People v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 09 September 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 88094
• Citation: 475 N.W.2d 288,438 Mich. 448
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Lee THOMAS, Defendant-Appellee. 438 Mich. 448, 475 N.W.2d 288

Page 288

475 N.W.2d 288

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Lee THOMAS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 88094.

438 Mich. 448, 475 N.W.2d 288

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 5, 1990.

Decided Sept. 9, 1991.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., Michael J. Modelski, Chief, Appellate Div., by Paul J. Fischer, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, for plaintiff-appellant.

Elbert L. Hatchett, Arnold L. Weiner, Pontiac, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

Leave was granted in this case to determine whether the circuit court erred in dismissing a common-law felony count of obstruction of justice, M.C.L. Sec. 750.505; M.S.A. Sec. 28.773. The reason for the dismissal was that the alleged conduct, making a false statement in a police report in support of an arrest warrant, fell within the statutory prohibition of the misdemeanor, failure to uphold the law, M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101). We find as follows: first, appellate courts review questions of law for error; second, M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101), failure to uphold the law, does not preclude the charge of common-law obstruction of justice; and, third, the charge of common-law obstruction of justice is not one single offense but many offenses, none of which encompasses the defendant's conduct. For these reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals. 182 Mich.App. 225, 452 N.W.2d 215.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The Court of Appeals adequately stated the facts as follows:

"On the night of August 21, 1987, defendant, a former Royal Oak Township police officer, was returning to the station following execution of a search warrant on a suspected drug house. He was accompanied by township police chief John Catewood, Deputy Chief Cecil Dawson and Sergeant Albert Serridge. While en route, the officers observed a suspected drug dealer in a parking lot. Defendant got out of the police car, called the suspect over and proceeded to search him. Two packages of cocaine were discovered and the suspect was arrested.

"Defendant prepared a police incident report on the arrest. In that report, defendant stated that he had received a tip that an individual fitting the suspect's description would be in the parking lot in possession of a gun and drugs. This statement was false.

"The report was forwarded with other materials to the prosecutor's office for the purpose of obtaining a warrant for the suspect's arrest. The report was sent before Deputy Chief Dawson had an opportunity to review it. However, upon his inspection of the report, Dawson realized that it contained false information and immediately informed the prosecutor's office.

"As a result of the false statement, defendant was charged with forgery, MCL 750.248; MSA 28.445, conspiracy to commit forgery, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1); MCL 750.248; MSA 28.445, uttering and publishing a forged instrument, MCL 750.249; MSA 28.446, obstruction of justice, MCL 750.505; MSA 28.773, and conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1); MCL 750.505; MSA 28.773.

"Defendant was bound over on the forgery, uttering and publishing and obstruction of justice charges. Both conspiracy counts were dismissed at the preliminary examination.

"Defendant's motion to quash the remaining charges was granted by the Oakland Circuit Court in an October 6, 1988, order. However, the court remanded defendant's case to the district court for trial on an added misdemeanor charge of willful failure to uphold the law, MCL 752.11; MSA 28.746(101)." 182 Mich.App. 225, 227-228, 452 N.W.2d 215 (1989).

The prosecutor appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the circuit court, finding that on these facts there could be no charge of forgery, uttering and publishing, or common-law obstruction of justice. The Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court's decision to quash the charge of common-law obstruction of justice on the ground that it was precluded by the statutory offense of wilful failure to uphold the law, M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101).

I

At the outset, it should be noted that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect

"abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing the circuit court's quashing of the obstruction of justice charge. As a general matter, the district court's decision to bind over the defendant is subject to review for abuse of discretion. See People v. King, 412 Mich. 145, 155, 312 N.W.2d 629 (1981). The holding in King, however, was based on the appellate court's review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence against the defendant. The circuit court in this case granted the motion to quash on the legal ground that Thomas' alleged conduct fell within the statutory scope of M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101). Appellate courts review questions of law for error. Thus, the circuit court's quashing of the obstruction of justice charge on the legal ground asserted in this case is subject to review for error.

