Albertsons v Kirkingburg

• Decision Date: 22 June 1999
• Docket Number: 98591
• Citation: 119 S.Ct. 2162,527 U.S. 555,144 L.Ed.2d 518
• Parties: 119 S.Ct. 2162 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESALBERTSONS, INC., Petitioner v. HALLIE KIRKINGBURG ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

527 U.S. 555

119 S.Ct. 2162

144 L.Ed.2d 518

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 98-591

ALBERTSONS, INC., Petitioner v. HALLIE KIRKINGBURG

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 1999]

Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.*

The question posed is whether, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), an employer who requires as a job qualification that an employee meet an otherwise applicable federal safety regulation must justify enforcing the regulation solely because its standard may be waived in an individual case. We answer no.

I

In August 1990, petitioner, Albertsons, Inc., a grocery-store chain with supermarkets in several States, hired respondent, Hallie Kirkingburg, as a truckdriver based at its Portland, Oregon, warehouse. Kirkingburg had more than a decade's driving experience and performed well when Albertsons' transportation manager took him on a road test.

Before starting work, Kirkingburg was examined to see if he met federal vision standards for commercial truckdrivers. 143 F.3d 1228, 1230-1231 (CA9 1998). For many decades the Department of Transportation or its predecessors has been responsible for devising these standards for individuals who drive commercial vehicles in interstate commerce.1 Since 1971, the basic vision regulation has required corrected distant visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye and distant binocular acuity of at least 20/40. See 35 Fed. Reg. 6458, 6463 (1970); 57 Fed. Reg. 6793, 6794 (1992); 49 CFR § 391.41(b)(10) (1998).2 Kirkingburg, however, suffers from amblyopia, an uncorrectable condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in his left eye and monocular vision in effect.3 Despite Kirkingburg's weak left eye, the doctor erroneously certified that he met the DOT's basic vision standard, and Albertsons hired him.4

In December 1991, Kirkingburg injured himself on the job and took a leave of absence. Before returning to work in November 1992, Kirkingburg went for a further physical as required by the company. This time, the examining physician correctly assessed Kirkingburg's vision and explained that his eyesight did not meet the basic DOT standards. The physician, or his nurse, told Kirkingburg that in order to be legally qualified to drive, he would have to obtain a waiver of its basic vision standards from the DOT. See 143 F.3d, at 1230; App. 284-285. The doctor was alluding to a scheme begun in July 1992 for giving DOT certification to applicants with deficient vision who had three years of recent experience driving a commercial vehicle without a license suspension or revocation, involvement in a reportable accident in which the applicant was cited for a moving violation, conviction for certain driving-related offenses, citation for certain serious traffic violations, or more than two convictions for any other moving violations. A waiver applicant had to agree to have his vision checked annually for deterioration, and to report certain information about his driving experience to the Federal Highway Administration, the agency within the DOT responsible for overseeing the motor carrier safety regulations. See 57 Fed. Reg. 31458, 31460-61 (1992).5 Kirkingburg applied for a waiver, but because he could not meet the basic DOT vision standard Albertsons fired him from his job as a truckdriver.6 In early 1993, after he had left Albertsons, Kirkingburg received a DOT waiver, but Albertsons refused to rehire him. See 143 F.3d, at 1231.

Kirkingburg sued Albertsons, claiming that firing him violated the ADA.7 Albertsons moved for summary judgment solely on the ground that Kirkingburg was "not 'otherwise qualified' to perform the job of truck driver with or without reasonable accommodation." App. 39-40; see id., at 119. The District Court granted the motion, ruling that Albertsons had reasonably concluded that Kirkingburg was not qualified without an accommodation because he could not, as admitted, meet the basic DOT vision standards. The court held that giving Kirkingburg time to get a DOT waiver was not a required reasonable accommodation because the waiver program was "a flawed experiment that has not altered the DOT vision requirements." Id., at 120.

