Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1996
• Docket Number: WYMAN-GORDON
• Citation: 664 N.E.2d 808,422 Mass. 551
• Parties: , 74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1315, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,307, 12 IER Cases 333, 51 A.L.R.5th 771 Karen A. GREEN v.COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 808

664 N.E.2d 808

422 Mass. 551, 74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1315,

69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,307, 12 IER Cases 333,

51 A.L.R.5th 771

Karen A. GREEN v. WYMAN-GORDON COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Jan. 9, 1996.

Decided May 3, 1996.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 19, 1994.

The case was heard by Daniel F. Toomey, J., on a motion for summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Mary A. Barker, Harvard (April H. Babbitt, Pepperell, with her) for plaintiff.

Richard C. Van Nostrand, Worchester (Michael G. Donovan with him) for the defendant.

Cynthia L. Amara & Stephen S. Ostrach, Boston, for New England Legal Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Robert S. Mantell, for Massachusetts Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH, O'CONNOR, GREANEY and FRIED, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The plaintiff, Karen A. Green, alleges that she was sexually harassed over a three-year period while employed by the defendant, Wyman-Gordon Company. The defendant terminated Green's employment in June, 1992. In April, 1994, Green brought suit against the defendant in the Superior Court, alleging violations of G.L. c. 214, § 1C (1994 ed.), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, § 11I (1994 ed.) (civil rights act), and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, G.L. c. 93, § 102 (1994 ed.) (equal rights act). Her action included common law claims for negligent failure to investigate and to correct, negligent training and supervision, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The trial judge allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. The plaintiff appealed. We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review and now affirm. ¹

The summary judgment record demonstrates the following (see Judson v. Essex Agric. & Technical Inst., 418 Mass. 159, 162, 635 N.E.2d 1172 [1994] ): The defendant hired the plaintiff in February, 1985. Starting in June, 1989, until her termination in June, 1992, the plaintiff was subjected to multiple instances of sexual harassment while she was employed in several different departments. While employed in the housekeeping department, Green was threatened and harassed by a coworker using obscene language and sexual slurs. The defendant held a meeting and issued a warning to the coworker, but refused Green's requests to change her work schedule.

After the plaintiff was assigned to another department, she was subjected to lewd and obscene remarks and gestures from another coworker. In addition, she was exposed to posters of naked and partially clothed women on the walls and ceiling of the work area. After Green reported to her supervisors that she was being harassed, a meeting was held, but the defendant took no action against the coworker. Although Green was permitted to change shifts for about one week, she was forced to return to the shift with the offensive coworker. About two weeks later, the plaintiff was terminated from her employment. As a result of the harassment, the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.

1. Background. In order to analyze the plaintiff's claims properly, we need to examine the legislative and judicial response to the problem of sexual harassment in the Massachusetts workplace. This court first addressed the issue of sexual harassment in College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162, 508 N.E.2d 587 (1987). In that case, the court decided that sexual harassment was a form of discrimination and that the plaintiff's claim was cognizable under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) (1994 ed.). Id. In O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 693 & n. 9, 511 N.E.2d 349 (1987), however, the provisions of G.L. c. 151B (1994 ed.) did not apply because the plaintiff's employer had fewer than six employees. See G.L. c. 151B, § 1(5). The court nevertheless decided that the plaintiff had a claim under the civil rights act on the rationale that art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights created a right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace. O'Connell v. Chasdi, supra at 693, 511 N.E.2d 349.

On December 9, 1986, before this court's decisions in College-Town and O'Connell v. Chasdi were published (but while they were pending in this court), the Massachusetts Legislature enacted St.1986, c. 588, entitled "An act prohibiting sexual harassment." Chapter 588 amended G.L. c. 151A (unemployment compensation), G.L. c. 151B (employment discrimination), G.L. c. 151C (education), and G.L. c. 214 (equity jurisdiction). The legislation added a definition of sexual harassment to G.L. c. 151B, § 1, see St.1986, c. 588, § 2, and added subsection 16A to § 4, declaring it to be an unlawful practice under c. 151B for an employer "to sexually harass any employee." St.1986, c. 588, § 3. In addition, the statute added G.L. c. 214, § 1C, which states: "A person shall have the right to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in chapter one hundred and fifty-one B and one hundred and fifty-one C. The superior court shall have the jurisdiction in equity to enforce this right and to award damages." St.1986, c. 588, § 6.