II

According to M.C.L. Sec. 750.505; M.S.A. Sec. 28.773, "[a]ny person who shall commit any indictable offense at the common law, for the punishment of which no provision is expressly made by any statute of this state, shall be guilty of a felony...." In People v. Davis, 408 Mich. 255, 274, 290 N.W.2d 366 (1980), Justice Coleman found that when a "charge sets forth all the elements of the statutory offense," a conviction under M.C.L. Sec. 750.505; M.S.A. Sec. 28.773 cannot be sustained. ¹ Therefore, to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the charge of common-law obstruction of justice, we must first determine whether M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101) "sets forth all the elements" of the common-law offense.

M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101) provides:

"Any public official, appointed or elected, who is responsible for enforcing or upholding any law of this state and who wilfully and knowingly fails to uphold or enforce the law with the result that any person's legal rights are denied is guilty of a misdemeanor."

According to the purpose section of this statute, the legislative intent was to create "[a]n act to require public officials to enforce the legal rights of citizens and to provide a penalty for failure to do so." 1966 P.A. 158. We find that defendant's alleged conduct exceeds the strictures of M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101).

We are required to construe M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101) according "to the fair import of [its] terms, to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law." M.C.L. Sec. 750.2; M.S.A. Sec. 28.192. We believe that construing M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101) according to its fair import and to effect its objects requires us to distinguish between the omission of a duty and affirmative acts. ² In reaching this result we find the analysis of People v. Crousore, 159 Mich.App. 304, 305, 406 N.W.2d 280 (1987), to be persuasive. In Crousore, the Court rejected the contention by the defendant that the common-law offense of accessory after the fact was preempted by the harboring and concealing statute, M.C.L. Sec. 750.199; M.S.A. Sec. 28.396. The basis for the Court's "We conclude that the Legislature did not intend the harboring and concealing statute to encompass all aspects of aiding and escape. Rather, the statute merely prohibits the providing of a refuge for or hiding the escapee. It does not go further and include a prohibition against something more to prevent the escapee's detection or arrest, e.g., providing supplies, weapons, money or transportation, as was done by defendant Wyngaard herein, with knowledge that a crime has been committed. Punishment for these additional acts is provided for under the common-law felony of accessory after the fact." Id. at 312, 406 N.W.2d 280.

holding was that the common-law felony punished additional acts that the statutory offense did not. Specifically, the Court in Crousore held:

Similar to Crousore, the statute in this case merely proscribes the wilful and knowing failure to uphold the law, acts of omission. It does not include the act of the defendant police officer in this case of falsifying a police report, an act of commission. Therefore since M.C.L. Sec. 752.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.746(101) proscribes an omission of duty and fails to include the affirmative acts and commissions as alleged here, we believe that it does not preclude the charge of common-law obstruction of justice against the defendant.

III

This analysis does not end the matter. An analysis of the common-law offense of obstruction of justice is necessary to determine if the charge can be maintained on the facts of this case.

Obstruction of justice is generally understood as an interference with the orderly administration of justice. This Court, in People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich. 291, 300, 17 N.W.2d 187 (1945), defined obstruction of justice as " 'impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or powers of administering justice therein.' " In People v. Coleman, 350 Mich. 268, 274, 86 N.W.2d 281 (1957), this Court stated that obstruction of justice is "committed when the effort is made to thwart or impede the administration of justice." While these definitions adequately summarize the essential concept of obstruction of justice, we believe they lack the specificity necessary to sustain a criminal conviction. ³

Early commentaries categorized offenses by what the particular offense wronged. For instance, some categories included offenses against property, persons, peace, health and public justice. ⁴ In Ware v. Branch Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 488, 491-492, 42 N.W. 997 (1889), the Court analyzed the category of related offenses under the heading breach of the peace. We find the analysis in Ware applicable.

"No principle is more universally settled than that which deprives all courts of power to...