4501 NORTHPOINT LP v. Maricopa County
Decision Date | 08 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA-TX 02-0027.,1 CA-TX 02-0027. |
Citation | 209 Ariz. 569,105 P.3d 1188 |
Parties | 4501 NORTHPOINT LP, a limited partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Fennemore Craig, P.C. By Paul J. Mooney and Jim L. Wright and Erika Garner, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Andrew Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney By Cary G. Hipps, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.
¶ 1 This appeal challenges the tax court's denial of attorneys' fees to 4501 Northpoint LP (Taxpayer) after it accepted an offer of judgment from Maricopa County (County). The tax court ruled that the judgment, entered pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 68, was not an adjudication on the merits qualifying Taxpayer to receive attorneys' fees under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 12-348(B)(1) (2003). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 This case arises out of a property tax valuation for the AMC theater complex and garages located at the Esplanade in Phoenix (Property). The Board of Equalization set the Property's full cash value at $13,597,923 for the 2000 tax year. Taxpayer filed its complaint in the Arizona State Tax Court on November 24, 1999, and trial was set for June 4, 2002.
¶ 3 On April 10, 2002, the County offered to reduce the valuation to $12,000,000, but Taxpayer rejected the offer. The County sent Taxpayer an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 on May 2, 2002. This time, the County offered to reduce the full cash value to $12,000,000 and to pay for costs but not attorneys' fees. Taxpayer filed a notice of partial acceptance of offer of judgment under Rule 68(c)(3), accepting the value and costs award but requesting attorneys' fees in accordance with A.R.S. §§ 12-348 and 12-349 (2003). The County cross-moved for attorneys' fees incurred after April 10, 2002, or, at least, for attorneys' fees incurred in responding to Taxpayer's fee application.
¶ 4 Following oral argument, the tax court ruled from the bench that Taxpayer could recover attorneys' fees. The tax court subsequently reversed itself, ruling that the Rule 68 judgment was not an adjudication on the merits entitling Taxpayer to attorneys' fees.
¶ 5 Ultimately, the tax court entered judgment. This appeal followed.
¶ 6 Statutory interpretation issues are questions of law subject to de novo review. Columbia Parcar Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 193 Ariz. 181, 183, ¶ 11, 971 P.2d 1042, 1044 (App.1999) (citations omitted). This case turns on the interpretation of A.R.S. § 12-348(B)(1), which states:
¶ 7 In interpreting a statute, "[o]rdinarily each word, phrase, clause, and sentence ... must be given meaning so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial." Columbia, 193 Ariz. at 185, ¶ 20, 971 P.2d at 1046 (citation omitted). Under this rule, the phrase "adjudication on the merits" entails a judicial determination on the substantive cause of action and must be given effect. Id.; see generally Black's Law Dictionary 42 (6th ed.1990) ("implies a hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual issue(s) involved"). that an adjudication It is not enough to obtain judgment by a consent decree or settlement agreement. Otherwise, the statute would award fees simply for "prevailing," as in any case in which a taxpayer obtains a reduction in value. See Arnold v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 167 Ariz. 155, 159, 805 P.2d 388, 392 (App.1990)
( ); State ex rel. Corbin v. Challenge, Inc., 151 Ariz. 20, 28, 725 P.2d 727, 735 (App.1986) (same); Wieland v. Danner Auto Supply, Inc., 695 P.2d 1332, 1333-34 (Okla.1984) (same).
¶ 8 In addition, a taxpayer who obtains a reduction in valuation by accepting an offer of judgment is different than a "successful party" in a contract case for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (2003) ( ). As we stated in Challenge, Inc., 151 Ariz. at 28, 725 P.2d at 735:
We acknowledge that a party who appeals and succeeds in reversing the trial court's entry of summary judgment may be a "successful party" on appeal and thus may be entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01.... That statute, however, is readily distinguishable from A.R.S. § 12-348 which expressly permits fees only to a party which prevails by an adjudication on the merits.
