Anderson v. Demolition Dynamics, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 February 2000 |
Docket Number | No. COA98-1350.,COA98-1350. |
Citation | 136 NC App. 603,525 S.E.2d 471 |
Parties | David A. ANDERSON, Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Gary R. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. DEMOLITION DYNAMICS, INC., Defendant. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Twiggs, Abrams, Strickland & Trehy, P.A., by Douglas B. Abrams, Raleigh, and Iraelson, Salsbury, Clements & Beckman, by Stewart M. Salsbury and Leslie Hayes Russo, Baltimore, MD, for plaintiff-appellant.
Smith, Helms, Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by Jon Berkelhammer, Andrew S. Chamberlin, and Manning A. Connors, III, Greensboro, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff David A. Anderson, ancillary administrator of the estate of Gary R. Anderson (decedent), appeals the trial court's grant of defendant Demolition Dynamics, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Pertinent facts and procedural history include the following: Plaintiff initiated the instant wrongful death suit 22 August 1996. Decedent died 19 August 1995 as a result of injuries suffered when he fell from an abandoned conveyor structure in a quarry. At the time, decedent and several employees of defendant were preparing the structure for demolition by means of explosives.
On the basis of the foregoing, defendant subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant 2 July 1998. Plaintiff timely appealed.
The Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), N.C.G.S. § 97-10.1 (1991), provides:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.
In addition, this Court has stated that an employee's remedies are exclusive as against the employer where the injury is caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the exclusivity provision of the Act precludes a claim for ordinary negligence, even when the employer's conduct constitutes willful or wanton negligence.
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1990). A summary judgment movant bears the burden of showing either that (1) an essential element of the non-movant's claim is nonexistent; (2) the non-movant is unable to produce evidence which supports an essential element of its claim; or, (3) the non-movant cannot overcome affirmative defenses raised in contravention of its claims. Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 120 N.C.App. 96, 99, 461 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 344 N.C. 676, 477 S.E.2d 150 (1996). In ruling on such motion, the trial court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, accepting the latter's asserted facts as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. Kennedy v. Guilford Tech. Community College, 115 N.C.App. 581, 583, 448 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1994).
Plaintiff contends the record reflects a genuine factual issue as to whether decedent was an employee of defendant. We agree.
It is undisputed that decedent was employed by a separate but related company, D.H. Griffin Wrecking Company (Griffin Wrecking). D.H. Griffin, Sr., (Mr. Griffin), his son, and Steve Pettigrew (Pettigrew), a former co-worker of decedent, formed defendant company to provide Griffin Wrecking with explosive demolition capabilities. The two companies often worked together on demolition projects, and decedent likewise was regularly involved with such projects.
Defendant maintains decedent, at the time of his death, was an employee of both Griffin Wrecking and defendant and that plaintiff's claim alleging negligence by defendant is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. However, plaintiff contends decedent was solely an employee of Griffin Wrecking and that plaintiff's wrongful death action against defendant may therefore proceed.
[S]ituations may exist under which an employee may properly be considered to be in the joint employment of two employers so that both become jointly responsible to pay compensation if the employee is injured by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment.
Collins v. Edwards, 21 N.C.App. 455, 458, 204 S.E.2d 873, 876, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 589, 206 S.E.2d 862 (1974). Our courts utilize the following three-prong "special employer" test to determine whether an employee may be deemed to have joint employers for purposes of the Act. See id. at 459, 204 S.E.2d at 876.
When a general employer lends an employee to a special employer, the special employer becomes liable for workmen's compensation only if:
204 S.E.2d at 876. For purposes of our ruling herein, we assume arguendo that the second prong of the special employer test has been met. However, we conclude the record reveals genuine issues of material fact as to the remaining prongs.
In the case subjudice, defendant makes no argument nor does the record reflect that decedent entered into a written employment contract with defendant. Nonetheless, defendant asserts decedent "expressly accepted... employment" by defendant for the quarry demolition job which resulted in decedent's death. Defendant points to evidence that decedent, after being contacted by Pettigrew, sought permission from Mr. Griffin to work at the site and maintains that by coming to the site, decedent "accepted that assignment." These actions standing alone do not conclusively satisfy the contract for employment prong of the special employer test.
Moreover, additional evidence was presented through the deposition testimony of Mr. Griffin, Pettigrew, and decedent's widow tending to show the following:
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