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. In addition to pressing its claim that Kirkingburg was not otherwise qualified, Albertsons for the first time on appeal took the position that it was entitled to summary judgment because Kirkingburg did not have a disability within the meaning of the Act. See id., at 182-185. The Court of Appeals considered but rejected the new argument, concluding that because Kirkingburg had presented "uncontroverted evidence" that his vision was effectively monocular, he had demonstrated that "the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see." 143 F.3d, at 1232. That difference in manner, the court held, was sufficient to establish disability. Ibid.

The Court of Appeals then addressed the ground upon which the District Court had granted summary judgment, acknowledging that Albertsons consistently required its truckdrivers to meet the DOT's basic vision standards and that Kirkingburg had not met them (and indeed could not). The court recognized that the ADA allowed Albertsons to establish a reasonable job-related vision standard as a prerequisite for hiring and that Albertsons could rely on Government regulations as a basis for setting its standard. The court held, however, that Albertsons could not use compliance with a Government regulation as the justification for its vision requirement because the waiver program, which Albertsons disregarded, was "a lawful and legitimate part of the DOT regulatory scheme." Id., at 1236. The Court of Appeals conceded that Albertsons was free to set a vision standard different from that mandated by the DOT, but held that under the ADA, Albertsons would have to justify its independent standard as necessary to prevent " 'a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.' " Ibid. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)). Although the court suggested that Albertsons might be able to make such a showing on remand, 143 F.3d, at 1236, it ultimately took the position that the company could not, interpreting Albertsons' rejection of DOT waivers as flying in the face of the judgment about safety already embodied in the DOT's decision to grant them, id., at 1237.

Judge Rymer dissented. She contended that Albertsons had properly relied on the basic DOT vision standards in refusing to accept waivers because, when Albertsons fired Kirkingburg, the waiver program did not rest upon "a rule or a regulation with the force of law," but was merely a way of gathering data to use in deciding whether to refashion the still-applicable vision standards. Id., at 1239.

II

Though we need not speak to the issue whether Kirkingburg was an individual with a disability in order to resolve this case, that issue falls within the first question on which we granted certiorari,8 525 U.S. ___ (1999), and we think it worthwhile to address it briefly in order to correct three missteps the Ninth Circuit made in its discussion of the matter. Under the ADA:

"The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-

"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

"(B) a record of such an impairment; or

"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

We are concerned only with the first definition.9 There is no dispute either that Kirkingburg's amblyopia is a physical impairment within the meaning of the Act, see 29 CFR § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998) (defining "physical impairment" as "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more of the following body systems: ... special sense organs"), or that seeing is one of his major life activities, see §1630.2(i) (giving seeing as an example of a major life activity).10 The question is whether his monocular vision alone "substantially limits" Kirkingburg's seeing.

In giving its affirmative answer, the Ninth Circuit relied on a regulation issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, defining "substantially limits" as "[s]ignificantly restrict[s] as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." §1630.2(j)(ii). The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see" because, "[t]o put it in its simplest terms [he] sees using only one eye; most people see using two." 143 F.3d, at 1232. The Ninth Circuit majority also relied on a recent Eighth Circuit decision, whose holding it characterized in similar terms: "It was enough to warrant a finding of disability ... that the plaintiff could see out of only one eye: the manner in which he performed the major life activity of seeing was different." Ibid. (characterizing Doane v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-628 (1997)).11

But in several respects the Ninth Circuit was too quick to find a disability. First, although the EEOC definition of "substantially limits" cited by the Ninth Circuit requires a "significant restrict[ion]" in an individual's manner of performing a major life activity, the court appeared willing to settle for a mere difference. By transforming "significant restriction" into "difference," the court undercut the fundamental statutory requirement that only impairments causing "substantial limitat[ions]" in individuals' ability to perform major life activities constitute disabilities. While the Act "addresses substantial limitations on major life activities,...