Poirier v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 25 October 1983
• Citation: 466 A.2d 1261
• Parties: Brian K. POIRIER v. Pearl E. HAYES.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1261

466 A.2d 1261

Brian K. POIRIER v. Pearl E. HAYES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 8, 1983.

Decided Oct. 25, 1983.

Tanous & Beaupain, Norman S. Heitmann, III (orally), East Millinocket, for plaintiff.

Twitchell, Linscott & Badger, Frederick J. Badger, Jr. (orally), Bangor, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN and GLASSMAN, JJ.

WATHEN, Justice.

Plaintiff Brian K. Poirier appeals from a directed verdict granted by the Superior Court (Penobscot County) at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case on the issue of liability. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the presiding justice erred in excluding proffered expert testimony concerning the rate of speed of defendant's vehicle and in granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant on the issue of liability. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's negligence to warrant submission of the case to the jury and therefore we sustain the appeal.

Plaintiff's complaint sought recovery for personal injuries sustained by him in an accident which occurred on April 19, 1981, on Route 116 in the town of Chester. The evidence presented at trial may be summarized as follows: At approximately 1:00 a.m. plaintiff was walking in a northerly direction along the edge of the pavement on the right-hand side of the roadway. He was wearing dark clothing and was quite intoxicated, having consumed approximately fifteen drinks during the course of an evening with his wife and friends at a "bottle club" known as the Spinning Wheel. Defendant, who was also a patron of the Spinning Wheel, left shortly after plaintiff and drove his vehicle north on Route 116 in the same lane of traffic in which plaintiff was walking. The portion of the road where the accident occurred had been recently repaved and the surface was dry. The roadway leading up to the point of impact was straight and the view was unobstructed. The posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour. Defendant testified that he was traveling at a speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour and that the headlights of his vehicle were dimmed. He testified that he did not see plaintiff until he suddenly appeared two to three feet in front of, and to the right of his vehicle. Defendant immediately applied his brakes, the wheels locked and the vehicle skidded to a stop. As a result of the impact plaintiff was thrown on top of the vehicle and was carried for some unspecified distance until he fell and landed behind it in the right-hand lane. The physical evidence included four skid marks left by defendant's vehicle, the longest of which measured 171 feet. Defendant's vehicle sustained front end damage estimated at $1,300.00. Having severed the issue of liability, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case the presiding justice directed a verdict in favor of defendant, finding "no evidence of negligence on the part of [defendant] causing this accident." ¹ From this ruling plaintiff appeals.

I.

In reviewing a directed verdict, we must consider the evidence, including every justifiable inference therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed. Reed v. Rule, 376 A.2d 445 (Me.1977); Moore v. Fenton, 289 A.2d 698, 700 (Me.1972). A verdict should be directed only if the evidence presents no issue for jury consideration. Martin v. Deschaine, 159 Me. 155, 156, 189 A.2d 569, 570 (1963). Based upon our review of the evidence presented, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's negligence to warrant submitting the issue to the jury.

The operator of a motor vehicle is required to drive "at a careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the way or place, and of any other conditions then existing." 29 M.R.S.A. § 1252(1) (1978). Evidence that a motorist was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted limit, or even at a lesser rate of speed if unreasonable under the particular circumstances, can give rise to a finding of negligence. Moses v. Scott Paper Company, 280 F.Supp. 37, 41 (D.Me.1968); Reed v. Rule, 376 A.2d at 447. Whether an individual was driving at an unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances is normally a question of fact for the jury. Feely v. Norton, 149 Me. 119, 124, 99 A.2d 285, 288 (1953).

The direct evidence of speed in this case consisted of defendant's testimony that he was traveling between 30 and 35 miles per hour. Notwithstanding his testimony, the jury would have been entitled to consider the length of the skid marks as evidence that defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Although the "mere skidding of a motor vehicle is not evidence of negligence," Hoch v. Doughty, 224 A.2d 54, 56 (Me.1966), skid marks may constitute circumstantial evidence of speed. It was for the jury to determine whether the rate at which defendant's vehicle was traveling was excessive and unreasonable under the...