Littlefield v. SC FORESTRY COM'N
| Decision Date | 20 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 25036.,25036. |
| Citation | 523 S.E.2d 781,337 S.C. 348 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Catherine LITTLEFIELD, Vivian Martin, and Jeremy James, for themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. SOUTH CAROLINA FORESTRY COMMISSION, South Carolina Department of Mental Health, both as representatives of all agencies of the State of South Carolina; Richard Eckstrom, in his official capacity as Treasurer of the State of South Carolina, South Carolina Budget and Control Board Division of Human Resources, Respondents. |
Armand Derfner, Peter Wilborn, and Ray P. McClain, all of Charleston, for appellants.
Vance J. Bettis, of Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis; Edwin E. Evans, Office of General Counsel, S.C. Budget and Control Board; and Samuel L. Wilkins, Office of Human Resources, S.C. Budget and Control Board, all of Columbia, for respondents.
At issue in this appeal is the manner in which state agencies calculate pay for unused annual leave of terminated, deceased, and retiring state employees. The methodology employed by state agencies differs depending upon whether the state employee is terminated, retires, or dies. The circuit court upheld the agencies' methodology, finding no equal protection violation in the disparate treatment accorded different employees. The court also denied employees' motion for class certification. We reverse.
Employees in this case are Catherine Littlefield and Vivian Martin, former employees of the South Carolina Forestry Commission.1 Littlefield was employed by the Commission from 1973 until May 1996, when she was laid off. In January 1996, Littlefield carried over 324.5 hours of annual leave.2 Between January and May 1996 (at which time she was terminated), Littlefield earned 97.5 more hours3 of annual leave. Prior to receiving notification of her termination in 1996, Littlefield used 20 hours of annual leave. Upon her termination, the Forestry Commission deducted the 20 hours leave she took in 1996 from her maximum allowable carryover of 351 hours, and paid her for 331 hours. She claims the 20 hours of annual leave she took prior to her termination in 1996 should not have been deducted from her maximum carryover hours, but should simply have been counted as hours earned and used in her final year of employment.
Martin was employed 40 hours per week by Commission from 1985 until she was laid off in October 1993.4 In January 1993, she carried forward 45 days (360 hours) of unused annual leave. Between January and October 1993, she earned another 100 hours of annual leave, of which she used 94.5 hours. Upon termination, she was paid 265.5 hours (360 hours minus 94.5 hours = 265.5 hours) of annual leave. She claims she was entitled to be compensated for 360 hours of annual leave, without regard to the 94.5 hours annual leave earned and taken in 1993, prior to her termination.
The method of calculation of termination pay for state employees is set forth in S.C.Code Ann. § 8-11-620, which provides:
Upon termination from state employment, an employee may take both annual leave and a lump-sum payment for unused leave, but in no event shall such combination exceed forty-five days in a calendar year except as provided for in § 8-11-610.5 If an employee dies, his legal representative shall be entitled to a lump-sum payment for his unused leave, not to exceed forty-five working days, except as provided for in § 8-11-610. Upon retirement from state employment or upon the death of an employee, a lump-sum payment will be made for unused leave, not to exceed forty-five days, unless a higher maximum is approved under the provisions of § 8-11-610, and without regard to the earned leave taken during the calendar year in which the employee retires.6 (Emphasis supplied).
State agencies interpret this statute to mean that, if state employment is terminated for reasons other than death or retirement, the employee is paid a maximum of 45 days annual leave upon termination, less any amounts of annual leave taken by the employee during the calendar year in which his or her employment terminates. If an employee dies or retires, however, the agencies do not deduct annual leave taken during the final calendar year from the amount carried forward from the previous year.7
The net effect of agencies' interpretation is that if an employee is terminated (as opposed to dying or retiring), and has used any annual leave during the final calendar year of employment, the employee's carryover account from the previous year is reduced by the number of days annual leave used during the year of termination.8 Employees contend that to essentially "dock" them twice for leave used in their final year of employment, while not doing so in the case of retirees and decedents, results in an equal protection violation. We agree.
To satisfy equal protection, a legislative classification must bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be achieved; members of the class must be treated alike under similar circumstances; and the classification must rest on some rational basis. Walker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 320 S.C. 496, 466 S.E.2d 346 (1995). When the Court considers the constitutionality of a statute passed by the General Assembly, it construes the statute so as to render it valid if possible. University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 180, 139 S.E.2d 771 (1964).
We find no rational basis for the differential treatment accorded terminated employees versus retiring or deceased employees. Initially, contrary to the construction placed upon it by agencies, Section 8-11-620 does not state that decedents' estates are to be compensated without regard to annual leave taken in the final year of employment; the statute specifically refers only to retirees in that regard. Accordingly, there is no rational basis for agencies to treat decedents differently than other terminated employees.
Moreover, we find no rational basis for the agencies' distinction between retirees and non-retirees. In the present case, appellant Littlefield worked for the Forestry Commission for 23 years when she was laid off due to a reduction in force. There is no indication in the record that her termination was in any way volitional, or that, but for the layoff, she would not have reached full retirement. To treat employees who are involuntarily laid off after 23 years of service differently than employees who manage to avoid such a layoff and reach retirement is simply irrational. We agree with Employees that agencies' construction of Section 8-11-620 results in an equal protection violation. We find a proper interpretation of Section 8-11-620 simply means that upon termination, an employee may not use or be paid for more than 45 days annual leave, but that annual leave which was accrued and used during the final year prior to termination may not be deducted from the amounts of annual leave carried forward from the prior year. Such an interpretation of the statute results in no equal protection violation, and renders the statute constitutional. See University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 180 139 S.E.2d 771 (1964)
(when this Court considers the constitutionality of a statute passed by the General Assembly, we construe the statute so as to render it valid if possible). Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's ruling on this issue.
The circuit court denied the...
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