Hays, In re

Decision Date06 June 1984
Docket NumberNo. 58724,58724
Citation80 Ill.Dec. 307,102 Ill.2d 314,465 N.E.2d 98
Parties, 80 Ill.Dec. 307 In re Robert HAYS. (The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert HAYS, Appellant).
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Neil Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Ellen M. Flaum, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Rebecca L. White, Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Commission, Springfield, for the State; Basil G. Greanias, State's Atty., Decatur, of counsel.

Jeff M. Plesko, Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Com'n, Carbondale, for appellee.

WARD, Justice:

The circuit court of Macon County declared Robert Hays to be a person subject under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-100 et seq.) to involuntary admission to a mental health facility. The appellate court reversed, with one judge dissenting (115 Ill.App.3d 686, 71 Ill.Dec. 521, 451 N.E.2d 9), and we granted the State's petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (87 Ill.2d R. 315).

On October 11, 1982, Robert Hays, 19 years old, voluntarily admitted himself to the psychiatric unit of Mercy Hospital in Urbana. He had been voluntarily admitted there on nine previous occasions over the preceding four years. The day following his admission, he twice refused to take medication. He threw a phone at security guards, became physically resistive, and had to be physically restrained and given medication. After being restrained, he told a nurse that he wanted to die. He later became quiet and did not cause further disturbance.

After this incident, the hospital petitioned the circuit court to have Hays declared a person subject to involuntary admission under article VI of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-600 et seq.). This was done, it was said, in order to transfer Hays to an institution with better facilities for his treatment.

On the evening following Hays' outburst, a physician executed the first certificate required under section 3-602 for an involuntary commitment (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-602). Hays was transferred that night to the Adolph Meyer Health Center in Decatur, a State facility. The next day the second certificate, which the statute requires to be executed by a psychiatrist, was prepared. At a hearing in the circuit court of Macon County, Hays was formally declared a person subject to involuntary admission.

The record shows that Hays was discharged from the Meyer facility on December 20, 1982, and though the question has not been raised by the parties, it is proper to comment on the question of mootness. We consider that review of the circuit court's action is appropriate, as the character of an involuntary commitment has been held to be of sufficient significance to permit the invoking of the "collateral consequence" exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Garcia (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 500, 502-03, 16 Ill.Dec. 684, 375 N.E.2d 557.

The single question presented is whether a petition for involuntary commitment of a voluntarily admitted patient may properly be brought when the patient has not made a request to be discharged. The State contends that there is no prohibition in the Code against a hospital's initiating a petition for involuntary commitment against a voluntary patient. The State argues that if a private hospital could not so proceed, there would be no way to transfer an "unsuitable" patient to another facility.

The appellate court has answered the question in the negative (In re Meyer (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 871, 63 Ill.Dec. 708, 438 N.E.2d 639; People v. Hill (1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 638, 28 Ill.Dec. 852, 391 N.E.2d 51; In re Clement (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 574, 340 N.E.2d 217.) In Clement the court said:

"We hold that a voluntary patient under the Code has an unqualified right to request to leave a Department facility at any time. Absent such a request by the patient, the Department may not infringe on this right by the institution of commitment proceedings. Only when the voluntary patient exercises his right and submits a written notice of his desire to leave may the Department exercise its right to file a petition for involuntary commitment.

[Clement] was committed in a manner not authorized by statute. He entered the hospital as a voluntary patient, and the subsequent commitment, with its accompanying stigma, deprived him of his right to request to leave without due process." 34 Ill.App.3d 574, 577, 340 N.E.2d 217.

Article III of the Code provides for the admission and discharge of adults in mental health facilities. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-100 et seq.) An adult may be admitted "voluntarily" into a facility upon the filing of an application and the facility's acceptance of the patient as "clinically suitable." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-400.) The application must contain a statement of the patient's right under the statute to a discharge, and the facility must orally inform him upon admission of this right. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-401.) Section 3-403 sets out this right to discharge:

"A voluntary patient shall be allowed to be discharged from the facility at the earliest appropriate time, not to exceed 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after he gives any treatment staff person written notice of his desire to be discharged unless he either withdraws the notice in writing or unless within the 5 day period a petition and 2 certificates conforming to the requirements of paragraph (b) of Section 3-601 and Section 3-602 [which pertain to involuntary commitment] are filed with the court. Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall order a hearing to be held within 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, and to be conducted pursuant to Article IX of this Chapter. Hospitalization of the patient may continue pending further order of the court." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-403.

The Code also sets out the procedure for emergency involuntary commitment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-600 et seq.) First a petition must be brought stating that "hospitalization is necessary for the protection of such person or others from physical harm." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-601.) In addition, two certificates stating that involuntary commitment is necessary must be secured in order for the petition to be heard by the court. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 91 1/2, pars. 3-602, 3-610.) The first certificate must accompany the petition and have been executed by...

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34 cases
  • In re Alfred H.H.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 21 Mayo 2009
    ... ... 215, 702 N.E.2d 555 ...         The case-by-case approach utilized in Barbara H. is consistent with this court's prior precedent. See In re Splett, 143 Ill.2d 225, 228, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991) (applying the collateral consequences exception); In re Hays, 102 Ill.2d 314, 317, 80 Ill.Dec. 307, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984) (also invoking the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine). More importantly, the case-by-case approach of Barbara H. is also consistent with subsequent opinions of this court. See In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, ... ...
  • People v. Jones
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    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 22 Mayo 2003
    ... ... Most recently, in In re James E., 207 Ill.2d 105, 278 Ill.Dec. 27, 797 N.E.2d 622 (2003), we created a "narrow exception" ( 207 Ill.2d at 114, 278 Ill. Dec. at 27, 797 N.E.2d at 622 ) to the rule in In re Hays, 102 Ill.2d 314, 80 Ill.Dec. 307, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984), regarding involuntary commitment of a voluntarily admitted patient of a mental health facility. This exception effectively swallowed the rule, resulting in our implicitly overruling Hays. 2 See James E., 207 Ill.2d at 117, 278 ... ...
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    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 28 Febrero 2020
    ... ... In re James E. , 207 Ill. 2d 105, 114, 278 Ill.Dec. 27, 797 N.E.2d 622 (2003) (explaining "that one of the purposes of the [Mental Health] Code was the encouragement of voluntary admissions"); In re Splett , 143 Ill. 2d 225, 233, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991) (same); In re Hays , 102 Ill. 2d 314, 319, 80 Ill.Dec. 307, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984) (stating that voluntary admission "generally is considered to be the preferred method of commencing treatment of mental illness"). There are two reasons for this preference. First, obviously, voluntary treatment does not involve the ... ...
  • Estate of Johnson by Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hosp.
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    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 11 Febrero 1988
    ... ... 3-400.) Such a voluntary patient must be discharged within five days of giving his written request to leave, unless a petition and two certificates are filed with the court asserting that the person is subject to involuntary admission. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-401; In re Hays (1984), 102 Ill.2d 314, 317-18, 80 Ill.Dec. 307, 465 N.E.2d 98.) Under the emergency-admission procedures of the Code, involuntary admission is commenced by the filing of a petition with the director of the mental health facility stating that immediate hospitalization is necessary for the ... ...
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