Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy

Citation453 F.3d 1151
Decision Date12 July 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-15577.,04-15577.
PartiesPEBBLE BEACH COMPANY, a California General Partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael CADDY, an individual, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Stephen M. Trattner, Washington, DC, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Mikal J. Condon, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Oakland, CA, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-03-04550-PJH.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TROTT and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Pebble Beach Company ("Pebble Beach"), a golf course resort in California, appeals the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of its complaint against Michael Caddy ("Caddy"), a small-business owner located in southern England. In addition, Pebble Beach seeks review of an order denying its request for an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Because Caddy did not expressly aim his conduct at California or the United States, we hold that the district court determined correctly that it lacked personal jurisdiction. Given the nature of the claims and the facts of this case, we conclude also that the district court properly exercised its discretion by denying Pebble Beach's motion to conduct additional jurisdictional discovery. Thus, we affirm.

I

Pebble Beach is a well-known golf course and resort located in Monterey County, California. The golf resort has used "Pebble Beach" as its trade name for 50 years. Pebble Beach contends that the trade name has acquired secondary meaning in the United States and the United Kingdom. Pebble Beach operates a website located at www.pebblebeach.com.

Caddy, a dual citizen of the United States and the United Kingdom occupies and runs a three-room bed and breakfast, restaurant, and bar located in southern England. Caddy's business operation is located on a cliff overlooking the pebbly beaches of England's south shore, in a town called Barton-on-Sea. The name of Caddy's operation is "Pebble Beach," which, given its location, is no surprise. Caddy advertises his services, which do not include a golf course, at his website, www.pebblebeach-uk.com. Caddy's website includes general information about the accommodations he provides, including lodging rates in pounds sterling, a menu, and a wine list. The website is not interactive. Visitors to the website who have questions about Caddy's services may fill out an on-line inquiry form. However, the website does not have a reservation system, nor does it allow potential guests to book rooms or pay for services on-line.

Except for a brief time when Caddy worked at a restaurant in Carmel, California, his domicile has been in the United Kingdom.

On October 8, 2003, Pebble Beach sued Caddy under the Lanham Act and the California Business and Professions Code for intentional infringement and dilution of its "Pebble Beach" mark. Caddy moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process. On March 1, 2004, the district court granted Caddy's motion on personal jurisdiction grounds, without addressing the insufficiency of service of process issue. The district court denied also Pebble Beach's request for additional discovery. Pebble Beach timely appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

II

We review de novo the district court's determination that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Caddy. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir.2004). We review a district court's decision to grant or deny discovery on jurisdictional facts for abuse of discretion. Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017, 104 S.Ct. 549, 78 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The arguments are straight forward. Caddy contends that the district court may not assert personal jurisdiction over him, and, consequently, that the complaint against him was properly dismissed. Pebble Beach argues in return that Caddy is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California, or, alternatively, in any forum in the United States, because he has expressly aimed tortious conduct at California and the United States.1 Pebble Beach asserts that it may look to the entire United States as a litigation forum pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) if Caddy's contacts with California are insufficient to warrant jurisdiction. As explained more thoroughly below, Rule 4(k)(2) may, in limited circumstances, be a basis for establishing jurisdiction where "the United States serves as the relevant forum for a minimum contacts analysis." Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir.2002).

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir.2003). However, this demonstration requires that the plaintiff "make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss." Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, for the purpose of this demonstration, the court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff, here, Pebble Beach. Id.

The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if it is permitted by a long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due process. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat. Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir.1996). Here, both the California long-arm statute and Rule 4(k)(2) — what is often referred to as the federal long-arm statute — require compliance with due process requirements. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1129 (California long-arm statute); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 922 (applying Rule 4(k)(2) as a federal long-arm statute). Consequently, under both arguments presented by Pebble Beach, resolution turns on due process.

For due process to be satisfied, a defendant, if not present in the forum, must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the assertion of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

In this circuit, we employ the following three-part test to analyze whether a party's "minimum contacts" meet the Supreme Court's directive. This "minimum contacts" test is satisfied when,

(1) the defendant has performed some act or consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000). "If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the defendant of due process of law." Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1995). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the "minimum contacts" test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (internal citations omitted). Here, Pebble Beach's arguments fail under the first prong. Accordingly, we need not address whether the claim arose out of or resulted from Caddy's forum-related activities or whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable per the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).

Under the first prong of the "minimum contacts" test, Pebble Beach has the burden of establishing that Caddy "has performed some act or consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum." Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. We have refined this to mean whether Caddy has either (1) "purposefully availed" himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, or (2) "purposefully directed" his activities toward the forum. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Although we sometimes use the phrase "purposeful availment" to include both purposeful availment and direction, "availment and direction are, in fact, two distinct concepts." Id.

Thus, in order to satisfy the first prong of the "minimum contacts" test, Pebble Beach must establish either that Caddy (1) purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, or the United States as a whole, or (2) that he purposefully directed its activities toward one of those two forums. Id.

1. Purposeful Availment

Pebble Beach fails to identify any conduct by Caddy that took place in California or in the United States that adequately supports the availment concept. Evidence of availment is typically action taking place in the forum that invokes the benefits and protections of the laws in the forum. Id. at 803. Evidence of direction generally consists of action taking place outside the forum that is directed at the forum. Id. (suggesting evidence of purposeful direction includes activities such as distribution and advertising). All of Caddy's action identified by Pebble Beach is action taking place outside the forum. Thus, if anything, it is the type of evidence that supports a purposeful direction analysis. Accordingly, we reject Pebble Beach's assertion that Caddy has availed himself of the jurisdiction of the district court under both concepts and proceed only to determine whether Caddy has purposefully directed his action toward one of two applicable forums.

2. Purposeful Direction: California

In Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court held...

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