.

1. Instructions on employer employee relationship. Comey argues that the judge's instruction on the subject of an employer and employee relationship under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) & (5), was narrow and fragmented. ³ The judge, in his instructions, distinguished an employee from an independent contractor as follows: "An independent contractor is one who exercises an independent employment contract to do work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer except to the result of the work." The judge indicated that a salesman who is under the control of the employer only with regard to the result to be obtained is an independent contractor. The plaintiff contends that because G.L. c. 151B, § 9, requires that the statute be "construed liberally," anyone who is paid by another for his services is an employee regardless of whether the person may also fall into the definition of an independent contractor.

Although the Commonwealth's employment discrimination law, G.L. c. 151B, affects a "broad array of employment practices" and extensively prohibits discrimination against certain protected classes, we do not read the statute as intending to broaden the definition of employee to include an independent contractor. See generally, Schreiber, Massachusetts Employment Discrimination Law, 63 Mass.L.Rev. 247 (1978). The statute itself defines an employee only in the negative, excluding "any individual employed by his parents, spouse or child, or in the domestic service of any person." G.L. c. 151B, § 1(6). Compare G.L. c. 152, § 1(4) ("employee" defined as "every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written"). In the absence of any indication to the contrary, we will not assume that the Legislature intended to cover relationships outside the traditional common law employer employee relationship. "Words and phrases having well-defined meanings in the common law are interpreted to have the same meanings when used in statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter as that with which they were associated at common law." 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 50.03, at 277-278 (4th ed. 1973). In a number of cases, we have utilized the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor in deciding whether an employment relationship exists. See, e.g., Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc. of Peabody, 348 Mass. 198, 205-207, 202 N.E.2d 771 (1964) (negligence action); American Flexible Conduit Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 345 Mass. 146, 186 N.E.2d 445 (1962) (tax case); Schofield's Case, 272 Mass. 229, 172 N.E. 346 (1930) (worker's compensation). We will not depart from the common law definition of employee absent a legislative substitute. ⁴

Although we find no error in the trial judge's instruction, we are mindful of the remedial purposes of the statute and the social interest that it tends to protect. See generally, Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1752, 1756-1758, 424 N.E.2d 244. Trial judges should carefully and fully instruct juries on all the factors that may be useful in distinguishing employees from independent contractors. See Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing factors which may distinguish employees from independent contractors). See also, Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 1476-1477, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947) (whether employer employee relationship exists depends upon circumstance of whole activity).

2. Other jury instructions. a. The plaintiff next contends that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they must find that the Hill Co. "terminated" Comey from its employment in order for Comey to recover. Although the judge used the word terminate as sometimes describing that activity required to trigger the defendants' liability, the judge, a number of times, stated that the defendants would be liable for discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Further, the judge instructed the jury that, assuming the plaintiff otherwise proved his case, the plaintiff could recover if Hill Co. unlawfully (1) relieved the plaintiff of his representation of Automated's products; (2) removed the plaintiff from his position; (3) deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to sell Automated's products; or (4) took the plaintiff off the sale of Automated products.

In context, the judge's instructions were not confusing or erroneous. The issue put to the jury was removal of the plaintiff as a representative of Automated products only and not one of termination from employment. ⁵ Viewing the charge as a whole, we find no error. See Posner v. Minsky, 353 Mass. 656, 660, 234 N.E.2d 287 (1968). Cf. Wilson v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 366 Mass. 588, 321 N.E.2d 819 (1975).

b. The plaintiff's final contention is that the judge erred in instructing the jury on the plaintiff's burden of proof. The plaintiff argues that because the instructions were confusing, the jury may have assumed their job to be that of making a third party determination regarding how well Comey was performing his job rather than determining the motive of the defendants in taking action against Comey.

The plaintiff, however, bases this...