Rodriguez v. Solar of Michigan, Inc.

Decision Date08 October 1991
Docket Number119722,119721,121145 and 121146,Nos. 119666,s. 119666
Citation478 N.W.2d 914,191 Mich.App. 483
PartiesFrances RODRIGUEZ, Personal Representative of the Estate of Alfredo Alonzo, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOLAR OF MICHIGAN, INC., Defendant, and Patricia Savoie, Personal Representative of the Estate of Todd Savoie, Defendant-Appellant. Frances RODRIGUEZ, Personal Representative of the Estate of Alfredo Alonzo, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross Appellant, v. SOLAR OF MICHIGAN, INC., Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and Patricia Savoie, Personal Representative of the Estate of Todd Savoie, Defendant. Peter SAVOIE and Patricia Savoie, and Patricia Savoie, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Todd J. Savoie, Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. RESTAURANTS BY BOSLEY, INC., Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellee, and Solar of Michigan, Inc., Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. Maria ALONZO, Rosie Franco, Angela Closna, Alfredo Alonzo, Jr., Frances Rodriguez, Elizabeth Ortiz, Edward Ortiz, Mark Vasquez, Stacy Reynolds, Melony Rodriguez, Roberta Rodriguez, Shea Ortiz, Mike Ortiz, Roman Ortiz, Brian Franco, Veronica Closna, Rocky Closna, Dominic Alonzo and Adrian Alonzo, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RESTAURANTS BY BOSLEY, INC., Defendant-Appellant. Peter SAVOIE and Patricia Savoie, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RESTAURANTS BY BOSLEY, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and Solar of Michigan, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Jerome F. O'Rourke, Flint (Robert D. Goldstein, Detroit, of counsel), for Frances Rodriguez, Maria Alonzo, and others.

Peacock, Fordney, Cady, Ingleson & Prine, P.C. by Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr., Andrew W. Prine, and Lynne M. Brown, Saginaw, for Peter Savoie and Patricia Savoie.

Thomas C. Wimsatt and Robert A. Hahn, Saginaw, for Solar of Michigan, Inc.

Kallas, Lower, Henk & Treado, P.C. by Constantine N. Kallas, Bloomfield Hills, for Restaurants by Bosley, Inc.

Before MARK J. CAVANAGH, P.J., and HOLBROOK, and CYNAR *, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated wrongful death and dramshop actions arise out of a December 22, 1984, automobile accident in which Alfredo Alonzo and Todd Savoie were killed when the cars they were driving collided. Frances Rodriguez, as personal representative of the estate of Alonzo, brought a wrongful death action against Solar of Michigan, Inc., at whose Christmas party Todd Savoie allegedly consumed alcoholic beverages, and against Peter Savoie, Todd's father, who held title to the car Todd was driving. 1 Patricia Savoie, as personal representative of the estate of Todd Savoie, was later added as a defendant in that action. Alonzo's family members brought a dramshop action against Restaurants by Bosley, doing business as Bosley's, which was Solar's caterer. Patricia Savoie, as personal representative of the estate of Todd Savoie, brought a wrongful death action against Solar, and Peter and Patricia Savoie, as the parents of Todd, filed a dramshop action against Bosley's. Solar and Bosley's filed cross-claims against each other in regard to these cases. The trial court consolidated the cases for trial, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiffs Rodriguez, Alonzo and Savoie. Various parties appealed and cross appealed. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

On December 21, 1984, Solar sponsored a Christmas party catered by Bosley's in Bosley's banquet room. Nineteen-year-old Todd Savoie, an employee of one of Solar's subcontractors, attended and obtained alcohol at the party. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on December 22, 1984, Orlie Wilson was driving west on M-57 west of Montrose, Michigan, and observed Todd's car weaving and coming up fast behind him. Todd's car went off the road to the right, then came back across almost hitting the rear end of Wilson's car, and went off the road on the other side, passing Wilson's car on the left. After Todd's car passed, it continued to weave on and off the road, back and forth across the center line. Wilson then was passed by Steve Carstensen, who was following Todd, hoping to see a license plate number because Todd had almost run him off the road. Wilson and Carstensen soon arrived at the scene of the accident. Alonzo's car and Todd's car had collided in the eastbound lane of M-57. Both drivers died. Todd's blood alcohol level was 0.21 percent and Alonzo's was 0.24 percent.

