Matthews v. Quarles, BH-29
| Decision Date | 02 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. BH-29,BH-29 |
| Citation | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2088,504 So.2d 1246 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2088 Thomas D. MATTHEWS and Rosalie Matthews, husband and wife, and Lyman W. Woodruff and Yuko Woodruff, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Paula QUARLES, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Barne J. Morain, Pensacola, for appellants.
Alan C. Sheppard of Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final order granting an easement by way of necessity over the appellants' properties. We affirm.
Appellee Quarles is the present owner of a four-acre tract which she purchased in 1975. In order to reach the nearest public road from her property, she must travel east on a dirt road which crosses appellants' properties. Quarles has used this road since 1975. In September 1983 appellants Matthews and Woodruff obstructed portions of the road across their properties. Quarles brought suit for a permanent road easement across the two properties and an injunction to prohibit either appellant from blocking the road. The trial judge granted appellee an easement by way of necessity over the lands of the appellants and an injunction. This appeal followed.
Appellants claim the trial court erred in granting the appellee an easement by way of necessity over the lands of the appellants. We disagree and affirm.
Florida has specifically adopted the common law easement by way of necessity in Section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983). This statute provides as follows:
Common law, statutory easements defined and determined.
(1) Implied grant of way of necessity.--The common law rule of an implied grant of a way of necessity is hereby recognized, specifically adopted and clarified. Such an implied grant exists where a person has heretofore or hereafter grants lands to which there is no accessible right-of-way except over his land, or has heretofore or hereafter retains land which is inaccessible except over the land which he conveys. In such instances a right-of-way is presumed to have been granted or reserved. Such an implied grant or easement in lands or estates exists where there is no other reasonable and practicable way of egress or ingress and same is reasonably necessary for the beneficial use or enjoyment of the part granted or reserved. An implied grant arises only where a unity of title exists from a common source other than the original grant from the state or United States; provided, however, that where there is a common source of title subsequent to the original grant from the state or United States, the right of the dominant tenement shall not be terminated if title of either the dominant or servient tenement has been or should be transferred for nonpayment of taxes either by foreclosure, reversion or otherwise.
In order for the owner of a dominant tenement to be entitled to a way of necessity over the servient tenement, (1) both properties must at one time have been owned by the same party, (2) the common source of title must have created the situation causing the dominant tenement to become landlocked, and (3) at the time the common source of title created the problem the servient tenement must have had access to a public road. Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, B.V., 404 So.2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Hanna v. Means, 319 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975). Such requirements are necessary because an easement by way of necessity is founded upon an implied grant or implied reservation which arises from the supposed intention of the parties that the party conveying or reserving the landlocked parcel intends to convey or retain whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of the property conveyed or reserved.
All of these elements of the common law way of necessity have been satisifed in the present case. First, both appellee's and appellants' properties were owned by a J.W. Daw in 1938. Second, J.W. Daw created the situation causing the four acres to be landlocked. Third, at the time J.W. Daw created the situation, the servient tenement did have access to a public road. Thus, since 1938, a common law way of necessity has existed over appellants' properties.
However, appellants argue that this easement has been terminated. Appellants...
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Easton v. Appler, 87-2995
...is 125 feet in width. Granting an easement of necessity where there is an alternative point of access is error. Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (easement by necessity cannot be implied where there is other reasonable access to the property); § 704.01, Fla. Stat. (198......
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Dupont v. Whiteside, 98-874
...by way of necessity is founded upon an implied grant which arises from the supposed intention of the parties. See Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, this presumed intention is not that the parties intended convenient access, only that it is presumed that a par......
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Parham v. Reddick, 88-655
...as between several adequate means of access even though one means of access may be more convenient than another." Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). See also Moran v. Brawner, 519 So.2d at 1133; Dixon v. Feaster, 448 So.2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Roy v. Euro-Hol......
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Enzor v. Rasberry
...It was not the 1964 conveyance that "created the situation causing the dominant tenement to become landlocked." Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). After the conveyance as before, access from the parcel purchased from Rasberry in 1964 to the nearest public road wa......
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Real property actions
...have had access to a public road. Source Enzor v. Rasberry , 648 So.2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). See Also 1. Matthews v. Quarles , 504 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). §13:60.2.2 Elements of Cause of Action — 2nd DCA To prove an easement of necessity, the claimant must show that (1......