McLeish v. Sony Corp. of America

• Citation: 105 Ill.Dec. 648,152 Ill.App.3d 628,504 N.E.2d 933
• Decision Date: 11 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-3472,85-3472
• Parties: , 105 Ill.Dec. 648, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,342 Rita J. McLEISH and William McLeish, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 933

504 N.E.2d 933

152 Ill.App.3d 628, 105 Ill.Dec. 648,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,342

Rita J. McLEISH and William McLeish, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 85-3472.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fourth Division.

Feb. 11, 1987.

Brenner, Mavrias, Dorn & Alm, Chicago (Bruce Farrel Dorn and Judith A. Matthews, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Ruff, Weidenaar & Reidy, Ltd., Chicago (James A. Davids, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Justice LINN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Rita and William McLeish bring this appeal seeking reversal of a trial court's order dismissing Count II of their three count complaint. In Count II, the McLeishs seek recovery from defendant Sony Corporation of America (Sony) based on a products liability theory. The McLeishs allege that a television manufactured by Sony exploded resulting in a fire which caused serious damage to their home. The trial court dismissed Count II after finding that the McLeishs' action against Sony was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Ill.Rev.Stat.1982, ch. 110, par. 13-213(d).

The McLeishs now appeal asserting that the trial court erred in dismissing their products liability action against Sony.

We affirm.

Background

This appeal is before us following the trial court's ruling that Count II of the McLeishs' complaint fails to state a cause of action under Illinois law. Accordingly, we must accept as true all of the well-pled allegations contained in Count II of the McLeishs' complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Cook v. Askew (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 1055, 341 N.E.2d 13.

Count II of the McLeishs' complaint reveals that the McLeishs' home was severely damaged by a fire which occurred on February 16, 1983. The fire was allegedly caused by the explosion of a Sony television set.

On April 16, 1985, the McLeishs filed a three count complaint against, inter alia, Sony. Count II sought recovery from Sony for the damage caused to the McLeishs' home based on a strict products liability theory.

Pursuant to Sony's motion, the trial court dismissed Count II ruling that because the McLeishs had failed to commence their lawsuit within two years of when they became aware of the damage, their action in strict liability was barred by Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 13-213(d).

The McLeishs now bring this appeal.

Opinion

The outcome of this appeal depends entirely on the construction of a single statutory phrase applicable to lawsuits sounding in strict products liability:

" * * * the plaintiff may bring an action within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of the personal injury, death or property damage, but in no event shall such action be brought more than eight years after the date on which such personal injury, death or property damage occurred." Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 13-213(d).

The McLeishs assert that the use of the term "may" indicates the legislature's intent that "[I]t is not compulsory to file a property damage lawsuit 2 years from the occurrence." Instead, it is the McLeishs' position that the two year limitation included in section 13-213(d) is in fact permissive and that it is the eight year limitation which is compulsory.

In Calumet Country Club v. Roberts Environmental Control Corp. (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 610, 91 Ill.Dec. 267, 483 N.E.2d 613, the court discussed this precise issue. In Calumet, the plaintiff hired the defendant to install some piping. On June 21, 1981, the piping allegedly became separated causing thousands of dollars in water damage. Subsequently, on September 29, 1983, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant alleging, inter alia, that it was the defendant's product which caused the plaintiff's property damage.

The trial court dismissed the action and the Calumet court affirmed. (136 Ill.App.3d 614, 91 Ill.Dec. 267.) The court held that the two year limitation set forth in section 13-213(d) was mandatory where the plaintiff knows, or should have known, that a defective product has caused personal injury or property damage. Specifically, the Calumet court ruled that "Section 13-213(d) clearly sets forth a two-year limitations period based upon a plaintiff's discovery of his cause of action * *...