Id. In other words, a successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 need not prevail by an adjudication on the merits to obtain attorneys' fees. However, a taxpayer must not only obtain a reduction in valuation but also prevail by an adjudication on the merits in order to obtain attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12-348. The act of accepting an offer of judgment does not go to "the merits" of an action because there are several reasons why a party may accept an offer of judgement that do not necessarily include any resolution of the merits. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876)
(. )
¶ 9 The County cites Columbia to support this view. In that case, the plaintiff had persuaded the superior court to set aside portions of an administrative order for further administrative proceedings on remand. Columbia, 193 Ariz. at 182, ¶ 8, 971 P.2d at 1043. The court, however, declined to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiff pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348(A)(2), which provides for fees to a party that prevails by an adjudication on the merits in a court proceeding to review a state agency decision.1 Id. at 183, ¶ 9, 971 P.2d at 1044. We explained in that case that the word "merits" "embraces a consideration of substance, not of form; of legal rights, not of mere defects of procedure or practice or the technicalities thereof." Id. at ¶ 15, 971 P.2d 1042 (quotations omitted). Thus, the remand ruling was procedural and did not qualify as an adjudication on the merits, notwithstanding the court's determinations on which issues to remand. Id.; see generally I Arizona Appellate Handbook § 11.2.1.4, at 11-10 (Sheldon H. Weisberg & Paul G. Ulrich, eds., 4th ed.2000).
¶ 10 In this case, the superior court entered a judgment, not an interlocutory order. Entering a Rule 68 judgment, however, does not determine the substance of issues but instead qualifies as a perfunctory act performed pursuant to the parties' agreement. Pope v. Gap, Inc., 125 N.M. 376, 961 P.2d 1283, 1289 (N.M.Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted). The court ordinarily exercises no discretion because, once the judgment is accepted, the court simply enters it. Id.; Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Mich. Mut. Liab. Co., 64 Mich.App. 315, 235 N.W.2d 769, 776 (1975) ( ).
¶ 11 The Arizona Supreme Court bolstered this view in Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 716 P.2d 28 (1986). The court rejected an argument that a stipulation to dismiss one defendant and the corresponding dismissal had collateral estoppel effect in litigation against another defendant. Id. at 572-73, 716 P.2d at 29-30. The court explained that "[n]othing is adjudicated between parties to a stipulated dismissal" and "none of the issues is actually litigated" in the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default. Id. at 573, 716 P.2d at 30 (citations omitted). A consent judgment may be conclusive as to an issue only if the parties have manifested such an intent in the agreement. Id. Otherwise, the issue remains unresolved.2Id.
¶ 12 Likewise, we cannot say that the Rule 68 judgment here qualifies as an adjudication on the merits. At no time did the trial court receive evidence or rule on the substance of the issues. The trial court's sole involvement, other than to rule on continuances, was to rule on the request for attorneys' fees. Nothing in the judgment indicates that the parties intended to be bound to any determination of fact or law. As a result, Taxpayer is not entitled to attorneys' fees.
¶ 13 Taxpayer alternatively argues that Rule 68(c)(3) authorizes it to recover attorneys' fees. Rule 68(c)(3) provides in part:
Partial Acceptance of Offer; Procedure. If, while such an offer remains effective within the meaning of this Rule, the adverse party serves written notice that the portion of the offer stating the monetary award to be made on the causes of action asserted is accepted, either party may file the offer together with proof of acceptance thereof and may apply to the court for a determination whether attorneys' fees should be awarded and, if so, the amount thereof.
¶ 14 It is fundamental that attorneys' fees are awardable in Arizona to the prevailing party "only when expressly authorized by contract or statute." Burke v. Ariz. State Retirement Sys., 206 Ariz. 269, 270, ¶ 7, 77 P.3d 444, 447 (App.2003), review denied (Mar. 16, 2004) (citations omitted). Rule 68(c)(3) creates no exception. By its terms, the rule allows a...
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4501 Northpoint Lp v. Maricopa County
...by the trial court and therefore is not an adjudication on the merits that allows a fee award under § 12-348(B). 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa County, 209 Ariz. 569, 574, ¶ 17, 105 P.3d 1188, 1193 (App.2005). In dissent, Judge Winthrop noted that Northpoint had achieved substantive relief ......