National Motor Club of Okl., Inc. v. State Ins. Bd.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1964
• Docket Number: No. 40996,40996
• Citation: 393 P.2d 511
• Parties: NATIONAL MOTOR CLUB OF OKLAHOMA, INC., Appellant, v. STATE INSURANCE BOARD of Oklahoma, Joe B. Hunt, President, Nelson H. Newman, Jr., Secretary, and Joe Carey, Member, and John J. Amar, Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 511

393 P.2d 511

1964 OK 138

NATIONAL MOTOR CLUB OF OKLAHOMA, INC., Appellant, v. STATE INSURANCE BOARD of Oklahoma, Joe B. Hunt, President, Nelson H. Newman, Jr., Secretary, and Joe Carey, Member, and John J. Amar, Appellees.

No. 40996.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 23, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the State Insurance Board orders the issuance of a motor service club agent's license under the provisions of Title 47 O.S.1961 § 653, a party who is neither a party in interest, nor a party aggrieved nor adversely affected by such order, may not maintain an appeal to this Court from said order.

2. The fact that a party may appear before the State Insurance Board and protest the issuance of a motor service club agent's license, does not ipso facto give such protesting party the right to maintain an appeal to this Court.

Appeal from an order of the Insurance Board.

National Motor Club of Oklahoma, Inc., protested the issuance of a motor service club agent's license to John J. Amar. The State Insurance Board issued the license and National Motor Club of Oklahoma, Inc., appealed from the order overruling its motion for rehearing. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that National could not maintain an appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Fellers, Snider, Baggett & McLane, by William C. Boston, Jr., Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Richard K. Race, Thomas M. Wakely, Oklahoma City, for appellee, State Insurance Board.

Savage, Gibson, Benefield & Shelton, Jack R. Lawrence, C. Wayne Litchfield, Oklahoma City, for appellee, John J. Amar.

IRWIN, Justice.

The issue presented is whether the appellant, National Motor Club of Oklahoma, Inc., hereinafter referred to as National can appeal to this Court from the order of the State Insurance Board issuing a Motor Service Club Agent's License to John J. Amar, referred to as Amar.

The record discloses that Amar filed an application with the State Insurance Board, referred to as Board, requesting a license as a motor service club agent. National filed a written demand with the Board that it hold a hearing prior to the issuance of the license and that it be granted the opportunity to be heard. A public hearing was had and National presented evidence and objected to the issuance of the license.

The Board determined that the record as reviewed would not be a bar to the issuance of a license and issued an order that the license application of Amar be granted as provided by Title 47 O.S.1961 § 653. National filed a motion for rehearing and the same was denied by the Board.

National filed its Petition in Error in this Court and Amar and the other appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that our laws do not grant National the right of appeal to the Supreme Court under the facts herein presented.

Both parties seem to agree that if National had the right of appeal from the order of the Board, such right is granted by Title 36 O.S.1961 § 347, and/or Title 75 O.S.Supp.1963 § 318. We find it unnecessary to determine whether one or both sections are applicable, but will assume that both sections govern the right of appeal.

Section 347, supra, provides:

'Any order or decision of the Board shall be subject to review by appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma at the instance of any party in interest. * * *' (emphasis ours).

Section 318, supra, was enacted in 1963, and is a part of the Administrative Procedures Act, which, inter alia, provides:

'Any person or party aggrieved or adversely affected by a final order in an individual proceeding, * * * is entitled to * * * judicial review * * *.' (emphasis ours).

Assuming that both sections are applicable, National has the right to appeal in the instant action if it is either a party in interest, or a party aggrieved or adversely affected. In considering whether it meets one or all of these requirements, the issue before us does not touch the merits of the appeal, but merely the authority of this Court to entertain the appeal.

In Love v. Wilson, 181 Okl. 558, 75 P.2d 876, we held that 'a party aggrieved' is one whose pecuniary interest is directly affected or whose right of property is established or divested by the decree; and, 'an interested party' is one whose statutory rights or immunities will be altered, enlarged, or abridged by the decree. Although the above definitions were set forth in an opinion involving probate matters, we did define the meaning of the terms.

In Board Of Review Created By Oklahoma Employment Security Act v. Codding, 199 Okl. 281, 185 P.2d 702, the Board of Review sought an appeal to this Court. In considering the cause and dismissing the same, we said:

'In Anderson v. Carder, Adm'r, 159 Kan. 1, 150 P.2d 754, it is stated that ordinarily one cannot appeal from a judgment unless he has a particular interest therein and is aggrieved thereby, and such interest must ordinarily be immediate and pecuniary.'

In Swan v. Home Savings & State Bank, 148 Okl. 42, 297 P. 250, we held that in order to maintain an appeal or a writ of error in this Court, it is necessary that appellant shall be injuriously affected or aggrieved by the order complained of and one cannot appeal from a decision, however erroneous, which does not affect his substantial rights.

In 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 176, page 517, we find this language:

'Since the legislature has power to formulate the conditions under which resort to the courts may be had, the persons accorded a right to obtain a review of administrative decisions and orders are to be ascertained from the terms of the statute providing therefor. Not every person who files a protest and is given an opportunity to be heard by the administrative agency has a right to appeal from an order of the agency, but whether a particular person has the right to contest administrative action is largely a question of law, dependent on a number of variable factors, including the nature and extent of his interest, the character of the administrative act, and the terms of the statute. Under some statutes anyone made a party to the proceeding may appeal, while under other statutes the right of appeal is limited to any party to the proceeding who is affected thereby, and even where intervention is granted it is not controlling as to the right of an appeal.'

In Arsenal Board of Trade v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 166 Pa.Super. 548, 72 A.2d 612, it is stated that...