In this case and two other cases decided today, ² we have an opportunity to revisit sexual harassment claims in this new statutory context.

2. Statutory claims. Employees who are victims of sexual harassment by their employers or their agents have a remedy under G.L. c. 151B, §§ 4(16A) and 5. ³ The plaintiff did not file a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) within the six-month statutory time period. See G.L. c. 151B, § 5. The plaintiff argues that her failure to file such a claim does not preclude her from bringing a sexual harassment suit in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 214, § 1C. Therefore, we must determine whether, by enacting G.L. c. 214, § 1C, the Legislature intended to create a duplicative remedy for victims of sexual harassment, such that a plaintiff may either seek relief initially by filing a complaint with the MCAD, or bypass the MCAD entirely and file a suit directly in the Superior Court. We conclude that the exclusive statutory remedy for the plaintiff in this case was that provided by c. 151B, for the reasons set out below.

We ordinarily construe statutes to be consistent with one another. St. Germaine v. Pendergast, 411 Mass. 615, 626, 584 N.E.2d 611 (1992). We assume that the Legislature was aware of existing statutes when enacting subsequent ones. LaBranche v. A.J. Lane & Co., 404 Mass. 725, 728, 537 N.E.2d 119 (1989). Thus, we attempt to interpret statutes addressing the same subject matter harmoniously, "so that effect is given to every provision in all of them." 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 122 (5th ed. 1992). See St. Germaine v. Pendergast, supra (construing exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation act). With these general principles in mind, we must examine the administrative scheme created by c. 151B and determine the reach of its exclusivity provisions. ⁴

General Laws c. 151B, § 9, provides, in relevant part: "[A]s to acts declared unlawful by section four, the procedure provided in this chapter shall, while pending, be exclusive." We have interpreted this broad exclusivity provision to embody a legislative intent "to subject all discrimination claims to some administrative scrutiny." Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 585, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994). ⁵ Accordingly, where c. 151B applies, a person may not evade its procedural requirements by recasting a discrimination claim as a violation of the equal rights act, see id. at 586, 631 N.E.2d 555, or the civil rights act, see Mouradian v. General Elec. Co., 23 Mass.App.Ct. 538, 543, 503 N.E.2d 1318 (1987). Applying this rationale, we have declined to create new common law remedies for employment discrimination which would allow claimants to sidestep c. 151B's administrative prerequisites. See Melley v. Gillette Corp., 19 Mass.App.Ct. 511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (1985), S.C., 397 Mass. 1004, 491 N.E.2d 252 (1986). Cf. Comey v. Hill, 387 Mass. 11, 20, 438 N.E.2d 811 (1982) (claimants may bring common law claims against employers which are grounded in tort and contract principles established prior to adoption of c. 151B).

Against this background, we see no basis to except claims of sexual harassment from the broad and comprehensive remedial scheme provided in c. 151B absent an explicit statutory authorization. We do not believe that G.L. c. 214, § 1C, contains such an authorization. Accordingly, we agree with the defendant that, in this case, c. 151B's remedies and procedures are exclusive and bar the plaintiff's claim under G.L. c. 214, § 1C. See 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 121 (5th ed. 1992) ("In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new provision is presumed in accord with the legislative policy embodied in [the] prior statutes").

This interpretation serves the legislative purpose by preserving the integrity of the administrative scheme. As we noted in the Charland case: "Chapter 151B reflects the [L]egislature's balancing of competing interests. Employees are protected against certain types of [unlawful action]. Employers are protected from unnecessary litigation by a relatively short statute of limitations, see ch. 151B § 5 (six months), and a mandatory conciliation process." Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., supra at 583, 631 N.E.2d 555, quoting Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass.1984). Indeed, the simultaneous amendment of c. 151B to add sexual harassment in employment to the list of unfair practices indicates a legislative intent to reinforce the administrative scheme, not weaken it. See St.1986, c. 588, § 3. See...