The jury found that Todd Savoie was fifty percent at fault for the accident, Bosley's was forty percent at fault, and Solar was ten percent at fault. The jury awarded plaintiffs Rodriguez and Alonzo $770,000 and plaintiffs Savoie $250,000, which was reduced by the percentage of Todd's fault. From the judgment issued after the verdict, the parties appealed and cross appealed, raising numerous issues.

First, defendants Solar and Bosley's claim that the trial court erred in precluding any reference to Alonzo's intoxication. The trial court determined that because there was no evidence that Alonzo's intoxication was a contributing factor in the accident, such evidence was not relevant. Defendants claim that the evidence is relevant to the issues of comparative negligence, proximate cause, the relative degree of fault of the various parties, the amount of damages, and for the impeachment of the testimony of Alonzo's widow regarding Alonzo's character, her knowledge of his activities on the night of the accident, and the amount of support he provided. We agree with defendants that this evidence was relevant and admissible.

The decision whether to admit certain evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion. Shanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 165 Mich.App. 395, 405, 418 N.W.2d 478 (1988). Generally, relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not. MRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401.

Violation of a statute by a plaintiff or a defendant creates a prima facie case from which a jury may draw an inference of negligence. Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 122, 243 N.W.2d 270 (1976). Operating a car on a public highway while intoxicated violates M.C.L. Sec. 257.625; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325. The standards for determining the comparative negligence of a plaintiff are indistinguishable from the standards for determining the negligence of a defendant, and the question of a plaintiff's own negligence for failure to use due care for his own safety is a jury question unless all reasonable minds could not differ or because of some ascertainable public policy consideration. Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 455-461, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987). In addition, proximate cause is an issue for the jury, provided that there is evidence from which reasonable persons could draw a fair inference that the injury was caused by negligence. Taylor v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 139 Mich.App. 389, 395, 362 N.W.2d 293 (1984). It is for the jury to determine whether a violation of a statute was a proximate cause of the accident. See Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 86, 393 N.W.2d 356 (1986).

Here, the evidence of Alonzo's intoxication should not have been excluded. There was sufficient evidence regarding Alonzo's alleged negligence on which reasonable minds could differ and from which the jury could have drawn a fair inference of a causal connection. On a separate record, Dr. Spitz testified regarding the effects that a 0.24 percent blood alcohol level would have on someone driving a car, including long reaction times, slow reflexes, impaired judgment, tunnel vision, inability to assess one's own speed, inability to interpret distance and time, and inability to deal with a sudden emergency. He concluded that Alonzo's intoxication was a contributing cause of the accident. Further, one of the plaintiffs' experts, when testifying in regard to Todd Savoie's intoxication, asserted some of the same effects of alcohol on a person, particularly the impairment of driving ability.

In addition, there were no skid marks at the scene of the accident, and no evidence that Alonzo took any evasive action. Carstensen could see Todd's taillights swerve and then disappear, but did not see any headlights, although a bridge and a dip in the road may have obstructed his view of Alonzo's car. Although no one actually witnessed the collision and saw the actions of Alonzo, from the evidence mentioned above we find that his intoxication was relevant to the issues of comparative negligence, proximate cause, and relative degree of fault of the parties and that evidence of his intoxication was admissible for use in impeachment. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. Accord Anderson v. Harry's Army Surplus, Inc., 117 Mich.App. 601, 608-609, 324 N.W.2d 96 (1982). See also De Voe v. C.A. Hull, Inc., 169 Mich.App. 569, 576-578, 426 N.W.2d 709 (1988). 2

Second, as a consequence of our finding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Alonzo's intoxication, we also would find that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiffs Rodriguez and Alonzo with respect to the issue of comparative negligence. The evidence outlined above, along with all legitimate inferences drawn from that evidence, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of comparative negligence when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. C.H.A.D. Enterprises, Inc., 183 Mich.App. 59, 62, 454 N.W.2d 188 (1990).

Third, plaintiffs Peter and Patricia Savoie claim that the trial court erred in allowing defendant Bosley's to assert comparative negligence as a defense to their dramshop claim, because the negligence asserted was that of Todd, the alleged intoxicated person, and not...

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