Darwin v. Connecticut, 794

• Decision Date: 20 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 794,M,794
• Citation: 391 U.S. 346,20 L.Ed.2d 630,88 S.Ct. 1488
• Parties: Roy F. DARWIN v. CONNECTICUT. isc
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

391 U.S. 346

88 S.Ct. 1488

20 L.Ed.2d 630

Roy F. DARWIN

v CONNECTICUT.

No. 794, Misc.

Decided May 20, 1968.

John F. Shea, Jr., for petitioner.

Joel H. Reed II and Etalo G. Gnutti, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Connecticut Su- preme Court affirmed the judgment. 155 Conn. 124, 230 A.2d 573 (1967). Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from this Court. We grant the writ and reverse.

On Friday, December 6, 1963, petitioner was arrested on a coroner's warrant charging him with murder. During that entire day until 9 p.m. petitioner was subjected to questioning. Some time that evening, the officer in charge brought in a revolving disc and sought to persuade petitioner to look at it and 'relax.' The trial judge said that '(the officer) was not completely unaware that this was a common hypnotic device.' the wheel turned for about half an hour, but petitioner refused to look at it.

The next morning the questioning resumed and continued intermittently until about 4 p.m. when petitioner fell forward, according to the trial judge, 'either fainting or pretending to faint.' He was revived and then confessed to the murder, as hereinafter described, in response to questioning by the officer in charge.

During the entire period petitioner was in custody, his counsel had been making determined but unsuccessful efforts to contact him or the officer in charge of him. On Friday, December 6, there were 19 phone calls to various police offices, including nine to the one at which petitioner was held. On Saturday, there were five calls, and on Sunday, there was one.

On Friday, there was a personal visit by one of the lawyers to the police barracks in Stafford Springs where petitioner had been taken that morning. But at about the same time that counsel arrived, the officer in charge took petitioner from the barracks and drove him around, apparently to protect him from what the officer thought were newspapermen.¹ Counsel made four visits to various barracks on Saturday.

Each of these attempts was met with disclaimers of knowledge of the whereabouts of either petitioner or of the officer in charge. The trial judge found that it was 'routine procedure' for investigating officers not to be disturbed during an investigation. At about 1 or 1:30 p.m. Saturday, at counsel's request, a superior court judge issued a writ of habeas corpus. A deputy sheriff was instructed to serve the writ upon the officer in charge of petitioner and upon the coroner within half an hour. The sheriff could not locate the officer or the coroner, although the purpose of this inquiry was stated to the communications officer at the Hartford barracks. On Sunday, the sheriff called the Stafford Springs barracks in search of the officer and received a call informing him that the officer would be at the superior court at 2 p.m.²

Petitioner's first confession, made orally after the 'fainting' incident on the afternoon of Saturday, December 7, the second day of arrest and interrogation, was excluded from evidence by the trial judge. The trial judge also excluded petitioner's written confession made shortly thereafter. The trial judge, however, admitted a subsequent written confession made on Sunday, December 8, and evidence as to a partial re-enactment of the crime which petitioner staged on that day at the request of the police. During the course of this partial reenactment, petitioner, as he had done intermittently during his custody, denied that he committed the crime. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed.

Since the trial in this case began before the decisions of this Court in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), these cases are not controlling. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). But they are relevant on the issue of voluntariness. Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966). In the present case, petitioner's lawyers made numerous attempts to communicate with petitioner or with the officer in charge. (Cf. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, supra, Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, 384 U.S., at 465, n. 35, 86 S.Ct., at 1623.) A writ of habeas corpus issued by a state judge at the request of petitioner's counsel was fruitless; and petitioner on three separate occasions sought and was denied permission to communicate with the outside world.

The inference is inescapable that the officers kept petitioner incommunicado for the 30 to 48 hours during which they sought and finally obtained his confession. See Davis v. State of North Carolina, supra, at 745—746, 86 S.Ct., at 1766—1767; Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). Considering the 'totality of the circumstances' (see Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967)), we conclude that the court erred in holding that the confession and the partial re-enactment were voluntary. The denial of access to counsel and the outside world continued throughout, and there was 'no break in the stream of events' from arrest throughout the concededly invalid confessions of Saturday, December 7, to the confession and re-enactment of Sunday, December 8, 'sufficient to insulate' the final events 'from the effect of all that went before.' Clewis v. State of Texas, supra, at 710, 87 S.Ct., at 1340. See Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, n. 2, 88 S.Ct. 189, 190, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967).

Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with our decision herein.

Reversed and...