Edwards v. Sammons

• Decision Date: 01 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 30061.,30061.
• Citation: 437 F.2d 1240
• Parties: Claybon J. EDWARDS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David T. SAMMONS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

437 F.2d 1240 (1971)

Claybon J. EDWARDS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David T. SAMMONS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 30061.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

February 2, 1971.

Rehearing Denied March 1, 1971.

Thomas M. Jackson, Macon, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Charles R. Adams, Jr., Fort Valley, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Before BELL, DYER, and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

BELL, Circuit Judge:

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in applying the doctrine of abstention in a voting rights case. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we reverse and remand for a decision on the merits.

During the week prior to the April 1, 1970 general election for mayor and council in the City of Fort Valley, Georgia, the city clerk mailed notices to 192 electors advising that pursuant to the provisions of § 5-1 of the city charter,¹ they were being purged from the voters list for failure to pay city ad valorem taxes. Of the 192 electors purged, 150 were Negro citizens.

Prior to the election a class action was instituted on behalf of the purged Negro electors in the Superior Court of Peach County seeking to have the charter provision declared unconstitutional as being in conflict with the Georgia Municipal Election Code, Title 34A, Georgia Code Annotated. On the night before the election, a temporary restraining order was entered ordering the defendant city officials to allow the 192 purged electors to vote on a special machine set up for that purpose. As a result of this order, 34 votes were cast on the special machine — 31 for a Negro candidate for city council and 3 for his white opponent.

On April 15, 1970 the Superior Court of Peach County entered an order upholding the provisions of the city charter under which the plaintiffs were purged. As a result the Negro candidate, Edwards, one of the appellants here, lost his race for city council by five votes.

Two days later, Edwards, and six of the purged electors filed suit in the federal district court against the appropriate city officials. Jurisdiction was premised on 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3).

Their complaint alleged first, that the city charter provision was in conflict with the Georgia Municipal Election Code. In this regard the plaintiffs urged that § 34A-515² of the Code outlines procedures for purging voters lists which they maintain are exclusive. The exclusivity argument is based on § 34A-102³ of the Code which provides that the Code shall take precedence over city charter provisions which are in conflict. In this connection, defendants maintain that § 34A-103(g) of the Code defines an elector in such a manner as to save the city charter provision in question from conflict with § 34A-102 of the Code.⁴

Secondly, plaintiffs alleged that the charter provision purging voters because of the failure to pay city ad valorem taxes was invalid in that it denied them rights secured by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A hearing was conducted on defendants' motion to dismiss on May 1, 1970. Thereafter an order was entered by the district court dismissing the action on the basis of the abstention doctrine and this appeal followed.⁵

The doctrine of abstention as fashioned in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 1941, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971, grew out of a desire to avoid federal constitutional questions where the case at hand could be decided by an adjudication in the state courts. It has generally been held proper where the constitutional issue might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination, Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 1944, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 1941, 316 U.S. 168, 62 S.Ct. 986, 86 L.Ed. 1355; to avoid disruption of a state administrative process, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 1942, 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424, or where needless friction in federal-state relationships might be otherwise avoided. Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 1959, 360 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058.

Deference to state court adjudication should be employed only where the issue of state law is uncertain, Harrison v. NAACP, 1959, 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152, and not where it is clear that no state construction could moot the federal constitutional issue. Baggett v. Bullitt, 1964, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377. Another rule of some pertinence here is contained in what the Supreme Court called the guide to decision in Zwickler v. Koota, 1967, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444, a quote from United States v. Livingston, D. S.C., 1959, 179 F.Supp. 9, 12-13, aff'd Livingston v. United States, 1960, 364 U.S. 281, 80 S.Ct. 1611, 4 L.Ed.2d 1719:

"Regard for the interest and sovereignty of the state and reluctance needlessly to adjudicate constitutional issues may require a federal District Court to abstain from adjudication if the parties may avail themselves of an appropriate procedure to obtain state interpretation of state laws requiring construction. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152. The decision in Harrison, however, is not a broad encyclical commanding automatic remission to the state courts of all federal questions arising in the application of state statutes. N.A.A.C.P. v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471, 79 S.Ct. 1192, 3 L.Ed.2d 1375. Though never interpreted by a state court, if a state statute is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will avoid or modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court to decide the federal question when presented to it. Any other course would impose expense and long delay upon the litigants without hope of its bearing fruit." 389 U.S. at 250-251, 88 S.Ct. at 397.

It may appear, conversely, that where the issue of state law could clearly moot the constitutional question by construction of the state statutes involved without resort to any federal constitutional construction, applying the doctrine of abstention would be the proper course of action. This, however, is an over simplification of the doctrine.

These approaches must also take into consideration the nature of the controversy and the particular right sought to be enforced. Cf. Harman v. Forssenius, 1965, 380 U.S. 528, 537, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (voting rights); Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 1964, 377 U.S. 218, 229, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (school desegregation); Baggett v. Bullitt, 1964, 377 U.S. 360, 375-380, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (First Amendment rights). In each of these cases the court referred to the nature of the rights involved as a reason to uphold the refusal of the District Court to abstain. Griffin referred to the need for prompt resolution of school desegregation questions. Baggett v. Bullitt focused on the need to avoid delay where the operation of the statute may inhibit First Amendment freedoms.

But Harman v. Forssenius points up the error in abstaining here. The controversy there involved the freighting of the right to vote in federal elections in Virginia with the necessity of paying a poll tax or, in the alternative, filing a certificate of residence, all in violation of the Twenty Fourth Amendment. The district court refused the request of the state that it abstain pending decision of state questions in the state courts. As an additional reason for finding no abuse of discretion in the refusal to abstain, the court stated:

"In addition to the clarity of the Virginia statutes, support for the District Court\'s refusal to stay the proceedings is found in the nature of the constitutional deprivation alleged and the probable consequences of abstaining. * * * As this Court has stressed on numerous occasions, `the right to vote freely for the candidate of one\'s choice is of the essence of a democratic society and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.\' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 523. The right is fundamental `because preservative of all rights.\' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, 226. In

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