State v. Glover

• Decision Date: 30 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 116,446,116,446
• Citation: 54 Kan.App.2d 377,400 P.3d 182
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Charles GLOVER, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

54 Kan.App.2d 377

400 P.3d 182

STATE of Kansas, Appellant,

v.Charles GLOVER, Appellee.

No. 116,446

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed June 30, 2017

John Grobmyer, legal intern, Andrew Bauch and Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorneys, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.

Elbridge Griffy IV, of Lawrence, for appellee.

Before Standridge, P.J., McAnany, J., and Hebert, S.J.

Standridge, J.:

The State takes this interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of evidence obtained after a law enforcement stop of Charles Glover's vehicle. The district court found that the initial stop was unlawful because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The State contends the district court erred in finding a lack of reasonable suspicion because the officer obtained a report that the registered owner of Glover's vehicle had a suspended driver's license and the officer reasonably inferred that Glover, the owner of the vehicle, was driving. Based on the particular facts presented in this case, we find the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehicle to investigate whether Glover had a valid driver's license: the evidence established that the officer knew the registered owner of Glover's vehicle had a suspended driver's license and there was no evidence from which the officer could have inferred that anyone but the registered owner was the driver of the vehicle.

FACTS

The parties stipulated to the facts of this case. On April 28, 2016, Douglas County Deputy Mark Mehrer was on routine patrol when he observed a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck. Mehrer ran the truck's license plate number through the Kansas Department of Revenue's file service, which confirmed that the plate was registered to the truck and indicated that the truck was registered to Glover. The report also stated that Glover had a revoked Kansas driver's license. Although Mehrer did not observe the driver of the truck commit any traffic infractions, Mehrer initiated a traffic stop based solely on the information that the driver's license of the truck's registered owner was revoked. Mehrer identified Glover as the driver of the truck. Glover was charged with driving without a license as a habitual violator under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-287, which is a class A nonperson misdemeanor.

Glover filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that Deputy Mehrer initiated the stop without the necessary reasonable suspicion to believe a crime had been, was being, or was going to be committed. Specifically, Glover argued the existence of evidence to show that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended driver's license is insufficient, without more, to support a reasonable inference that the owner of the vehicle is the person driving the vehicle. The State filed a response in opposition to the motion to suppress, arguing that Mehrer had a reasonable suspicion that Glover was the driver of the truck because it was reasonable for the officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle was also the driver of the vehicle in this case because there was no evidence from which a contrary inference could be made. The district court ultimately granted Glover's motion to suppress, holding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. The court reasoned:

"I mean, just as a personal observation, I have three cars registered in my name. My husband drives one every day; my daughter's in [Washington, D.C.] with one every day, and I drive the other. And I think that's true for a lot of families that if there are multiple family members and multiple vehicles, that somebody other than the registered owner often is driving that vehicle."

The State timely filed an interlocutory appeal seeking review of the district court's decision on the motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal of a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the ultimate determination of suppression is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review where, as here, the parties have stipulated to the material facts. See State v. Ramirez , 278 Kan. 402, 404, 100 P.3d 94 (2004). "Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a question of law and is reviewed de novo." State v. Coleman , 292 Kan. 813, Syl. ¶ 4, 257 P.3d 320 (2011).

REASONABLE SUSPICION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibit unreasonable government searches and seizures. A seizure occurs when an officer has restrained the liberty of a person by means of physical force or show of authority. State v. Greever , 286 Kan. 124, 135, 183 P.3d 788 (2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968] ). A law enforcement officer who stops a vehicle on a public roadway has effected a seizure. State v. Marx , 289 Kan. 657, 661, 215 P.3d 601 (2009).

To comply with the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer conducting a vehicle stop must "know of specific and articulable facts that create a reasonable suspicion the seized individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime or traffic infraction." State v. Jones , 300 Kan. 630, 637, 333 P.3d 886 (2014) ; see K.S.A. 22-2402(1) (codifying requirement that law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom the officer reasonably suspects "is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime"). The inquiry into the reasonableness of searches and seizures balances the State's interests against an individual's right to be secure from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Terry , 392 U.S. at 20–21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The reasonableness of an officer's suspicion depends on the totality of circumstances in the view of a trained law enforcement officer. State v. Martinez , 296 Kan. 482, 487, 293 P.3d 718 (2013).

"Reasonable suspicion means a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped is involved in criminal activity. Something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch must be articulated. Reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Both reasonable suspicion and probable cause are dependent upon the content of information possessed by the detaining authority and the information's degree of reliability. Quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion." State v. Toothman , 267 Kan. 412, Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 (1999).

The appellate court is "called upon to employ common sense and ordinary human experience" in evaluating whether the circumstances justify the detention. Jones , 300 Kan. at 647, 333 P.3d 886. " ‘[R]easonable suspicion represents a "minimum level of objective justification" which is "considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." ’ " City of Atwood v. Pianalto , 301 Kan. 1008, 1011, 350 P.3d 1048 (2015). The burden is on the State to demonstrate the lawfulness of the stop. See K.S.A. 22-3216(2).

ANALYSIS

The question presented on appeal is whether Deputy Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of Glover's vehicle to investigate whether the driver had a valid driver's license based solely on the fact that Mehrer knew that Glover, the registered owner of the observed vehicle, had a suspended license.

In support of its argument that Mehrer had reasonable suspicion, the State relies on State v. Hamic , 35 Kan.App.2d 202, 129 P.3d 114 (2006), for guidance. In Hamic , an officer observed a green Jeep Cherokee, which he believed was owned by Jena Hamic–Deutsch. The officer had personal knowledge of two previous instances in which Hamic–Deutsch operated the Jeep with a suspended license and without proof that the vehicle was covered with liability insurance: once approximately 2 months before the stop, and once approximately 1 month later. The officer also knew that a warrant had been issued for Hamic–Deutsch's arrest for a probation violation and that Hamic–Deutsch was a registered coowner of the Jeep. The officer did not observe a traffic violation and did not visually confirm that Hamic–Deutsch was operating or occupying the Jeep. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer learned that the driver was Hamic–Deutsch's mother and that Hamic–Deutsch was an occupant. After investigation, the officer arrested both women on several charges. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.

The Hamic court analyzed the totality of the information known to the officer at the time of the vehicle stop and ultimately determined that it supported a reasonable inference that Hamic–Deutsch was either the driver or occupant of the vehicle. 35 Kan.App.2d at 210, 129 P.3d 114 ("The officer personally knew that Hamic–Deutsch had been driving the Jeep on two separate occasions within the past 2 months, supporting a reasonable presumption that Hamic–Deutsch was the Jeep's principal operator."). On the issue of whether a law enforcement officer is justified in suspecting that the registered owner of a vehicle is the driver of that vehicle, the court stated as follows:

"Perhaps it is more a matter of common experience than a profound legal maxim to declare that a law enforcement officer is reasonable in suspecting that the registered owner of a vehicle is the driver of the owned vehicle, absent evidence to the contrary. One presumes that it is common for a reasonably cautious citizen to honk or wave at a moving vehicle that is owned by a friend without first having identified the vehicle's occupants, and in doing so, rationally expect that the friend will receive the greeting. Further, the caveat, that the owner-is-the-driver inference may lose its rationality where the officer possesses contrary

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