Quinton A., Matter of

• Citation: 402 N.E.2d 126,425 N.Y.S.2d 788,49 N.Y.2d 328
• Parties: , 402 N.E.2d 126 In the Matter of QUINTON A. (ANONYMOUS), Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert ABRAMS, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor- Respondent.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1980
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 788

425 N.Y.S.2d 788

49 N.Y.2d 328, 402 N.E.2d 126

In the Matter of QUINTON A. (ANONYMOUS), Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert ABRAMS, as Attorney-General of the State of New York,

Intervenor- Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 20, 1980.

Janet R. Fink, New York City, Charles Schinitsky and Nancy Duncan, Brooklyn, for appellant

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (A. David Stern, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Robert J. Schack and Shirley Adelson Siegel, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), intervenor-respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

We hold that subdivision 2-a of section 753-a of the Family Court Act, which provides for mandatory restrictive placement of the State's most violent juvenile offenders, is constitutional. However, an error in the fact-finding stage of this proceeding mandates reversal of appellant's juvenile delinquency adjudication.

The statute under attack here provides that, where a youth between 14 and 15 years of age is found to have committed a designated felony act involving the infliction of serious physical injury upon a person who is 62 years of age or more, the Family Court is required to order restrictive placement of the juvenile in a secure facility operated by the Division for Youth (Family Ct. Act, § 753-a, subd. 2-a). After a fact-finding hearing, appellant was found to have committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law, § 160.15) and burglary in the second degree (Penal Law, § 140.25), both designated felony acts (Family Ct. Act, § 712, subd. (h)). Since appellant was found to have caused serious physical injury (Penal Law, § 10.00, subd. 10) to a 73-year-old woman, at the the subsequent dispositional hearing Family Court was obliged to order a restrictive placement (Family Ct. Act, § 753-a, subd. 2-a). On this appeal, appellant maintains that the mandatory nature of his restrictive placement denied him due process and equal protection of law.

Before addressing the constitutional challenge, the relevant statutory scheme should be outlined. Alarmed at what was perceived to be a dramatic increase in crime by seemingly remorseless juveniles, and in an attempt to deal more effectively with these juveniles without surrendering them to the criminal justice system, the Legislature enacted the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 (L.1976, ch. 878). The purpose of the juvenile justice system was redefined to direct the courts to consider "the needs and best interests of the (juvenile) as well as the need for protection of the community" (Family Ct. Act, § 711; see People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 687, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520, 350 N.E.2d 906, 908). The act accommodates the needs of the juvenile and society at large by affording the offender intensive rehabilitative treatment, albeit in a setting removed from his previous environment (see, generally, Gottfried, Barsky & Baron, Juvenile Crime: Report of Recommendations and Summary of Findings, NYS Assembly Comm. on Child Care (1976)).

Perhaps the most significant change made by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act is availability of restrictive placements for those juveniles found to have committed a designated felony act. In most cases, restrictive placement is ordered where the court, after a dispositional hearing, finds that the juvenile requires such placement (Family Ct. Act, § 753, subd. 1; § 753-a, subd. 2). But where a juvenile is found to have committed a designated felony act which causes serious physical injury to a person 62 years of age or older, the court must restrictively place the juvenile without regard to the availability of other alternatives for treatment (id., § 753-a, subd. 2-a). The majority of restrictive placements are composed of three distinct phases during which the juvenile is afforded rehabilitative and therapeutic treatment: an initial period of six months to one year in a "secure facility" (Executive Law § 515-a), followed by a second phase of the same duration in a residential facility and concluding with "intensive supervision" until expiration of the three-year placement period. During the placement period, the juvenile may not be discharged from the custody of the Division for Youth, but placement may be extended, after a hearing, until the juvenile reaches 21 years of age (Family Ct. Act, § 753-a, subd. 4; for a more detailed analysis of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 see 45 Fordham L.Rev. 408).

Appellant maintains that the mandatory aspect of subdivision 2-a of section 753-a transgresses both his procedural and substantive rights. This argument proceeds on the premise that during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding the juvenile surrenders some of the basic rights which are available in the criminal justice system. Notable among these are the right to trial by jury (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647), bail (People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, supra ) and indictment (see Matter of Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454, 393 N.E.2d 450). This relinquishment, appellant maintains, imposes a correlative duty on the State to furnish treatment in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the juvenile's individualized needs as well as the needs of the community. The statute, however, renders the presentation of evidence at the dispositional hearing an empty ritual except for the limited purpose of determining the initial duration of secure confinement. This loss of liberty with no evidence that the restrictive placement was necessary for community safety or appropriate for his needs constitutes, according to appellant, a deprivation of due process. ^*

In assessing appellant's due process challenge, it is well to remember that the primary thrust of article 7 of the Family Court Act is treatment and rehabilitation, rather than deterrence or retribution concerns traditionally associated with criminal law (see Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv.L.Rev. 104). Hence, in most cases the Legislature has chosen not to brand the juvenile who commits an act which would otherwise be a crime a criminal, but recognizes that he is a person not fully responsible for his conduct (see Matter of Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 247 N.E.2d 253 revd. on other grounds sub nom. Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; but see L.1978, chs. 478, 481). It has taken a path designed not solely to punish the malefactor but to extinguish the causes of juvenile delinquency through rehabilitation and treatment (see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra ).

At the same time, however, it must be remembered that proceedings such as this are, at the very least, quasi-criminal in nature (Matter of Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679, 224 N.E.2d 102, 105). While supervision and even confinement of the juvenile is aimed primarily at rehabilitation, the incapacitative and deterrent aspects of restrictive placement cannot be disguised. Any restrictive placement necessarily combines, in varying degrees, elements of deterrence, punishment and rehabilitation. Enactment of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, where the Legislature recognized that confinement of juveniles, whose conduct endangers the public safety as a legitimate State concern, acknowledges this fact. Good intentions on the part of the court and flexible vocabulary as to the goals of the juvenile justice system do not alter this reality.

Thus, restrictive placement is a deprivation of liberty which the State may not accomplish without first affording appellant due process of law. But given a finding beyond a reasonable doubt (Family Ct. Act, § 744, subd. (b)), that appellant committed acts which would have been felonious if committed by an adult, appellant's liberty interest has been diminished to the point where utilization of a rehabilitative program requiring restrictive placement is not violative of due process unless the selection of that program lacks a rational basis or its application constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451). Thus, the notion that, in the postadjudicative stage, therapeutic treatment in the least restrictive setting is the cornerstone for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is rejected. It is unnecessary to decide whether there is some right to treatment within the confines of the due process clause (compare Matter of Lavette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23, 316 N.E.2d 314, 317, and Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 367-371, 373 F.2d 451, 452-456, with O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578-579, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2495-2496, 45 L.Ed.2d 396. (Burger, Ch. J., concurring)), as it is undisputed that restrictively placed juveniles are indeed being afforded treatment.

It may properly be taken that the Legislature concluded, in the light of the statistics and other evidence available to it, that the increase in juvenile crime and in crimes of violence against senior citizens were causally related. "There is generally a very strong presumption that 'the Legislature has investigated and found the existence of a situation showing or indicating the need for or desirability of the legislation' " (Matter of Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357, 364, 352 N.Y.S.2d 924, 930, 308 N.E.2d 442, 446, quoting Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878, 209 N.E.2d 539,...