City of Atwood v. Pianalto

• Citation: 350 P.3d 1048,301 Kan. 1008
• Decision Date: 22 May 2015
• Docket Number: 109,796.
• Parties: CITY OF ATWOOD, Appellee, v. Richard David PIANALTO, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

301 Kan. 1008

350 P.3d 1048

CITY OF ATWOOD, Appellee

v.Richard David PIANALTO, Appellant.

109,796.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 22, 2015.

Daniel C. Walter, of Ryan, Walter & McClymont, Chtd., of Norton, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Charles A. Peckham, city attorney, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee.

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

Richard D. Pianalto appeals from his conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol, arguing the evidence of that offense was the product of an illegal traffic stop. Pianalto claims the officer who initiated the stop was mistaken about the applicable speed limit because a traffic sign normally posting the limit had been knocked to the ground. Pianalto contends the speed limit increased as a matter of law on the seemingly unposted roadway, so the officer had no basis to pull Pianalto over for speeding. We affirm his conviction.

Factual and Procedural Background

Early on the morning of January 1, 2012, an Atwood police officer observed Pianalto's vehicle traveling westbound on North Lake Road within the city limits. Using his radar gun, the officer checked Pianalto's speed as their vehicles passed each other. This instrument showed Pianalto traveling 28 miles per hour. The officer, a lifelong city resident, believed there was a posted 20 miles per hour speed limit on North Lake Road, so the officer activated his emergency equipment to initiate a traffic stop for a speeding violation. The officer was unaware the speed limit sign at this location had been knocked down.

During the stop, the officer developed suspicion that Pianalto was intoxicated. He administered field sobriety tests and arrested Pianalto. An evidentiary breath test showed Pianalto had a breath alcohol concentration of .148 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, which is well in excess of the .08 specified by statute. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1567. Pianalto was convicted in Atwood Municipal Court of DUI and speeding.

Pianalto appealed both convictions for a trial de novo in Rawlins County District Court, where he challenged whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop based on the fallen traffic sign. He argued that unless otherwise marked, the speed limit automatically increased to 30 miles per hour at the place of the stop in accordance with K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1558, so Pianalto's 28 miles per hour speed did not provide the reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop for speeding. The district court denied Pianalto's motion to suppress in a written order. It stated in part:

“1. The facts are not at issue. Simply stated, the arresting officer initiated a traffic stop of [Pianalto] for travelling 28 mph in what the officer mistakenly believed was a 20 mph zone based upon his use of a radar gun. The zone was and had for more years than anyone knew been a 20 mph zone but because the 20 mph speed limit sign had been knocked down the argument is that the speed limit reverted to 30 mph. The arresting officer did not have knowledge that the sign had been knocked down therefore making his mistake one of fact, not one of law. Had the officer known the sign had been knocked down then the argument could be made that his mistake was one of law, i.e. [,] did the speed limit revert to 30 mph.

“2. Although an argument could be made, and in fact was, that the speed limit did not increase to 30 mph based upon the speed limit sign having been knocked down it is not necessary to address that issue as this matter can be decided on the mistake of fact issue alone.”

The district court then concluded a reasonable mistake of fact could not invalidate a traffic stop when the officer had a “reasonably articulable” suspicion the motorist was speeding and ruled that the evidence against Pianalto would not be suppressed. The court did not explicitly conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop despite the mistake, but that is implicit.

After the motion to suppress was denied, Pianalto stipulated he was operating his vehicle with a breath alcohol content above the legal limit. The district court found him guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and imposed a sentence. The district court made no findings and entered no judgment as to the speeding violation. Pianalto timely appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the DUI conviction. City of Atwood v. Pianalto, No. 109,796, ––– Kan.App.2d ––––, 2014 WL 642203, at *5 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion). In doing so, the panel assumed the speed limit reverted to 30 miles per hour under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 8–1558 when the sign was knocked down. 2014 WL 642203, at *3. Next, the panel agreed the officer's error about the speed limit was a reasonable mistake of fact, writing:

“Had [the officer] known that the speed limit sign was down but was unaware that this fact caused the speed limit to revert to 30 miles per hour, this situation would have constituted a mistake of law, rendering the traffic stop invalid. But here the record clearly indicates that [the officer] reasonably believed there was still a speed limit sign in place at the Highway 25 entrance to North Lake Road imposing a 20 miles per hour speed limit. [The officer] was mistaken factually that the 20 miles per hour speed limit sign was still in place.” 2014 WL 642203, at *4.

Finally, addressing an argument raised by Pianalto that another officer's earlier knowledge of the downed sign should be imputed to the arresting officer, the panel held the issue was not preserved because Pianalto failed to raise it in the district court. Nonetheless, the panel continued, the arresting officer could be charged with the other officer's knowledge only if he was acting on the other officer's directions. 2014 WL 642203, at *4–5.

Pianalto petitioned for review, which this court granted. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 60–2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals decisions).

Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures....” See also Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 15. A traffic stop is considered a seizure of the driver. State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 773, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007). To comply with the Fourth Amendment, the officer conducting the stop “must ‘ “have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on fact, that the person stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” [Citation omitted.]’ ” 284 Kan. at 773, 166 P.3d 1015.

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. “What is reasonable depends on the totality of circumstances in the view of a trained law enforcement officer.” State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 487, 293 P.3d 718 (2013). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court must:

“ ‘ “[J]udge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience. [Citation omitted.] ‘Our task ... is ...’ ... to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention. [Citation omitted.] We make our determination with deference to a trained law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances, [citation omitted], remembering that reasonable suspicion represents a ‘minimum level of objective justification’ which is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” ' [Citations omitted.]” 296 Kan. at 487, 293 P.3d 718.

We must decide whether the panel erred when it affirmed the district court's denial of Pianalto's motion to suppress. Our answer turns on a single issue: whether the arresting officer's allegedly mistaken conclusion about the posted governing speed limit was objectively reasonable. If so, when combined with the officer's uncontested observation that Pianalto was driving 28 miles per hour, the officer would have had reasonable suspicion to initiate a lawful traffic stop.

Standard of review

A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed by an appellate court using a bifurcated standard. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial competent evidence. An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess witness credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence. The district court's ultimate legal conclusion regarding the suppression of evidence is reviewed de novo. If the material facts underlying the trial court's decision are not in dispute, whether to suppress evidence is a question of law subject to de novo review. Martinez, 296 Kan. at 485, 293 P.3d 718.

Discussion

The parties have hotly disputed whether we are dealing with a mistake of fact or mistake of law. Pianalto argues the panel erred when it concluded the arresting officer made a mistake of fact, stating “[t]he failure of the officer to know that [Pianalto] could not be charged with violating a speed limit when he was not properly notified constitutes a mistake of law and renders the initial stop invalid.” The City argues the arresting officer made a mistake of fact because he did not know the sign had been knocked down. This distinction previously impacted the standard governing the remaining analysis.

Prior to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), a majority of federal circuits to consider the issue held that, while reasonable suspicion could be founded upon an officer's reasonable mistake of fact, it could not be based upon an officer's mistake of law—no matter how reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir.2013) ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.2003) ; United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.1998). And our court had adopted the majority position, holding “an officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop violative of the Fourth Amendment and § 15 o...